Copyright (c) 2009 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/raul_caruso Recent documents in Raul Caruso en-us Sun, 11 Oct 2009 12:49:16 PDT 3600 http://works.bepress.com/raul_caruso/30 http://works.bepress.com/raul_caruso/30 Sun, 06 Sep 2009 00:56:47 PDT What is the broad impact of sport participation and sport activities in a society? The first aim of this paper is tackling this crucial point by studying whether or not there is a relationship between sport participation and crime. A panel dataset have been constructed for the twenty Italian regions over the period 1997-2003. The impact of spot participation on different type of crimes has been studied. Results show that: (i) there is a robust negative association between sport participation and property crime; (ii) There is a robust negative association between sport participation and juvenile crime; (iii) There is a positive association between sport participation and violent crime, but it is only weakly significant. Raul Caruso Sport Economics http://works.bepress.com/raul_caruso/29 http://works.bepress.com/raul_caruso/29 Thu, 21 May 2009 03:17:26 PDT This paper finds an empirical evidence that al Qaeda behaves as a contest organizer rewarding a prize to candidate extremist groups. Would-be terrorists must then compete with each other to prove their commitment and ability. Hence to maximize their own probability of winning the prize, each group (maximizes its effort). In particular, in the presence of costless information each candidate group can observe the results of attacks of other groups. Therefore, each group tries to make attacks at least equally destructive as the foregoing attacks. The testable implication is that: the number of victims of terrorist attacks is associated with the number of victims of past attacks. Resulting evidence confirms the hypothesis. However, results show that al Qaeda-style jihadist terrorist activity depends also upon grievance for poverty and socio-economic conditions. Raul Caruso Terrorism http://works.bepress.com/raul_caruso/28 http://works.bepress.com/raul_caruso/28 Mon, 23 Mar 2009 04:22:32 PDT This paper is intended to complement the existing literature on civil wars. First, it presents a simple theoretical model of conflict which defines a two-sector economy. In a contested sector two agents struggle to appropriate the maximum possible fraction of a contestable output. In an uncontested sector, they hold secure property rights over the production of some goods. Agents split their resource endowment between 'butter', 'guns' and 'ice-cream'. Following the theoretical insights the empirical analysis focuses on the relationship between civil wars and different sectors of the economy. In particular, a panel probit specification shows that the incidence of a civil war decreases in the size of manufacturing sector. [forthcoming on Defence and Peace Economics] Raul Caruso Economics of Conflict http://works.bepress.com/raul_caruso/27 http://works.bepress.com/raul_caruso/27 Fri, 12 Dec 2008 03:43:12 PST This shor paper highlights some tentative policy implications of economic theories of conflict. A particular focus is given to african war-torn economies. Raul Caruso Economics of Conflict http://works.bepress.com/raul_caruso/26 http://works.bepress.com/raul_caruso/26 Fri, 21 Nov 2008 07:08:41 PST This short paper aims to find an empirical evidence that al Qaeda behaves as a contest organizer rewarding an indivisible prize - namely, official membership and economic rewards - to candidate extremists groups. Would-be terrorists must then compete with each other to prove their commitment and ability. Hence to maximize their own probability of winning the prize, each group (maximizes its effort) tries to make attacks at least equally destructive as the foregoing attacks. The testable implication is that: the number of victims must depend upon the number of victims of past attacks. Resulting evidence confirms the hypothesis. At the same time, results show that al Qaeda-style terrorist activity depends also upon grievance for poverty and socio-economic conditions. Raul Caruso Terrorism http://works.bepress.com/raul_caruso/25 http://works.bepress.com/raul_caruso/25 Sat, 20 Sep 2008 15:14:17 PDT [italian]Oggetto di questo saggio è la teoria 'triangolare' delle interazioni sociali di Kenneth Boulding. La riscoperta della riflessione teorica di Boulding in merito alle interazioni sociali è particolarmente importante in questi anni in cui la letteratura economica sta ponendo grande enfasi sul ruolo delle istituzioni sia formali sia informali nello sviluppo e nella crescita economica. L'economista di Liverpool anticipava molti degli elementi che adesso si ritrovano nelle moderne teorie economiche delle istituzioni, del capitale sociale, della reciprocità e dei beni relazionali. [English]The topic of this essay is the 'triangular theory" of social interactions as expounded by Kenneth Boulding. Rediscovering the theoretical reflections of Kenneth Boulding about social interactions is even more important nowadays when economists are emphasizing the role of both formal and informal institutions in economic development and growth. In fact, he pioneered the study of elements which are commonly considered in the economic theories of institutions, social capital, reciprocity