Wittgenstein, value pluralism and politics

Matthew Moore, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo

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Copyright © 2010 Sage Publications. The definitive version is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453710384354.

Abstract

This article makes three main claims: (1) that the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, properly understood, has no normative or political implications whatsoever; (2) that scholars with otherwise dramatically conflicting interpretations of Wittgenstein should nonetheless all agree with this conclusion; and (3) that understanding the (non-) implications of Wittgenstein’s philosophy helps to answer the two motivating questions of the literature on value pluralism — whether values are (or can be) plural (yes), and whether value pluralism leads to, requires, or reveals some particular normative or political response (no).