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<title>Mireille Hildebrandt</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2012  All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt</link>
<description>Recent documents in Mireille Hildebrandt</description>
<language>en-us</language>
<lastBuildDate>Tue, 03 Jan 2012 07:53:19 PST</lastBuildDate>
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<item>
<title>De rechtsstaat in cyberspace?</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/39</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/39</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 26 Dec 2011 01:09:12 PST</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Cyberspace is inmiddels overal. Wat tien jaar geleden misschien nog een aparte niet-fysieke wereld leek waar niemand wist dat je een hond was, gaat steeds meer lijken op een verzameling onderling verbonden dorpspleinen. Met dien verstande dat alles wat iedereen doet permanent wordt opgenomen, opgeslagen en doorzocht op betekenisvolle patronen. Steeds meer personen, organisaties maar ook dingen raken verbonden via het internet. De Internationale Telecommunicatie Unie sprak in 2005 van het ‘internet van de dingen’, om aan te geven dat binnen afzienbare tijd alles overal (‘everyware’) via draadloze identificatiesystemen traceerbaar is. Intussen raakt iedereen via de smartphone ‘always on(line)’. Deze rede richt zich op de computationele infrastructuur die het mogelijk maakt om de overstelpende hoeveelheid data die gebruikers voortdurend lekken en verstrekken op een slimme manier op te slaan en te doorzoeken. Deze infrastructuur genereert allerhande inferenties waarmee op geaggregeerd niveau slimme, dynamische profielen kunnen worden gemaakt van gebruikers, burgers, consumenten, belastingbetalers, verzekeringnemers, reizigers of patiënten. Deze profielen bieden ongekende kansen en mogelijkheden en dito onzekerheden. De rechtsstaat is langs drie kanten in het geding: (1) de verfijnde kennis op geaggregeerd niveau kan onzichtbare inbreuken maken op de privacy en de gegevensbescherming en op het discriminatieverbod, (2) de computationele orde van cyberspace bepaalt in toenemende mate onze waarneming, kennis en de beslissingen waarmee we geconfronteerd worden, terwijl de algoritmes die eraan ten grondslag liggen onzichtbaar, onbegrijpelijk en vaak ook geheim zijn, (3) de normatieve implicaties van deze technologische infrastructuur kunnen gemakkelijk de normatieve kracht van geldende rechtsnormen overstemmen, waardoor het geschreven recht een papieren draak lijkt te worden. Het doordenken van de verhouding tussen rechtsstaat en cyberspace is niet gediend met doemdenken of utopisme. De leerstoel ICT en rechtsstaat hoopt onderzoek uit te bouwen op het grensvlak van recht, ethiek en ICT, ten einde te onderzoeken of, en zo ja, onder welke voorwaarden juridische bescherming ingebouwd kan worden in de computationele ondergrond van cyberspace.</p>

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</description>

<author>Mireille Hildebrandt</author>


<category>Legal Implications of Emerging Technologies</category>

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<item>
<title>Oordeelsvorming door mens en machine: heuristieken, algoritmes en legitimatie</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/38</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 30 Jun 2011 12:50:55 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>Gezien de ontwikkelingen op het terrein van ‘data mining’, ‘machine learning’, en neurale netwerken is het niet onwaarschijnlijk dat geautomatiseerde ‘rechtsvinding’ op middellange termijn een grote vlucht zal nemen. In deze bijdrage zal ik onderzoeken hoe heuristiek en legitimatie van het juridische oordeel zich verhouden tot juridische expertsystemen. In navolging van Moretti kunnen we het gebruik van dit soort expertsystemen kwalificeren als ‘lezen op afstand’. Om te voorkomen dat juridische argumentatie zich gedachteloos gaat baseren op de aannamen die in de gebruikte computertechnieken schuilen, zullen juristen moeten leren om niet alleen juridische teksten maar ook de bevindingen van expertsystemen te interpreteren. De kwaliteit van juridische argumentatie zal in de toekomst mede afhangen van de mate waarin wordt doorzien dat juridische teksten op verschillende wijze ‘op afstand gelezen’ kunnen worden, afhankelijk van de gebruikte algoritmes.</p>

