Articles
Wishful thinking in strategic environments, Review of Economic Studies (2007)
Towards developing a theory of systematic biases about strategies, I analyze strategic implications of a...
Waiting to persuade, Quarterly Journal of Economics (2004)
I analyze a sequential bargaining model in which players are optimistic about their bargaining power...
Bargaining without a common prior – An immediate agreement theorem, Econometrica (2003)
In sequential bargaining models without outside options, each player’s bargaining power is ultimately determined by...
Walrasian bargaining, Games and Economic Behavior (2003)
Given any two-person economy, consider an alternating-offer bargaining game with complete information where the proposers...
Bargaining over Risky Assets, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (2002)
We analyze the subgame-perfect equilibria of a game where two agents bargain in order to...
Unpublished Papers
A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements (with Jonathan Weinstein), Econometrica, forthcoming (2007)
Rationalizability is a central solution concept of game theory. Economic models often have many rationalizable...
Impact of higher-order uncertainty (with Jonathan Weinstein), Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming (2007)
In some games, the impact of higher-order uncertainty is very large, implying that present economic...