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<title>Peter B. Rutledge</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2008  All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/peter_rutledge</link>
<description>Recent documents in Peter B. Rutledge</description>
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<title>Whither Arbitration</title>
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<pubDate>Thu, 11 Oct 2007 15:20:24 PDT</pubDate>
<description>Over the past several decades, scholars and policymakers have debated the future of arbitration in the United States.  Those debates have taken on new significance in the present Congress, which is considering a variety of reform proposals.  Among the most widely watched are ones that would prohibit the enforcement of predispute arbitration clauses in employment, consumer and franchise contracts.  Reviewing the available empirical literature, the paper explains how many of the assumptions driving the arbitration reform debate are unproven at best and flatly wrong at worst.  It then tries to sketch out the economic impact of any move by Congress to limit arbitration in certain fields.  The effect, I submit, would be to harm the very consumers and employees whom Congress is trying to protect.  While arbitration certainly can be refined on the edges and more empirical research needs to be done, advocates for reform simply have not made their case.</description>

<author>Peter B. Rutledge</author>


<category>Dispute Resolution</category>

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<title>Arbitration and Article III</title>
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<pubDate>Fri, 27 Jul 2007 08:12:33 PDT</pubDate>
<description>This Article is part of a broader research agenda that studies the relationship between arbitration and constitutional law.  Taking its cue from the recent Canadian Softwood Lumber dispute over the constitutionality of NAFTA's dispute resolution boards, this paper asks a broader question:  "Why is arbitration compatible with Article III?"  Under the traditional account, parties waive their right to an Article III forum, thereby eliminating any Article III issue.  Accounts grounded in waiver, however, fail to grapple adequately with the significant structural concerns presented by arbitration.  Instead, this paper defends the need for a more robust theory, one that accounts for these structural concerns and can address the novel constitutional challenges presented by a variety of arbitral schemes ranging from domestic employment disputes to international commercial ones.  Drawing on appellate review theory, the paper proposes a bi-polar matrix for assessing the constitutionality of arbitration - an approach that comports with the core principles of the theory and also enhances its explanatory value.  The paper concludes by applying this modified appellate review theory to a variety of contexts in arbitration law - including international commercial arbitration and NAFTA arbitration.</description>

<author>Peter B. Rutledge</author>


<category>Constitutional Law</category>

<category>Dispute Resolution</category>

<category>International Law</category>

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