Copyright (c) 2009 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/nmacdoug Recent documents in Neal MacDougall en-us Fri, 21 Aug 2009 15:25:00 PDT 3600 http://works.bepress.com/nmacdoug/2 http://works.bepress.com/nmacdoug/2 Wed, 04 Jun 2008 13:07:37 PDT Existing institutions allocating water in California reflect prior appropriation water rights established when water was abundant. These allocation rules queue users and do not encourage water conservation. increased water scarcity and growing valuation of water's environmental benefits are inducing a transition to water allocation mechanisms that increase water efficiency in agriculture. Transferable rights systems will lead to market-like water allocation, induce farmers to adopt water conservation technology, and may not face strong objection from senior water rights holders. One must weigh the efficiency gains associated with transition from water rights to water markets against the transaction costs associated with installing facilities that enable water exchange and trading. Transition to water markets may preserve the agricultural sector's well-being while allowing the transfer of some water outside of agriculture - in particular, for environmental benefit. The cost of policies proposed to reduce agricultural water supply while encouraging water trading are inversely related to the extent of trading allowed. The more farmers trade water, the less costly reducing water supply is to agriculture. Policies reducing water supply to Central Valley Project contractors and allowing trading only among these contractors are much more expensive than are policies encouraging trading among all agricultural water users in California. David Zilberman