O 5M3 lançou três questões autor, no sentido de actualizar o artigo e obter uma visão a posteriori sobre o seu conteúdo. O resultado é o Anexo a este 5M3, no qual mantivemos os comentários no seu detalhe e na língua em que o autor as escreveu. O 5M3 quis saber se o processo de transição para a TDT tem sido demasiado tecnocrático: e o lado dos consumidores? Matteucci concorda. O debate terá sido muito pautado por um enfoque na questão da “convergência tecnológica” em prejuízo de uma maior atenção ao lado da procura. O 5M3 lançou também uma questão sobre o futuro e a arena televisiva que está a surgir. Para Matteucci o mercado televisivo só pode crescer… o desafio para os operadores será sobretudo a gestão da diversidade do seu portefólio de conteúdos. Finalmente, o 5M3 questionou Matteucci sobre os agentes baseados na Internet (Youtube, etc.) e a resposta do autor levanta alertas pertinentes: será de esperar mais intervenção por parte dos reguladores nacionais e internacionais.

Italian broadcasting has long been terrestrial. Its main features (spectrum chaos, market concentration and chronic non enforcement of norms) were considered not conducive to a rapid and reliable diffusion of digital terrestrial TV (DTT). In 2005, the private terrestrial duopolist (Mediaset) entered the pay market with a pay-per-view offer on DTT and, within a few years, has affirmed as a fast-growing pay-TV operator, threatening the established satellite incumbent (Sky). This evidence apparently challenges the received wisdom of the literature and the business practice. We study the launch of DTT in Italy and the main operators’ strategies, with the aim of explaining these original market dynamics. Our economic and strategic analysis is closely intertwined with the appraisal of the institutional side and the overall Italian policy for digital TV. A few main points stand out. First, the enduring spectrum chaos has not significantly hampered Mediaset’s digital strategy, nor spectrum was a binding constraint, thanks to biased regulation. Second, the entrant crafted a coherent and gradual premium content strategy, fine-tuning its evolution in accordance with the platform diffusion. Third, the public policy for digital TV, with its distorting focus on the terrestrial platform, served as a supporting complement to the private strategy: in particular, it favoured the diffusion of DTT over rival platforms, and benefited its main pay-TV offer. On overall, the analysis uncovers a complex and unique national case, rooted in an effective, albeit contentious, public-private interplay. Consequently, the Italian case does not convincingly challenge the received wisdom on DTT.

Recenti statistiche evidenziano che il problema della bassa crescita ed efficienza dell’Italia risiede principalmente nella dinamica della produttività totale dei fattori (total factor productivity, o TFP), in netto peggioramento proprio nel settore manifatturiero. Inoltre, tra le spiegazioni del supposto declino economico ed industriale dell’Italia, quelle che si concentrano sulle variabili tecnologico-organizzative sembrano tornare in primo piano, anche alla luce del dibattito sulla “strategia di Lisbona”. Questi temi sono ricollegabili al dibattito sull’evoluzione strutturale e organizzativa del modello NEC e sulle sue capacità di risposta alle sfide dell’economia globale. Il presente lavoro studia l’evoluzione della relazione tra R&S, organizzazione e produttività con l’Indagine sulla manifattura di Capitalia-Unicredit. In particolare, l’analisi econometrica si concentra sull’area NEC, con l’obiettivo di raffrontarne l'andamento rispetto alla manifattura nazionale. Viene usato un modello a due stadi che tiene conto dell’autoselezione del campione, tipicamente interessante le imprese con attività di R&S. Nel periodo di osservazione,caratterizzato da difficoltà estese a tutta la manifattura nazionale, emergono chiari segnali di particolare sofferenza per l’area NEC, sia in termini di performance economica che di efficienza. In particolare, in Italia l’innovazione tecnologica connessa ad attività di R&S risulta aver contribuito a frenare il declino della TFP, ma limitatamente all’area non NEC. Inoltre, alcuni caratteri strutturali ed organizzativi “snelli”risultano positivamente associati alla TFP, ma anche in questo caso l'area NEC pare non averne beneficiato. Nel complesso, si evidenzia un processo evolutivo complesso per il modello di specializzazione dell’area NEC,che vede tipologie di imprese vincitrici e tipologie perdenti. In prospettiva, le persistenti difficoltà macroeconomiche non possono che accelerarne i fenomeni di riconfigurazione organizzativa e di ristrutturazione produttiva.

