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<title>Narayana R Kocherlakota</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2008  All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/nkocher</link>
<description>Recent documents in Narayana R Kocherlakota</description>
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<lastBuildDate>Thu, 03 Jan 2008 12:10:44 PST</lastBuildDate>
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<title>Risky Collateral and Deposit Insurance</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/nkocher/1</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 25 Jan 2007 12:26:51 PST</pubDate>
<description>This paper provides a new rationalization for deposit insurance and systemic disintermediations. I consider an environment in which borrowers face no penalty for failing to repay obligations except the loss of their collateral.  I assume that this collateral has aggregate risk.  For a subset of the exogenous parameters, I demonstrate that an optimal arrangement features deposit insurance.  For a strictly smaller set of parameters, it is optimal in some states of the world to have systemic distintermediations and concomitant falls in real output.</description>

<author>Narayana R. Kocherlakota</author>


<category>G21</category>

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