Copyright (c) 2009 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa Recent documents in Nuno Garoupa en-us Mon, 09 Nov 2009 06:06:11 PST 3600 http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/28 http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/28 Thu, 22 Oct 2009 11:03:09 PDT We make three claims. First, reputation matters. Virtually every theory of judicial power is dependent, ultimately, on perceptions of judges. Our second claim is that reputation can be divided into individual and collective components. Individual reputation provides information about individual performance whereas collective reputation provides information about the quality of the judiciary in general. At the same time, each member of an institution cares about his individual reputation, but also about the reputation of the group as a whole (establishing and shaping the character, attributes and nature of the group). Collective reputation determines the status of the judiciary, but individual reputation influences the judge's relative perception vis-à-vis their fellow judges. Therefore, not all reputation building is necessarily socially beneficial; it is possible that some internal status dynamic operates differently than what would be socially optimal. Third, different legal systems configure institutions in different ways in order to address the problem of information and reputation. The classical understandings of the common law and civil law judiciaries can be seen as sets of linked institutions that are mutually supportive in addressing the problem of information and reputation. Nuno Garoupa Comparative Law and Economics http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/27 http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/27 Sat, 12 Sep 2009 19:14:14 PDT We consider the distortions that corruption generates in law enforcement. Corruption dilutes deterrence, and hence the government needs to adjust law enforcement activities appropriately. We argue that this distortion is not the only one taking place. A misalignment of goals between the government and the enforcers results in another set of agency costs by which activities that put enforcers in direct contact with criminals increase at the cost of other law enforcement activities. The paper discusses the implications of both distortions. Luciana Echazu Criminal Law and Procedure http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/26 http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/26 Mon, 24 Aug 2009 19:16:43 PDT In an influential paper Polinsky and Che (1991) propose that litigation can be made a more cost effective tool for setting primary activity incentives (such as for product safety or promissory performance) by reducing plaintiffs' recovery while simultaneously raising defendants' damages. "Decoupling" recovery and damages in this manner reduces the number of filed suits, but increases the deterrent impact of each. Litigation costs fall but, if damages are raised sufficiently, the level of deterrence is maintained. Yet this story does not account for the fact that when the state takes from liable defendants more than it gives to victorious plaintiffs, it effectively taxes the transaction that led to the present litigation. This tax drives a wedge between the private and social benefits of entering the transaction. The result is that socially beneficial transactions may fail to take place. In this paper we explore how this transactions-discouraging aspect of decoupling affects its propriety. Nuno Garoupa Other http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/25 http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/25 Fri, 17 Jul 2009 06:26:16 PDT Specialized courts have become a key component of the legal reform packages implemented in civil law countries, particularly, in the area of family law. One argument for this policy is that they are able to reach a decision faster than the regular courts, which are normally congested. We use data from a survey of Spanish family courts in the region of Madrid to test this claim. After controlling for other relevant variables, the econometric results did not provide strong support for specialized courts. Nuno Garoupa Family Law and Economics http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/24 http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/24 Mon, 02 Feb 2009 13:23:22 PST Part I lays out why incentives and audiences matter. We explain the idea of judicial audiences and how they shape the judiciary in different legal families. We provide a common framework for understanding what have been traditionally perceived as very different institutions, namely the so-called "career" judiciary and the "recognition" judiciary. This framework provides new insights into the profound changes judiciaries have been going through in many different jurisdictions across the world. Part II considers the particular dynamics of internal and external audiences for judicial performance, using case studies from various judicial systems. In particular, we look at traditional civil law jurisdictions such as France, Italy and Japan where judicial activism has progressively made its way. We also compare the United States and Britain, examining recent British constitutional reforms in detail and speculating about the future consequences of the new institutional design. We argue that our framework provides a useful way of understanding the main forces shaping the recent changes in all these different jurisdictions, thus providing a common ground for analysis. Nuno Garoupa Comparative Law and Economics http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/23 http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/23 Thu, 07 Aug 2008 12:31:44 PDT