Copyright (c) 2008 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/nancy_ammons Recent documents in Seattle University en-us Thu, 03 Jan 2008 11:33:42 PST 3600 http://works.bepress.com/nancy_ammons/5 http://works.bepress.com/nancy_ammons/5 Sat, 24 Mar 2007 16:39:05 PDT Eric Clark believed he was battling space aliens when he shot and killed Officer Jeffrey Moritz. Charged under a first-degree murder statute that requires knowledge the victim is a police officer, Clark should have been "not guilty" two ways: first, by reason of insanity, and second, because he did not satisfy the mens rea requirement. Instead, he was found guilty, and the United States Supreme Court's decision upholding this result tortured insanity law jurisprudence. The only plausible explanation for the Court's decision lies in society's emotional reaction to mental illness. Fear and loathing have displaced not only care and compassion, but even logic. This article first describes and then unpacks the irrationality of the Court's reasoning in Clark. The Court's inexplicable decisions -- finding no semiotic truncation of Arizona's insanity statute, and upholding its refusal to admit evidence of mental illness on the question of mens rea -- can be explained only by reference to our unconscious selves. The mentally ill frighten us, and when we are frightened, we do not think clearly. But the decisions in Clark serve only to stigmatize and marginalize even further a group that needs our help as well as our compassion. We must reexamine the criminal law's insanity jurisprudence. Our unconscious animus toward the mentally ill ill-serves them, and ill-becomes us. Susan D. Rozelle Criminal Law and Procedure Evidence Jurisprudence Law and Society Psychology and Psychiatry Public Law and Legal Theory Social Welfare http://works.bepress.com/nancy_ammons/4 http://works.bepress.com/nancy_ammons/4 Mon, 19 Mar 2007 06:44:40 PDT Who should be the beneficiaries of race-conscious affirmative action? Conspicuous by its absence in the US affirmative action debate, this question takes us beyond conventional majority/minority discourse and forces us to confront questions of comparative entitlement. Asking the "Who Question" serves to illuminate a much larger debate over the nature of equality itself. Two paradigms of equal protection compete in modern scholarship: antidiscrimination vs. antisubordination. Yet, neither offers a satisfactory method to select affirmative action beneficiaries on its own.The Supreme Court's current antidiscrimination approach to affirmative action remains incomplete. In focusing solely on remedying particularized underrepresentation, the Court tells us how to count, but not who gets counted. Silence on the Who Question has led to doctrinal incoherence in lower courts; yet, a complete answer hinges on a societal understanding of race that antidiscrimination theory is unable to supply. To examine an antisubordination alternative in action requires a comparative international perspective. By making the eradication of societal hierarchies its explicit goal, India presents a stark alternative to US affirmative action. It has developed a sophisticated methodology to assess group disadvantage empirically. This Article considers whether India's approach could be replicated in the US, as other commentators have proposed. Highlighting obstacles posed by patterns of immigration and social mobility, the Article concludes that an antisubordination approach would be practically unworkable and normatively undesirable in the US context.Appreciating the shortcomings of each of these equality paradigms on their own paves the way for an integrated understanding of equal protection in which antisubordination values serve to give normative content to antidiscrimination doctrine. India's example also suggests ways to improve on our current method of selecting beneficiaries and provides the basis for a clearer allocation of decisional authority between the judiciary and the political branches in matters of race. Sean A. Pager Civil Rights Comparative Law Constitutional Law Public Law and Legal Theory http://works.bepress.com/nancy_ammons/3 http://works.bepress.com/nancy_ammons/3 Fri, 09 Mar 2007 10:40:52 PST Who should be the beneficiaries of race-conscious affirmative action? Conspicuous by its absence in the US affirmative action debate, this question takes us beyond conventional majority/minority discourse and forces us to confront questions of comparative entitlement. Asking the "Who Question" serves to illuminate a much larger debate over the nature of equality itself. Two paradigms of equal protection compete in modern scholarship: antidiscrimination vs. antisubordination. Yet, neither offers a satisfactory method to select affirmative action beneficiaries on its own.The Supreme Court's current antidiscrimination approach to affirmative action remains incomplete. In focusing solely on remedying particularized underrepresentation, the Court tells us how to count, but not who gets counted. Silence on the Who Question has led to doctrinal incoherence in lower courts; yet, a complete answer hinges on a societal understanding of race that antidiscrimination theory is unable to supply. To examine an antisubordination alternative in action requires a comparative international perspective. By making the eradication of societal hierarchies its explicit goal, India presents a stark alternative to US affirmative action. It has developed a sophisticated methodology to assess group disadvantage