Államelmélet és játékelmélet. Miről szól az alkotmány közgazdaságtana? [Game Theory and the Theory of the State. An Outline of Constitutional Economics]

Peter Cserne, University of Hamburg

Abstract

A large number of central theoretical problems of modern Western states can be epitomised in a three-cornered dilemma, i.e. a situation where a choice has to be made among three potentially incompatible principles. To the tension between democracy and constitutionalism (popular participation and constitutional constraints) the goal of efficient decision-making adds a third dimension. Constitutional economics is interpreted here as an analytical approach to law, state and politics, based on rational choice theory. It endeavours both an explanatory and a justificatory task. By offering methodological tools for the economic analysis of constitutional law and for political philosophy, rational choice theory helps to make clear the complex interaction of individual interests and political ideas, and the tradeoffs between partially incompatible objectives and values. The explanation and/or justification of qualified majority voting in legislative bodies serves as an example to illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the rational choice approach in constitutional theory. In conclusion, the essay argues that even if a large number of issues can be explained in terms of individual instrumental rationality and non-intended consequences in a methodologically rigorous and empirically fruitful way, there are issues which cannot be handled adequately in current models which are exclusively based on instrumental rationality.