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</description>

<author>Mireille Hildebrandt</author>


<category>Legal Implications of Emerging Technologies</category>

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<title>Proactive Forensic Profiling: Proactive Criminalization?</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/37</link>
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<pubDate>Sat, 18 Jun 2011 06:55:08 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>"With the aid of your precog mutants, you've boldly and successfully abolished the post-crime punitive system of jails and fines. As we all realize, punishment was never much of a deterrent, and could scarcely have afforded comfort to a victim already dead."</p>
<p>Philip K. Dick, The Minority Report</p>
<p>In his short story ‘The Minority Report’, science fiction author Philip K Dick has one of his main characters suggest that a pre-emptive strike of precrime ‘punishment’ should comfort the victim, claiming that the life of the victim is more important than an individual human subject’s ability to develop her moral agency.  This pointedly confronts us with the dilemma of the criminalization of future behaviours. If criminal intelligence is capable of predicting who will most probably commit a murder, should we punish the culprit before she can perform the act? The reader may object that in such a case the suspect cannot be punished, as punishment cannot refer to future action; as long as a person has not performed the action her behaviour cannot be qualified as wrongful and thus cannot be liable to punitive intervention. The right term would be something like a preventive measure, such as detention, therapy or any kind of physical intervention that would rule out the criminal act that has been predicted. I invite the reader, however, to imagine that having been categorized as a person that will commit a crime at some point in the future could indeed lead to an accusation of wrongfulness and culpability. Contrary to our present common sense, this wrongfulness would inhere in the fact that a person will violate the criminal law, and this future violation would also imply guilt. That we now think this to be nonsensical is no guarantee that epistemic changes triggered by novel computing infrastructures could not instigate an entirely different concept of what it means to punish a person.</p>
<p>In this chapter I will explore the implications of this thought-experiment, suggesting that proactive forensic profiling may extend the boundaries of the criminal law in a way that surreptitiously erodes the very meaning of punishment as we understand it today. Such an exercise may sharpen our awareness of the achievements of the legal protection presently offered by the criminal law and confront us with the extent to which we take such protection for granted. Building on findings within the field of profiling practices I will argue that new ways of knowledge construction will challenge the logic of the criminal law. First, they may counter our expectation that the criminal law responds to past rather than future events, and second, they may counter our expectation that the criminal law concerns actions rather than biological or behavioural characteristics. Those who prefer to think of the central tenets of criminal law as moral or conventional maxims that are independent of socio-technical infrastructure, could find my argument a tiring exercise. They may not be interested in the technicalities of what has been called ‘knowledge discovery in databases’ (KDD). However, if as has been argued by a number of legal scholars the epistemic shift generated by the digital revolution has serious implications for the meaning of law, this would also concern the meaning of punishment. To understand these implications we need to come to terms with the technologies that trigger them. This chapter thus offers a tentative exploration of the implications of emerging socio-technical infrastructures of knowledge production for the scope of the criminal law.  After a brief discussion of the meaning of terms like criminal and forensic profiling, I undertake an analysis of proactive forensic profiling as producing novel types of knowledge claims that are highly relevant for proactive criminalization. I will argue that these knowledge claims, typical of actuarial justice, are an affordance of the socio-technical infrastructure of profiling technologies. The novelty of ‘knowledge discovery in databases’ concerns its focus on effective prediction without the need to understand or explain the patterns it uncovers. This brings in the issue of human autonomy in relation to causal determination and freedom of the will: what does it mean that profiling technologies are capable of ‘predicting’ our future behaviours? Rejecting both determinacy and indeterminacy as problematic Cartesian viewpoints, I embrace the underdeterminacy of human agents as situated embodied subjects, and investigate how such underdeterminacy relates to profiling and to the boundaries of criminalization in the present legal framework. In the last section I will argue that the knowledge claims generated by profiling techniques can restrict human freedom if they profile people as correlated objects, whereas they can also enlarge human freedom if they allow people to become aware of the profiles they match. People can realise their potential as correlatable subjects, capable of resisting the correlations they are presented with. Returning to the main point of this chapter, I will conclude that the issue of whether human agents are treated as correlated objects or as correlatable subjects is not just a matter of moral philosophy, but a matter of engaging in the design of the architecture of proactive forensic profiling.</p>