The current quest for open standards (OS) as a way to achieve interoperability in converging ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) is assessed, to uncover OS economic foundations and policy rationale, beyond the current hype. In fact, OS typically contain IPRs (patents, copyrights), and are not immune from those anticompetitive behaviours potentially stemming from the legal monopoly on IP (intellectual property). At the same time, OS provision is likely to encounter market and public failures, and seems to ask for a new sustainable balance between private and public interests. The starting point of the paper is to ascertain whether OS really behave as a more “benign” type of IPRs, so to justify the recent public emphasis and support paid to OS - especially within EU. Second, an unconventional review of the literature is proposed, with the aim of bridging distant fields of theory and sketch the economics of interoperability provision and OS. Third, the “openness” problems are explored and benchmarked against the emerging category of semi-commons, which provides an original policy perspective on “truly” open IPRs. Consequently, the paper paves new ways to the on-going debate on the reform of the EU ICT standardization process.

The deployment of next generation communications (NGC) progresses unevenly, frequently suffering from insufficient interoperability. Interoperability remains a fundamental driver for NGC diffusion, but existing theories remain vague on how to ensure its provision. Since interoperability features increasing returns and public good regimes, its market provision may be hampered. At the same time, public efforts might be ineffective when colliding with private operators' incentives. Sometimes, the policy instruments used might even distort technological diffusion and competition in a way incompatible with a market-neutral approach. This paper aims to investigate these issues.

The quest for interoperability of interactive TV has been a major concern of the EU Institutions. Its policy foundations were built on the enabling role of open standards, whose peculiar standardization process should guarantee affordable and widespread IPRs availability. After having received considerable public support and financial funds, the ITV roll-out appears disappointing, and the diffusion of the main concerned standard, the MHP, stagnates. We conduct a comprehensive analysis of the main markets facts and passages of the ITV policy, to derive a multifaceted assessment of its technological, economic and institutional drivers. Several important issues stand out. Beside the inner complexity of the policy, a few normative inconsistencies and conflicting aims adversely impacted its feasibility. Several logical ambiguities also dampened the correct choice of instruments. In particular, the existing literature clarifies two main points: open standards cannot be uncritically assimilated to open source software, and the role of open standards along the broadcasting value chain is largely unexplored. Consequently, their effects here might differ from those experienced in traditional ICT markets. Finally, a certain evidence of regulatory capture of the EU policy-maker emerges.

Digital switch-over is receiving a growing attention world-wide. Its importance is not limited to the business sphere. There is also a strong public rationale in promoting a fast and efficient switch-off of the analogue signal. Digital transmissions are more efficient, and free up valuable portions of the TV spectrum that can be profitably used for other TLC and multimedia services. The transition to digital proves particularly difficult in the terrestrial platform (DTT). First, DTT features as the incumbent platform in most countries, so that during the switch-over, transmissions are necessarily simulcast (in analogue and digital). Moreover, coordination problems are likely to arise, both from the supply-side (among broadcasters) and in the market (between broadcasters and viewers). While the first type of problem can be tackled with centralised spectrum management, the market coordination appears more difficult to work out. In particular, since network markets typically display “chicken-egg” coordination failures, broadcasters and viewers need to align their strategies and incentives. Typically, broadcasters want to invest in DTV only if there is a sizeable audience developed, to justify their investment. On the other side, viewers refrain from switching to digital if the new services do not pay-off, in terms of better technology and more attractive content. Consequently, Governments, Antitrust and Regulatory Bodies have designed a variety of initiatives to guide the transition and to easy coordination: additional spectrum slots, compulsory deadlines for the analogue switch-off (sunset dates), investment incentives and consumer subsidies. However, because of the novelty of the problem, the policy-maker needs sound guidance, since some instruments may jeopardise the market and stifle emerging competition. One additional reason for caution is that a policy-neutral approach to digital switch-over and multiplatform competition needs to be guaranteed, as stated in the EU NRF. We construct a simulation model of a market of heterogeneous users and firms to analyze the switch-over process from the analogue platform and the adoption of digital TV (henceforth, DTV). The paper identifies the relationships between different degrees of content variety and market dynamics (in terms of the analogue and digital market shares). The switching costs and the variety of content (both in the “traditional” analogue and in the “advanced” digital platforms) are the key-variables affecting the rate of diffusion of DTV and the duration of the transition to digital broadcasting. The model can provide instrumental policy tools as it assists in evaluating the most appropriate deadline for the switch-off, the role of the switching costs (and thereby the optimal subsidization policy) and the trade-off between the price and the offered contents (for broadcasters). A few empirical policy cases are then examined (mostly from US and EU) and confronted with the theoretical predictions of the model. Implications for regulatory efficacy and effectiveness are drawn. Finally, the paper derives useful lessons regarding the DTV market structure, the competition between broadcasters (in terms of price and product differentiation) and the possible emergence of monopolies in the digital and analogue markets.