In recent decades, many countries around the world have institutionalized judicial councils, institutions designed to maintain an appropriate balance between judicial independence and accountability. Our paper, the first comparative inquiry into this phenomenon, has two aims. First, we provide an economic theory of the formation of judicial councils and identify some of the dimensions along which they differ. Second, we discuss the national experience of several legal systems in light of our theory. Nuno Garoupa Comparative Law and Economics http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/22 http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/22 Sun, 29 Jun 2008 12:44:59 PDT In this paper we test to what extent the Kelsenian-type of constitutional judges are independent from political parties by studying the Portuguese Constitutional Court. The results yield three main conclusions. First, constitutional judges in Portugal are quite sensitive to their political affiliations and their political party's presence in government when voting. Second, peer pressure is very relevant. Third, the 1997 reform that was enacted to increase judicial independence has had no robust statistically significant effect. Nuno Garoupa Comparative Law and Economics http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/21 http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/21 Sun, 29 Jun 2008 12:38:50 PDT The myth of American exceptionalism in the matter of plea-bargaining is certainly by now quite untrue. It is now an important part of criminal procedure in the United Kingdom. Plea-bargaining has been transplanted to several civil law countries such as France and Italy. Informal versions, based on non-trial settlement, have been observed in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and around the world. They have generated serious opposition. In that respect, the Law and Economics literature contrasts with many other legal approaches. The most essential message of the vast economic literature on plea-bargaining is that it is an efficient instrument of criminal procedure because it reduces enforcement costs (for both parties) and allows the prosecutor to concentrate on more meritorious cases. While the discussion that has emerged as a result of the comparative observations relies on the beneficial nature of transplants in criminal procedure, we prefer to see it as an indication that the Law and Economics endorsement of plea-bargaining should be reassessed. The success of transplants relies on the existence of appropriate incentives, and the detailed study of the Italian experience provides a good indication that the traditional inquisitorial system might not generate such incentives. Our new theory emphasizes the role of the prosecutor and that of the defense counsel. We argue that the incentives of the prosecutor and those of the defense counselor are determinants of the success or failure of plea-bargaining. For example, on the defendant's side, the way a criminal legal aid system is implemented, or the way public defender offices are organized, explain many of the difficulties encountered by plea-bargaining in England & Wales as well as in France or in Italy. On the prosecutor's side, the literature inspired by the American empowered prosecutor is complicated with a model that takes into account the serious institutional differences with other prosecutorial bodies, seen as weaker in England & Wales and more bureaucratic in most civil law jurisdictions.We are skeptical that plea-bargaining can lead to or is consistent with the desirable outcome in many circumstances. Therefore, our point is not to reject an economic assessment of plea-bargaining, or criminal procedure in general, but rather mitigate any general optimism about the result of such assessment. In particular, a major implication of our analysis is that the comparative efficiency of plea-bargaining to a larger extent depends on the possibility of a legal system to address the multiple principle-agent problems in criminal litigation. Nuno Garoupa Comparative Law and Economics Criminal Law and Procedure http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/20 http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/20 Sun, 29 Jun 2008 12:33:57 PDT This paper uses comparative evidence to inform the ongoing debate about the selection and discipline of judges. In recent decades, many countries around the world have created judicial councils, institutions designed to maintain an appropriate balance between judicial independence and accountability. Our paper has two aims. First, we provide a theory of the formation of judicial councils and identify some of the dimensions along which they differ. Second, we test the extent to which different designs of judicial council affect judicial quality. We find that there is little relationship between councils and quality. We also offer a positive explanation for why judicial councils nevertheless remain attractive institutions. Nuno Garoupa Comparative Law and Economics http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/19 http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/19 Wed, 04 Jun 2008 07:33:54 PDT Many governments, and the European Commission, have engaged in active reforms of the legal profession (namely with regards to the lawyers). This paper analyzes the relevant dimensions of these reforms (access, fees, marketing, organization, and conduct). One of the major criticism to these reforms is that they are excessively oriented by economic reasoning. This paper provides a more critical framework of the reforms, and identifies the shortcomings of what has been incorrectly perceived as economic reasoning. Nuno Garoupa Comparative Law and Economics