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</description>

<author>Mireille Hildebrandt</author>


<category>Philosophy of Criminal Law</category>

<category>Legal Implications of Emerging Technologies</category>

<category>Safety and Justice</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>Privacy en identiteit in slimme omgevingen</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/36</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 28 Feb 2011 04:12:16 PST</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Omgevingen zijn slim omdat ze anticiperen op ons toekomstig gedrag. Op basis van een voortdurende opslag van data en de permanente analyse daarvan ontwikkelt de slimme omgeving kennis over onze voorkeuren, gewoonten, leefstijl, gezondheid, stemmingen en voornemens. Die kennis is statistisch van aard en de mate waarin toekomstig gedrag daadwerkelijk wordt voorzien hangt af van de juistheid, de relevantie en de compleetheid van de data. Tegelijk moeten we constateren dat wanneer de bewoner van een slimme omgeving op grond van die afgeleide kennis op een bepaalde manier wordt behandeld, de kans bestaat dat zij zich op den duur gaat gedragen naar wat van haar wordt verwacht. In de sociologie heet dat ‘if men define a situation as real, it is real in its consequences’;1 hier kunnen we dat inzicht uitbreiden tot ‘if machines define a situation as real, it is real in its consequences’. In deze bijdrage zal ik mij richten op de vraag in hoeverre het feit dat omgevingen kennis over mij ontwikkelen en die kennis proactief toepassen een aantasting kan zijn van mijn privacy. Ik noem dit het ‘inferentieprobleem’ omdat meestal onzichtbaar is welke afgeleide kennis op mij wordt toegepast. Om te onderzoeken hoe dit zich verhoudt tot de privacy zal ik eerst ingaan op wat hier bedoeld wordt met slimme omgevingen en vervolgens de traditionele opvattingen van privacy bespreken. Ik zal daarna bepleiten dat privacy in het licht van slimme omgevingen het best kan worden opgevat als de bescherming van de vrijheid om onze identiteit zonder onredelijke beperkingen te kunnen ontwikkelen. Na een analyse van het Europeesrechtelijke kader van privacy en gegevensbescherming zal ik de lacunes en tekortkomingen hiervan analyseren met betrekking tot genoemd ‘inferentieprobleem’ en oplossingsrichtingen duiden voor een legitieme privacy verwachting die is gebaseerd op een effectief recht op adequate feedback, zoals bijvoorbeeld toegekend in art. 12 van de Richtlijn Gegevensbescherming. Tenslotte bepreek ik waarom dat transparantierecht, wil het een ‘effective remedy’ zijn, articulatie behoeft in de ICT infrastructuur van slimme omgevingen.</p>

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</description>

<author>Mireille Hildebrandt</author>


<category>Legal Implications of Emerging Technologies</category>

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<title>Criminal Liability and &apos;Smart&apos; Environments</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/35</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 09 Feb 2011 08:13:32 PST</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>The spread of smart applications touches the foundations of the criminal law, notably causality, wrongfulness, and legal personhood. First, distributed multi-agent systems form hybrid networks that exhibit emergent behaviours that cannot be attributed to either one of the agents or explained in terms of an aggregation of actions. This makes it hard to determine which action actually caused the harm or the damage that would normally be addressed by the criminal law. Second, it is hard to imagine a smart environment or infrastructure itself becoming the culprit of a criminal charge, but at some point we may have to concede that the self-management that was inscribed in their programs has actually generated a self that should be called to account for its actions. Such a self would require a measure of empathy and a capacity to reflect on the meaning of one’s actions. If artificial agents develop into artificial life forms they would have to share our vulnerability and the ambiguity of our language for us to call them to account in a criminal court.</p>

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</description>

<author>Mireille Hildebrandt</author>


<category>Philosophy of Criminal Law</category>

<category>Legal Implications of Emerging Technologies</category>

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<title>Juridische bescherming &apos;by design&apos;?</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/34</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 02 Feb 2011 06:56:54 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>Dit is een redactioneel voor het tijdschrift van de Vereniging Wijsbegeerte van het Recht: Rechtsfilosofie & Rechtstheorie. Zie: http://www.bjutijdschriften.nl/tijdschrift/rechtsfilosofieentheorie/2010/2</p>

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</description>

<author>Mireille Hildebrandt</author>


<category>Legal Implications of Emerging Technologies</category>

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<title>The Indeterminacy of an Emergency: Challenges to Criminal Jurisdiction in Constitutional Democracy</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/33</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 26 Jul 2010 02:11:31 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>In this contribution I address the type of emergency that threatens a state’s monopoly of violence, meaning that the state’s competence to provide citizens with ele- mentary security is challenged. The question is, whether actions taken by the state to ward off these threats (should) fall within the ambit of the criminal law. A central problem is the indeterminacy that is inherent in the state of emergency, implicating that adequate mea- sures as well as constitutional constraints to be imposed on such measures cannot easily be determined in advance. This indeterminacy raises two interrelated issues. Firstly, the issue of whether it makes sense to speak of criminal jurisdiction when the existing jurisdiction is challenged as such. To what extent does the indeterminacy call for inherently unlimited powers of the state, implying there can be no such thing as criminal jurisdiction during a state of emergency? Second—if criminal jurisdiction is not in contradiction with the state of emergency—the issue of what criminal liability could mean in such a state needs to be confronted. To what extent does the indeterminacy inherent in the state of emergency jeopardise criminal liability because such indeterminacy engenders severe legal uncer- tainty regarding the standards against which the relevant actions are to be judged? Both issues will be discussed from the perspective of constitutional democracy, assuming that what is at stake in times of emergency is both the competence to sustain the monopoly of violence and the possibility to constrain the powers of the state.</p>