Notwithstanding the severe price shocks that have been shacking its value chain, coffee remains a fundamental component of the Ethiopian economy and export. Nevertheless the prolonged price decline has substantially weakened its production basis and prospects, so that appropriate financial services are urgently needed to sustain rural communities. To gather focused evidence on the financial supply and demand of small Ethiopian coffee producers, in 2005 we carried out an original survey interviewing 120 farmers from the Jimma zone (Oromia regional state); further, the statistical analysis was complemented by “focus group” discussions and individual interviews with “key-experts” of the coffee value chain. Several important findings emerge from this study. First, there is a strong evidence of an overall gap between demand and supply of financial services across the different sources (formal and informal ones). Second, informal financial services (loans) are very costly, while those from microfinance institutions (MFI) and cooperatives often appear not tailored to the farmers’ needs (in relation to timing, length and amounts). Concerning saving products, their diffusion is still very limited, because they have been recently introduced, but in the future they could become an important component for strengthening the microfinance outreach; currently, they also stand as a substitute for risk-insurance products, totally absent in the Ethiopian coffee production chain. Regarding policy recommendations, the main priorities appear those of enlarging the outreach of MFI and financially active cooperatives. More generally, a need emerges for demand-oriented financial services and suitable “bottom-up” agricultural development and policy-making.

Ce papier discute des raisons économiques qui sous-tendent l’exclusivité des contrats dans les marchés multimédia. Il montre comment les accords exclusifs dans la distribution des contenus en Europe fonctionnent comme des barrières à l’entrée et/ou des stratégies d’accroissement des coûts des concurrents pour les nouveaux opérateurs de télédiffusion payante. La suppression des clauses exclusives, récemment validée par la Commission européenne, peut être économiquement justifiée lorsqu’elle engendre un impact positif sur l’innovation technologique et le développement de platesformes de transmission alternatives pour la distribution de services multimédia. Les récentes décisions européennes semblent encourager une nouvelle « approche d’accès ouvert » pour la distribution des contenus à forte valeur ajoutée dans l’industrie multimédia.

This paper challenges the traditional economic reasons supporting copyright licensing exclusivity in dealership agreements in media markets. It argues that, in Europe, exclusive dealings in content distribution acted as barriers to entry and/or raised rivals’ cost strategies against new Pay-TV operators. The removal of exclusive dealing clauses, as recently implemented by the European Commission, can be economically justified when it generates positive impacts on technological innovation and on the development of alternative transmission platforms for the delivery of multimedia services. Recent European Antitrust decisions seem to encourage a new ‘open access approach’ for premium content distribution in the media industry.

We analyse the recent EU experience in DTV policy-making, focusing on the introduction of the terrestrial platform (DTT) and the digital switch-over. The DTT launch campaign was actively supported by member states, while the EU Institutions have tried to shape the policy mix emphasising points such as market liberalization, facility-based competition, market-oriented and technologically neutral policy-making. The paper reviews the most important UE cases brought in front of the Commission, starting from the German case, which underwent the first negative decision concerning state aid in DTT deployment, since its policy was found violating the neutrality principle. Then, it moves to briefly sketch the France and UK cases, which were instead found compatible with the EU Treaty. Finally, it presents in detail the Italian case, where a peculiar mix of chronic policy mismanagement, institutional conflict and lobbying has significantly hampered new infrastructure roll-out and multiplatform competition. As a result, the country’s DTT policy has been substantially challenged by the EU Institutions, both for illegal state aid and infringement to the UE law (especially in the realm of the New Regulatory Framework). On overall, the paper argues that the implementation of the EU policy mix is dramatically complex, both conceptually and procedurally. Moreover, it requires careful fine tuning, and presents some grey areas of competence intersection, where the national interest still plays a big role. As a result, the new DTV policy framework remains intrinsically prone to member states’ particularisms and abuses, especially in the realm of state aid. A few suggestions, aimed at implementing a more rigorous economic approach to state aid control in media markets, are then presented. Finally, the Italian case stands as particularly multidimensional and complex to tackle, and requires a wider policy debate and treatment at the EU level.