Copyright (c) 2009 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/peter_cserne Recent documents in Péter Cserne en-us Tue, 10 Nov 2009 05:24:28 PST 3600 http://works.bepress.com/peter_cserne/50 http://works.bepress.com/peter_cserne/50 Fri, 23 Oct 2009 03:07:33 PDT This is a chapter of a multiple-authored 3000 page doctrinal commentary on the Hungarian constitution which discusses the duty to contribute to public revenues, i.e. the constitutional power to tax, as regulated in the constitutional and interpreted by the Hungarian Constitutional Court since 1990. Péter Cserne Constitutional law http://works.bepress.com/peter_cserne/49 http://works.bepress.com/peter_cserne/49 Fri, 23 Oct 2009 03:00:30 PDT This chapter is to appear in the Elgar Encyclopedia on contract Law (2nd ed), in the volume on contact law. Its purpose is to provide an overview of the economic analyses of contractual duress. The focus will be on the distinctive features of the economic perspective on the duress doctrine, as developed in the theoretical literature of law and economics. Along with the results of economic analysis, the legal background and some non-economic theories of duress are also briefly presented. Péter Cserne http://works.bepress.com/peter_cserne/48 http://works.bepress.com/peter_cserne/48 Thu, 01 Oct 2009 10:48:06 PDT Péter Cserne Jurisprudence and philosophy of law http://works.bepress.com/peter_cserne/47 http://works.bepress.com/peter_cserne/47 Fri, 11 Sep 2009 02:14:57 PDT Péter Cserne Law and economics: general and methodology http://works.bepress.com/peter_cserne/46 http://works.bepress.com/peter_cserne/46 Fri, 11 Sep 2009 02:10:08 PDT Péter Cserne Law and economics: general and methodology Jurisprudence and philosophy of law http://works.bepress.com/peter_cserne/45 http://works.bepress.com/peter_cserne/45 Mon, 31 Aug 2009 07:30:51 PDT The way we nowadays think about "immoral" contracts is based on a number of assumptions. One of these assumptions concerns the relative isolation of law and extra-legal standards. This view, however, is not new or even modern: to a large extent, it can be traced back to Roman law that has been both praised and condemned for this relative separation.In this paper we venture into the problematic of "immoral" transactions by combining historical, doctrinal and economic analysis. Focusing on cases and doctrines in ancient Roman law, our goal is to show how Roman lawyers found reasonable answers to issues which, in spite of obvious differences in economic and cultural context, can teach some lessons for our modern understanding of contract regulation. After a brief overview of economic analyses of law and morality and some methodological problems of the economic analysis of legal history, we turn to the historical dynamics of the Roman doctrine of immoral contracts. We reconstruct how and why the term immorality (contra bones mores) became a general clause of Roman law in a relatively short time; discuss what kind of cases were solved with reference to this clause; and analyse how this clause shows the practical rationality of Roman lawyers. Finally, we raise some substantive and methodological points where this historical case can provide insights for the economic analysis of the interactions of law and morality. Péter Cserne Law and economics: general and methodology Contract law http://works.bepress.com/peter_cserne/44 http://works.bepress.com/peter_cserne/44 Thu, 28 May 2009 11:17:08 PDT An important characteristic of necessity cases is that ex ante and sometimes even ex post both parties have an interest in upholding the contract. From an economic perspective, the policy objective of regulating necessity is to give optimal incentives for precaution, search and rescue. These incentive effects have been widely discussed in the law and economics literature, the received view being that price control based on the costs of the rescue plus a small reward provide optimal incentives. In this paper we argue that the received view is unwarranted. Our model suggests that in many cases the socially efficient contract price is higher than the rescue costs. To be sure, due to serious information problems the practical implementation of this theoretical optimum is much more difficult than the cost-plus price setting supported by the received view. While the policy implications of our model are rather tentative we suggest that the judicial costs of estimating policy variables should be taken into account. A second objective of this paper is to argue for an economic interpretation of the term 'necessity' in contract law. Instead of various substantive criteria suggested in the philosophical literature we suggest defining the term by working backwards from the possible remedies. The excuse of necessity should be available for contracting parties when, all things considered, a judicial control (modification) of the contract price is desirable. Necessity is thus "defined" by what courts can and should do. Péter Cserne Contract law http://works.bepress.com/peter_cserne/41 http://works.bepress.com/peter_cserne/41 Fri, 03 Apr 2009 06:49:19 PDT Law and legal science have played a significant, but hitherto underestimated role in Weber's life, both professional and non-academic. Trained as a lawyer, he drew upon an existing vocabulary of legal scholarship and adapted from it, more or less implicitly a large number of conceptual and methodological tools for his sociological projects. The goal of this paper is to identify and evaluate these complex links between Weberian sociology and contemporary legal scholarship, with special emphasis on Jhering's and Jellinek's theories. (This paper is a significantly revised Hungarian version of my 2005 English language essay on Weber.) Péter Cserne History of ideas http://works.bepress.com/peter_cserne/30 http://works.bepress.com/peter_cserne/30 Mon, 23 Jun 2008 02:14:50 PDT In this paper I discuss the role of inter- and multidisciplinary research in jurisprudence and legal scholarship in general, in light of a case study on the conceptual and methodological problems of an economic approach to paternalism in contract law. Péter Cserne Law and economics: general and methodology Jurisprudence and philosophy of law http://works.bepress.com/peter_cserne/29 http://works.bepress.com/peter_cserne/29 Mon, 23 Jun 2008 01:43:08 PDT This is a book review of Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker's A Legal Theory without Law: Ponser v. Hayek on Economic Analysis of Law (Tübingen: Mohr 2007) Péter Cserne Law and economics: general and methodology Jurisprudence and philosophy of law