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</description>

<author>Mireille Hildebrandt</author>


<category>Philosophy of Criminal Law</category>

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<title>The Challenges of Ambient Law and Legal Protection in the Profiling Era</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/32</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 17 Jun 2010 01:17:09 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Ambient Intelligence is a vision of a future in which autonomic smart environments take an unprecedented number of decisions both for the private and the public good. It involves a shift to automated pattern recognition, a new paradigm in the construction of knowledge. This will fundamentally a¡ect our lives, increasing speci¢c types of errors, loss of autonomy and privacy, unfair discrimination and stigmatisation, and an absence of due process. Current law’s articula- tion in the technology of the printed script is inadequate in the face of the new type of knowledge generation. A possible solution is to articulate legal protections within the socio-technical infra- structure. In particular, both privacy-enhancing and transparency-enhancing technologies must be developed that embed legal rules in ambient technologies themselves.This vision of ‘Ambient Law’ requires a novel approach to law making which addresses the challenges of technology, legitimacy, and political-legal theory. Only a constructive and collaborative e¡ort to migrate law from books to other technologies can ensure that Ambient Law becomes reality, safeguard- ing the fundamental values underlying privacy, identity, and democracy in tomorrow’s ambient intelligent world.</p>

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<author>Mireille Hildebrandt et al.</author>


<category>Legal Implications of Emerging Technologies</category>

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<title>Law, Human Agency and Autonomic Computing. The Philosophy of Law Meets the Philosophy of Technology</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/31</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 01 Apr 2010 11:39:45 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Autonomic computing refers to self-managing computing systems that are capable of reconfiguring their own program in order to sustain their functionality. It implies a minimisation of human intervention and raises a host of questions around the issues of personal autonomy, identity, legal personhood and what has been called 'the statistical governance of the real' (Rouvroy).</p>
<p>This edited volume contains chapters by legal philosophers such as Massimo Durante, Roger Brownsword, Mireille Hildebrandt, Hyo Kang, Stefano Rodota and Antoinette Rouvroy, confronted with philosophers of technology such as Don Ihde, Jos de Mul and Bibi van den Berg, Jannis Kallinikos, Paul Mathias and Peter-Paul Verbeek.</p>

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</description>

<author>Mireille Hildebrandt</author>


<category>Legal Implications of Emerging Technologies</category>

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<title>Recht en markt: met falen en opstaan</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/30</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 01 Apr 2010 11:16:36 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Inleiding</p>
<p>Mijn waardering voor Aernout Schmidts bescheidenheid, eruditie en historisch besef is des te groter nu hij tegelijk een scherp analyticus is, altijd bereid om wat voor de hand ligt af te zetten tegen wat onder de voet wordt gelopen. De verscheidenheid van zijn belangstelling drong zich op toen hij liet vallen dat hij Heimito Doderers Die Strudlhofstiege ging aanschaffen, waardoor ik een nieuw stukje van mijn eigen onwetendheid en een nieuwe auteur van het formaat van Musil ontdekte. Schrijvend over het Wenen van de eer- ste helft van de 20e eeuw voegt Doderer zich in de lange rij van Midden-Europese overgangsfiguren die worstelden met de confrontatie tussen een rationalistisch, op natuurwetenschappelijke causaliteiten gebaseerd wereld- beeld en de duistere oprispingen van het onderbewuste. Voorzover Doderer de verheerlijking van het onbewuste weet te vermijden die in sommige interpretaties van Schopenhauer, Nietzsche en Freud naar voren treedt, zou ik hem zelfs aan kunnen halen bij het formuleren van een kritiek op het rationele keuzemodel dat ten grondslag ligt aan de economische analyse van het recht.</p>
<p>Zo’n kritiek is echter al eerder geschreven en de huidige generatie rechts-economen lijkt zich bewust te zijn van de caveats bij haar uitgangspunten.3 In dit hoofdstuk zal ik mij in eerste instantie dan ook beperken tot de vraag in hoeverre nieuwe ICT-infrastructuren tot een vorm van marktfalen kunnen leiden die de effectiviteit en de legitimiteit van rechtsregels aantast. Bij het zoeken naar remedies zal ik vervolgens aandacht besteden aan de mate waarin een economische analyse recht kan doen aan juridische begrippen die constitutief zijn voor een rechtsstatelijke democratie. Ik zal de vraag verder inperken door haar toe te spitsen op de bescherming van privacy in het tijdperk van profileringstechnologie.</p>

