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<title>Nadia N. Sawicki</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2013  All rights reserved.</copyright>
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<description>Recent documents in Nadia N. Sawicki</description>
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<title>The Hollow Promise of Freedom of Conscience</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/nadia_sawicki/14</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 11 Mar 2013 11:35:24 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p><em>Two hundred years ago, Thomas Jefferson asserted that no law "ought to be dearer to man than that which protects the rights of conscience against the enterprises of the civil authority." Since then, freedom <strong>of </strong>conscience has continued to be heralded as a fundamental principle of American society. Indeed, many current policy debates-most notably in the medical and military contexts-are predicated on the theory that claims of conscience are worthy of legal respect. This Article, which offers a comprehensive account of the contemporary treatment of conscience, challenges established assumptions and seeks to reframe the debate about the normative value of conscience in American society. This Article first clarifies contemporary understandings of conscience <strong>by </strong>systematically analyzing its treatment in positive law. It looks beyond the traditional medical, military, and religious contexts, giving a descriptive account of law's treatment of conscience across various substantive realms, including tax evasion, civil disobedience, discrimination, and even violent terrorism. It demonstrates that legal accommodations are typically granted on an ad hoc basis, without a guiding doctrinal principle. If there is a consistent and coherent justification for treating cases differently, our legal system has thus far failed to provide it. </em><em>This Article concludes that, in order for American law to reflect the kind of robust, autonomy-based respect for conscience to which every pluralistic society aspires, we must agree on a content-neutral guiding principle for negotiating future claims for legal accommodation. The alternative, the Article posits, is to concede that American society has abandoned the fundamental purpose of conscientious  accommodation-- namely, protecting the individual from oppressive majoritarian understandings of morality.</em></p>

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<author>Nadia N. Sawicki</author>


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<title>Patient Protection and Decision Aid Quality: Regulatory and Tort Law Approaches</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/nadia_sawicki/13</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 11 Mar 2013 11:35:23 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>Nadia N. Sawicki</author>


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<title>The Abortion Informed Consent Debate: More Light, Less Heat.</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/nadia_sawicki/12</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 13 Sep 2012 08:55:18 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>Nadia N. Sawicki</author>


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<title>Informed Consent Beyond the Physician-Patient Encounter: Tort Law Implications of Extra-Clinical Decision Support Tools.</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/nadia_sawicki/11</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 13 Sep 2012 08:55:17 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>Nadia N. Sawicki</author>


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<title>&quot;There Must Be a Means&quot; - The Backward Jurisprudence of Baze v. Rees</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/nadia_sawicki/10</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 21 Aug 2012 07:15:31 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>Nadia N. Sawicki</author>


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<title>Character, Competence, and the Principles of Medical Discipline</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/nadia_sawicki/9</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 30 May 2012 11:35:59 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>This Article presents a first-of-its-kind analysis of the disciplinary functions of state medical licensing boards-the frequently overlooked administrative agencies designed to serve as the "gatekeepers" of the medical profession. It concludes that medical boards may have lost sight of their primary goal of patient protection and suggests that a renewed focus on professional licensing boards may go a long way towards addressing some of the quality of care problems plaguing the American medical system.</p>
<p>This Article identifies three fundamental legal principles underlying medical boards' authority to discipline physicians: the goal of public protection, substantive due process limitations based on fitness to practice medicine, and the concept of disciplinary minimalism. It demonstrates that boards, which frequently sanction physicians who engage in criminal conduct and other forms of "unprofessional conduct" outside the clinical sphere, often exercise their disciplinary discretion in a manner inconsistent with these fundamental principles. A more effective use of medical boards' scarce resources would involve a focus on physicians whose misconduct is more clearly linked to clinical practice. Accordingly, this Article suggests that boards return their focus to the principles of professional discipline, prioritizing disciplinary actions taken on the basis of competence, rather than character.</p>

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<author>Nadia N. Sawicki</author>


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<title>A Theory of Discipline for Professional Misconduct</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/nadia_sawicki/5</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 04 Feb 2011 08:38:11 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>State medical boards derive their licensure and disciplinary authority from the police powers reserved to the states under the 10th Amendment. Though it is clear that public health, safety, and welfare are well-served by the educational and examination requirements uniformly imposed upon medical professionals, many medical practice acts also authorize discipline for professional misconduct that does not directly implicate clinical competence or patient safety - for example, being convicted of a felony or a crime of moral turpitude, failing to comply with a child support order, providing expert opinion to a court without reasonable investigation, ordering unnecessary laboratory tests, engaging in conduct that brings the medical profession into disrepute, or violating a professional code of ethics. Supporters of such broad disciplinary powers commonly justify them by reference to the easy truisms of professionalism and public trust, but fail to situate their arguments within police power-based theories of state action. This paper aims to develop a comprehensive account of the legal justifications for sanctioning professional licensees for behavior that does not clearly implicate clinical competence.</p>

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<author>Nadia N. Sawicki</author>


