The Algebraic Eraser (AE) is a cryptographic primitive that can be used to obscure information in certain algebraic cryptosystems. The Colored Burau Key Agreement Protocol (CBKAP), which is built on the AE, was introduced by I. Anshel, M. Anshel, D. Goldfeld, and S. Lemieux in 2006 as a protocol suitable for use on platforms with constrained computational resources, such as RFID and wireless sensors. In 2009 A. Myasnikov and A. Ushnakov proposed an attack on CBKAP that attempts to defeat the generalized simultaneous conjugacy search problem, which is the public-key computational problem underlying CBKAP. In this paper we investigate the effectiveness of this attack. Our findings are that success of the attack only comes from applying it to short keys, and that with appropriate keys the attack fails in 100% of cases and does not pose a threat against CBKAP. Moreover, the attack in makes assumptions about CBKAP that do not hold in practical implementations, and thus does not represent a threat to the use of CBKAP in applications.