and relational goods. [forthcoming on 'Storia del Pensiero Economico'] Raul Caruso General Economics http://works.bepress.com/raul_caruso/24 http://works.bepress.com/raul_caruso/24 Sat, 19 Jul 2008 15:08:57 PDT The article applies insights of contest theory to al Qaeda's recruitment process. Al Qaeda can be considered as a contest organizer rewarding an indivisible prize, namely, official membership and economic rewards, to candidate extremist groups. Would-be terrorists must then compete with each other to prove their commitment and ability. Candidate terrorist groups compete by maximizing their efforts to win the prize, i.e. maximizing the number of casualties. Eventually, al Qaeda reaps the benefits of the most successful attacks in the form of a huge return in terms of image, while paying a limited price. If correct, this model carries at least two important implications for counterterrorist policy. First, inasmuch as al Qaeda's main incentive to prompt competition is through spreading common knowledge about the existence of the prize, action should be undertaken to falsify and confuse the kind of information that aspirant terrorists receive. Second, because al Qaeda's reward is as much ideological as economic, efforts should be dedicated to track down and halt financial flows before they are used to reward the applicants Raul Caruso Terrorism http://works.bepress.com/raul_caruso/23 http://works.bepress.com/raul_caruso/23 Tue, 15 Jul 2008 14:46:40 PDT Abstract: L'obiettivo di questo lavoro è di applicare un modello economico, la teoria dei contest, per comprendere il processo con cui al Qaeda recluta e premia gli aspiranti terroristi. In base al modello, al Qaeda può essere considerato come l'organizzatore di una gara che attribuisce un premio indivisibile Poiché l'obiettivo di al Qaeda è di diffondere il terrore, gli sforzi di un potenziale affiliato possono essere 'misurati' osservando il numero di vittime che riesce a causare. Di conseguenza, la crescita e la diffusione degli attacchi terroristici su scala globale può essere spiegata come il tentativo da parte di gruppi in competizione di ottenere la membership. Il modello ha poi importanti implicazioni a livello di policy per il controterrorismo. In primo luogo, dato che l'incentivo principale per suscitare la competizione tra i gruppi è diffondere un sapere comune circa l'entità del premio, si può suggerire di intraprendere azioni finalizzate a falsificare o almeno confondere il tipo di informazioni ricevute dagli aspiranti terroristi. In secondo luogo, poiché la ricompensa di al Qaeda è tanto ideologica quanto economica, la prescrizione che ne segue consiste nell'impedire che il premio venga effettivamente riscosso. Raul Caruso Terrorism http://works.bepress.com/raul_caruso/22 http://works.bepress.com/raul_caruso/22 Fri, 02 May 2008 15:00:52 PDT Il punto di partenza di questo breve saggio è la consapevolezza che - in termini economici - il calcio ha una natura 'multipla'. Esso presenta sia alcune caratteristiche di bene di mercato sia le caratteristiche di un bene relazionale. Nel contempo, il calcio può presentare anche caratteristiche tipiche dei rapporti di coercizione. Il genus specifico del calcio è da ritrovare nella combinazione delle diverse caratteristiche. Non è infatti possibile distinguerle in maniera netta, ma esse coesistono nella produzione del prodotto calcio a tutti i livelli. Raul Caruso Sport Economics http://works.bepress.com/raul_caruso/20 http://works.bepress.com/raul_caruso/20 Wed, 23 Jan 2008 05:03:23 PST [ENGLISH]This work presents original results regarding the relationship between economic life and organised crime in Italy. This empirical study is underpinned by some theoretical insights drawn from conflict and rent-seeking theories. Then the paper presents a panel analysis including the twenty Italian regions over the period 1997-2003. The results show that : (a) a significant positive association does exist between investments in real estate sector and the index of organised crime; (b) a significant positive association does exist between public investments and the index of organised crime index; (c) a significant negative association does exist between social protection expenditures and the index of organised crime; (d) a significant negative association does exist between investments in private investments and the index of organised crime. [ITALIAN] In questo lavoro si presentano risultati nuovi inerenti al legame tra sistema economico e criminalità organizzata. Sulla base di alcuni intuizioni teoriche derivate dalle teoria economiche del rent-seeking e dei conflitti, è stata costruita un'analisi panel per le 20 regioni italiane nel periodo 1997-2003. I risultati dell'analisi empirica mostrano che: (a) esiste un'associazione positiva significativa tra gli investimenti nel settore delle costruzioni e l'indice di criminalità organizzata; (b) Esiste una associazione positiva significativa tra gli investimenti della pubblica amministrazione e l'indice di criminalità organizzata; (c) Esiste un'associazione negativa significativa tra la spesa per protezione sociale e l'indice di criminalità organizzata; (d) Esiste un'associazione negativa significativa tra gli investimenti in industria in senso stretto e l'indice di criminalità organizzata. Raul Caruso Economics of Crime