<category>Medical Jurisprudence</category>

<category>Torts</category>

<category>Products Liability</category>

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<title>Compliance With Advance Directives: Wrongful Living and Tort Law Incentives</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/nadia_sawicki/4</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 04 Feb 2011 08:38:09 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>Modern ethical and legal norms generally require that deference be accorded to patients' decisions regarding treatment, including decisions to refuse life-sustaining care, even when patients no longer have the capacity to communicate those decisions to their physicians.  Advance directives were developed as a means by which a patient's autonomy regarding medical care might survive such incapacity.  Unfortunately, preserving patient autonomy at the end of life has been no simple task.  First, it has been difficult to persuade patients to prepare for incapacity by making their wishes known.  Second, even when they have done so, there is a distinct possibility that those wishes will be disregarded or ignored and that a patient whose expressed choice was to refuse life-sustaining treatment will nonetheless be kept alive against his or her will.  This problem is only exacerbated by the fact that patients finding themselves in this situation have routinely been denied adequate legal remedies on the grounds that continued life is not a compensable harm.  This article rejects that reasoning, and in so doing, takes an important step toward more fully enforcing one's legal and moral right to refuse care at the end of life.</p>
<p>The authors argue for recognition of a wrongful living variant of battery in situations where physicians have recklessly or intentionally disregarded or misinterpreted advance directives, and offer guidance on some of the difficult questions relating to damages that have perplexed the courts and commentators in this area.  While allowing recovery for wrongful living will not resolve many of the outstanding issues leading to low utilization of advance directives by patients or the need for interpretation of a patient's stated wishes in many circumstances, it will offer significant protection to those who have made their wishes clear.</p>

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<author>Holly Fernandez Lynch et al.</author>


<category>Health Law and Policy</category>

<category>Public Law and Legal Theory</category>

<category>Law and Society</category>

<category>Law and Technology</category>

<category>Elder Law</category>

<category>Remedies</category>

<category>Medical Jurisprudence</category>

<category>Torts</category>

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<title>Doctors, Discipline, and the Death Penalty: Professional Implications of Safe Harbor Statutes</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/nadia_sawicki/3</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 04 Feb 2011 08:38:08 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>State capital punishment statutes generally contemplate the involvement of medical providers, and courts have acknowledged that the qualifications of lethal injection personnel have a constitutionally relevant dimension.  However, the American Medical Association has consistently voiced its opposition to any medical involvement in executions.  In recent years, some states have responded to this conflict by adopting statutory mechanisms to encourage medical participation in lethal injections.  Foremost among these are safe harbor policies, which prohibit state medical boards from taking disciplinary action against licensed medical personnel who participate in executions.</p>
<p>This Article posits that safe harbor policies, as limitations on medical board autonomy, safe harbor policies must be viewed not merely as artifacts of the political discourse on capital punishment, but as part of the historical narrative of American medical regulation.  As a matter of policy, safe harbors cannot be defended by reference to the three traditional justifications for regulating medical professionals -- they are not necessary to keep the profession from exceeding the scope of its delegated powers; they do not promote traditional medical goals; and they do not satisfy the criteria for promotion of important state goals unrelated to medicine.  This Article suggests that safe harbors and other restrictions on board autonomy, if not adequately justified, may weaken public confidence in the authority and independence of the medical profession.  Because the loss of systemic medical trust tends to have a corrosive effect on the medical profession’s ability to promote patient interests and public health, policymakers should be wary of adopting safe harbors without first considering their trust implications in the professional sphere.</p>

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<author>Nadia N. Sawicki</author>


<category>Legislation</category>

<category>Health Law and Policy</category>

<category>Criminal Law and Procedure</category>

<category>Constitutional Law</category>

<category>Professional Ethics</category>

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<title>Discussions of Health Web Sites in Medical and Popular Media</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/nadia_sawicki/2</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 04 Feb 2011 08:38:07 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>To what extent and how do medical and popular media discuss issues of quality when it comes to health Web sites? The answer in brief is that while academic medical researchers are deeply concerned about the quality of Web sites that center on health, the popular media hardly attend to this issue. A deeper answer to the question uncovers more disconnects between academic Web site analysts, survey researchers, and popular media.</p>
<p>In the following reports, the members of a University of Pennsylvania research group that I directed explore this issue in two ways. First, they update and review an analysis of quantitative scholarly research on the quality of health Web sites. Second, they examine the general discussion of health Web sites over six months in 47 media outlets representing a wide range of media, from medical research journals to television network news operations.</p>
<p>The topic is important because so many people go online to get health information. A national survey conducted by the Pew Internet & American Life Project is perhaps most definitive. It found that 62 percent of internet users have gone online in search of health information. Extrapolating from its data, the Pew group further found that about 6 million Americans go online for medical advice on a typical day. That, it added, means "more people go online for medical advice on any given day than actually visit health professionals, according to figures provided by the American Medical Association."</p>
<p>The Pew group also found that Web health "seekers" often use search suggestions from friends, search with others, or ask people they consider knowledgeable searchers to help them find health information online. They report being satisfied with their searches, and the few who discuss their findings with physicians state that they agreed that what they had learned was correct. The Pew researchers readily admit that the health seekers may not have been as successful in gaining correct knowledge as they believe. And, in fact, an experimental study by Stanford and colleagues concluded that consumers make judgments about health site credibility in ways that are quite different than what medical professionals consider appropriate.</p>

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<author>Joseph Turow et al.</author>


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<title>There Must Be A Means: The Backward Jurisprudence of Baze v. Rees</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/nadia_sawicki/6</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 04 Feb 2011 08:37:45 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>The Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Baze v. Rees begins with a seemingly simple assertion of constitutional law.  “We begin with the principle, settled by Gregg, that capital punishment is constitutional.”  It continues, “It necessarily follows that there must be a means of carrying it out.”   This second pronouncement provides the foundation for the Supreme Court’s holding in Baze that Kentucky’s refusal to modify its lethal injection procedure does not violate the Eighth Amendment.  However, in taking the position that the constitutionality of an existing method of capital punishment is dependent on the availability of alternative execution procedures, the Supreme Court has turned Eighth Amendment jurisprudence on its head, establishing a dangerous loophole that could imperil our most important constitutional protections.  This essay highlights the error in the Court’s reasoning in Baze, and describes the potential consequences of applying this reasoning to other areas of constitutional law.</p>

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<author>Nadia N. Sawicki</author>


<category>Constitutional Law</category>

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