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<title>P. Sean MORRIS</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2011  All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/p_sean_morris</link>
<description>Recent documents in P. Sean MORRIS</description>
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<title>Vertical Restraints and Parallel Trade: Selective Distribution and Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in Light of the Revised Rules on Vertical Agreements</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/p_sean_morris/21</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 01 Jun 2011 12:58:44 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>P. Sean Morris</author>


<category>Antitrust, Competition Law &amp; Intellectual Property Law</category>

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<title>The Law and Economics of Trademarks: Product Differentiation, Market Power and New Directions in Antitrust</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/p_sean_morris/20</link>
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<pubDate>Sun, 18 Apr 2010 05:02:07 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>The purpose of this paper is to clarify the relationship between trademarks and market power and their             implication for antitrust law and policy by using law and economics approaches. The interaction of trademarks and antitrust continues to be an enigmatic area of intellectual property rights and policy making. Antitrust law protects competition and the competitive process by preventing certain type of conduct that threatens a free market. Trademark law protect the owners brand and for the owner to reap the economic incentive from its protection.  In this paper, I argue that both the law and economics of trademark should steer new directions for both policy goals.  Do trademarks confer market power? Are well known marks too dominant? If so, what do current antitrust law tells us about the interaction of intellectual property rights and competition? This research paper will offer a discourse into product differentiation and monopolistic competition in trademarks. While current law and economics model of trademark law argues that trademarks serves to lower consumer search costs, I argue that trademarks are monopolist in nature.</p>

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<author>P. Sean Morris</author>


<category>Antitrust, Competition Law &amp; Intellectual Property Law</category>

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<title>Does the WTO have the Implied Powers to Regulate Competition?</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/p_sean_morris/17</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2009 06:12:32 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>P. Sean Morris</author>


<category>International Economic Law</category>

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<title>The Reform of Article 82 and the Operation of Competition Principles upon the Normal Trading Functions of Copyright Collecting Societies</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/p_sean_morris/16</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 27 Oct 2008 04:38:17 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>In a recent ruling, the European Commission demands that copyright collecting societies (CCS) in Europe ends restrictions preventing composers and songwriters in one country from joining collecting societies in another (the CISAC decisions). The decisions also demands to stop restrictions preventing companies in one country to clear copyrights via the collecting society in another country. The CISAC case brings to the forefront the issues that have always been in contention for a while, that is the operation of competition principles upon their normal trading function of CCSs. The collective management of copyright has always been seen a way to eliminate any perceived form of inefficiencies that may accompany rights holders managing their rights on an individual basis. As technology continues to improve and copyrights usage becomes more troublesome to track, especially in the music and other online content distribution channels, the collective management of rights by collecting societies is crucial. The new channels of distribution however, brought some headaches, since rights holders are normally restricted to a copyright collecting society in their territory and at the same time CCS have gain substantial market power thus restricting the amount of competitors which leads to abuse of such market power. This article is thus about the reform of Article 82 and the operation of competition norms upon the normal trading functions of copyright collecting societies and addresses the problems associated with such trading functions.</p>

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<author>P. Sean Morris</author>


<category>Antitrust, Competition Law &amp; Intellectual Property Law</category>

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<title>Pirates of the Internet, At Intellectual Property&apos;s End with Torrents and Challenges for Choice of Law</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/p_sean_morris/6</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 29 May 2008 16:29:42 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>This article will address three fundamental issues (i) the impact and legal status of BitTorrent technology on copyright infringement of music, software and movies over the internet (ii) damages and the enforcement of intellectual property rights via the EC Directive and (iii) argue that damages should continue to be used as a form of deterrence to illegal file sharing and “torrents” download by the end users who are enticed in the first place by the “torrent” up loaders through their websites and internet service providers “ISP’s” who might bear indirect liability for copyright infringement. The central point is that the same manner in which taxes are due to the state and failure to render unto “Caesar” what is due will likely result in a fine or prison sentence the same approach must be taken to internet copyright infringement through file sharing and “torrents” where there is a copyright infringement.  A comparison of three recent cases that were decided on the BitTorrent technology platform will be used to bolster the arguments. The article begin with an overview of legal and economic argument in the current debate on internet copyright infringement then assess the enforcement of such infringement through the EC Directive on enforcement of intellectual property and its relations to damages and then concludes with the impact on choice of law for internet copyright infringement that takes place beyond national borders.</p>

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<author>P. Sean Morris</author>


<category>Antitrust, Competition Law &amp; Intellectual Property Law</category>

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<title>Patent Licensing and No Challenge Clause: A Thin Line Between Article 81 EC Treaty and the Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/p_sean_morris/5</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 29 May 2008 10:46:06 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>P. Sean Morris</author>


<category>Antitrust, Competition Law &amp; Intellectual Property Law</category>

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<title>Competition in Air Transport in Europe under a WTO Umbrella</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/p_sean_morris/2</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 29 May 2008 10:21:17 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>P. Sean Morris</author>


<category>International Economic Law</category>

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<title>Grant-backs and No Challenge Clauses in Europe: What Lessons after the MedImmune v. Genentech Case?</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/p_sean_morris/1</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 29 May 2008 10:15:59 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>This article will discuss the provisions of Article 5 of the new Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (``TTBER'') in Europe and analyse whether the provisions in the Article are anti competitive. Article 5 of the TTBER concerns grant-backs and no challenge clauses. The article will examine the MedImmune v. Genentech case of the US Supreme Court to find out whether there is any likely impact for no challenge clauses in Europe. The case concerned a patent validity dispute in which a Pharmaceutical company, MedImmune, Inc., manufactured a drug Synagis, which Genentech, another pharmaceutical company, alleged to have violated its ``Cabilly II'' patent. The case was brought before the US Supreme Court, which held on 9 January 2007 that a patent licensee is not required to terminate or be in breach of its licence agreement before it can seek a declaratory judgment that the underlying patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. The article first discusses the interaction of competition and intellectual property law in Europe followed by an examination of the TTBER grant-backs and no challenge provisions in Article 5. In the final part, a brief discussion on patent licensing and the doctrine of licensee estoppel is discussed to unravel any likely impact of MedImmune on no challenge clauses in licensing contracts in Europe.</p>

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<author>P. Sean Morris</author>


<category>Antitrust, Competition Law &amp; Intellectual Property Law</category>

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