‘Disarmament’ Under the NPT: Article VI in the 21st Century

Paul M. Kiernan, George Washington University Law School

Abstract

This Article examines the term “nuclear disarmament” within Art. VI of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and offers a new interpretation that accepts as compliance a full spectrum of partial disarmament steps. Historically, the U.S. legal position has emphasized the view that the NPT fails to require more than the pursuit of nuclear disarmament talks. This view has contributed to a disarmament process that many states characterize as too slow and too slight. This Article proposes that a shift in emphasis from an occasional pursuit of negotiations, to a more detailed discussion of potential measures, should neutralize this complaint and yet preserve U.S. flexibility. This outcome would better position the U.S. to address its most urgent nonproliferation concerns. In short, this Article examines a term that American scholars and practitioners have neglected in an important respect, and it provides an understanding of that term beyond what other legal writers have offered, with significant diplomatic and strategic implications.