empirically. This Article considers whether India's approach could be replicated in the US, as other commentators have proposed. Highlighting obstacles posed by patterns of immigration and social mobility, the Article concludes that an antisubordination approach would be practically unworkable and normatively undesirable in the US context.Appreciating the shortcomings of each of these equality paradigms on their own paves the way for an integrated understanding of equal protection in which antisubordination values serve to give normative content to antidiscrimination doctrine. India's example also suggests ways to improve on our current method of selecting beneficiaries and provides the basis for a clearer allocation of decisional authority between the judiciary and the political branches in matters of race. Sean A. Pager Civil Rights Comparative Law Constitutional Law Public Law and Legal Theory http://works.bepress.com/nancy_ammons/2 http://works.bepress.com/nancy_ammons/2 Wed, 07 Mar 2007 12:25:16 PST Who should be the beneficiaries of race-conscious affirmative action? Conspicuous by its absence in the US affirmative action debate, this question takes us beyond conventional majority/minority discourse and forces us to confront questions of comparative entitlement. Asking the "Who Question" serves to illuminate a much larger debate over the nature of equality itself. Two paradigms of equal protection compete in modern scholarship: antidiscrimination vs. antisubordination. Yet, neither offers a satisfactory method to select affirmative action beneficiaries on its own.The Supreme Court's current antidiscrimination approach to affirmative action remains incomplete. In focusing solely on remedying particularized underrepresentation, the Court tells us how to count, but not who gets counted. Silence on the Who Question has led to doctrinal incoherence in lower courts; yet, a complete answer hinges on a societal understanding of race that antidiscrimination theory is unable to supply. To examine an antisubordination alternative in action requires a comparative international perspective. By making the eradication of societal hierarchies its explicit goal, India presents a stark alternative to US affirmative action. It has developed a sophisticated methodology to assess group disadvantage empirically. This Article considers whether India's approach could be replicated in the US, as other commentators have proposed. Highlighting obstacles posed by patterns of immigration and social mobility, the Article concludes that an antisubordination approach would be practically unworkable and normatively undesirable in the US context.Appreciating the shortcomings of each of these equality paradigms on their own paves the way for an integrated understanding of equal protection in which antisubordination values serve to give normative content to antidiscrimination doctrine. India's example also suggests ways to improve on our current method of selecting beneficiaries and provides the basis for a clearer allocation of decisional authority between the judiciary and the political branches in matters of race. Sean A. Pager Civil Rights Comparative Law Constitutional Law Public Law and Legal Theory http://works.bepress.com/nancy_ammons/1 http://works.bepress.com/nancy_ammons/1 Fri, 02 Mar 2007 11:55:38 PST Who should be the beneficiaries of race-conscious affirmative action? Conspicuous by its absence in the US affirmative action debate, this question takes us beyond conventional majority/minority discourse and forces us to confront questions of comparative entitlement. Asking the "Who Question" serves to illuminate a much larger debate over the nature of equality itself. Two paradigms of equal protection compete in modern scholarship: antidiscrimination vs. antisubordination. Yet, neither offers a satisfactory method to select affirmative action beneficiaries on its own.The Supreme Court's current antidiscrimination approach to affirmative action remains incomplete. In focusing solely on remedying particularized underrepresentation, the Court tells us how to count, but not who gets counted. Silence on the Who Question has led to doctrinal incoherence in lower courts; yet, a complete answer hinges on a societal understanding of race that antidiscrimination theory is unable to supply. To examine an antisubordination alternative in action requires a comparative international perspective. By making the eradication of societal hierarchies its explicit goal, India presents a stark alternative to US affirmative action. It has developed a sophisticated methodology to assess group disadvantage empirically. This Article considers whether India's approach could be replicated in the US, as other commentators have proposed. Highlighting obstacles posed by patterns of immigration and social mobility, the Article concludes that an antisubordination approach would be practically unworkable and normatively undesirable in the US context.Appreciating the shortcomings of each of these equality paradigms on their own paves the way for an integrated understanding of equal protection in which antisubordination values serve to give normative content to antidiscrimination doctrine. India's example also suggests ways to improve on our current method of selecting beneficiaries and provides the basis for a clearer allocation of decisional authority between the judiciary and the political branches in matters of race. Sean A. Pager Civil Rights Comparative Law Constitutional Law Public Law and Legal Theory