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<author>Mireille Hildebrandt</author>


<category>Legal Implications of Emerging Technologies</category>

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<title>Zorg om voorzorg</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/29</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 26 Feb 2010 02:57:00 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>De bundel 'Zorg om voorzorg', komt voort uit de studiedag van 7 november 2008 met dezelfde naam, naar aanleiding van het verschijnen van het boek 'De voorzorgcultuur' van Roel Pieterman en het advies van de WRR inzake 'Onzekere Veiligheid'.</p>
<p>De inleiding van mijn hand is toegevoegd. Naast een beschrijving van de verschillende hoofdstukken biedt deze inleiding ook een kritische reflectie op het gehanteerde begrippenkader. Een aantal auteurs plaatsen voorzorg in het verlengde van extreme preventie en bepleiten de kosten-batenanalyse als panacea voor verantwoord beslissen in onzekerheid. Daartegenover pleit ik voor een voorzorgbeginsel dat ziet op verschillende vormen van onzekerheid, zoals bijvoorbeeld in kaart gebracht door Andrew Stirling. Ik wijs er ook op dat in geval van onzekerheid een kosten-baten analyse net zo min als toepassing van het voorzorgbeginsel kan voorschrijven welke beslissing genomen moet worden. Om die reden zijn zowel de kosten-batenanalyse als het voorzorgbeginsel nuttige instrumenten voor beleidsvorming, die uiteindelijk om politieke besluitvorming vraagt.</p>

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</description>

<author>Mireille Hildebrandt et al.</author>


<category>Philosophy of Criminal Law</category>

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<item>
<title>Human rights as preconditions for intercultural society</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/28</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/28</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 18 Feb 2010 05:06:59 PST</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>In this contribution human rights will be considered not simply as conditions for an intercultural society such as the European Union but as preconditions, or, in other words, human rights will be conceptualized as constitutive and not as causal or moral conditions for 'European Integration'. This means that the level of the analysis is epistemological rather than methodological, though at many points I will indicate the consequences of this approach for the way comparative law can be practiced, if it is to contribute to an intercultural 'area of freedom, security and justice' (art. 29 of the Treaty of the European Union). In par. 2 I will reflect on the use of the term European, that refers to much more than a geographical territory or an economic market. In par. 3 I will question the idea of European Integration, which I will elucidate in par. 4 by a conceptualization of 'the intercultural' as a shifting fluidium of diversities. In par. 5 I will move to the constitutive meaning of human rights for a European 'Rechtsstaat' and in par. 6 I will conclude this exercise by pointing out the possible contribution of comparative law for the ongoing institutionalization of human rights as preconditions for an intercultural European area of freedom, security and justice.</p>

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<author>Mireille Hildebrandt</author>


<category>Safety and Justice</category>

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<title>The Meaning and the Mining of Legal Texts</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/27</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 18 Feb 2010 00:35:12 PST</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Positive law, inscribed in legal texts, entails an authority not inherent in literary texts, generating legal consequences that can have real effects on a person’s life and liberty. The interpretation of legal texts, necessarily a normative undertaking, resists the mechanical application of rules, though still requiring a measure of predictability, coherence with other relevant legal norms and compliance with constitutional safeguards. The present proliferation of legal texts on the internet (codes, statutes, judgments, treaties, doctrinal treatises) renders the selection of relevant texts and cases next to impossible. We may expect that systems to mine these texts to find arguments that support one’s case, as well as expert systems that support the decision-making process of courts, will end up doing much of the work. This raises the question of the difference between human interpretation and computational pattern-recognition and the issue of whether this difference makes a difference for the meaning of law. Possibly, data mining will produce patterns that disclose habits of the minds of judges and legislators that would have otherwise gone unnoticed (reinforcing the argument of the ‘legal realists’ at the beginning of the 20th century). Also, after the data analysis it will still be up to the judge to decide how to interpret the results or up to the prosecution which patterns to engage in the construction of evidence (requiring a hermeneutics of computational patterns instead of texts). My focus in this paper regards the fact that the mining process necessarily disambiguates the legal texts in order to transform them into a machine-readable data set, while the algorithms used for the analysis embody a strategy that will co-determine the outcome of the patterns. There seems a major due process concern here to the extent that these patterns are invisible for the naked human eye and will not be contestable in a court of law, due to their hidden complexity and computational nature. This position paper aims to explain what is at stake in the computational turn with regard to legal texts. This prepares for the question I want to put forward to those involved in distant reading and not-reading of texts: could a visualization of computational patterns constitute a new way of un-hiding the complexity involved, opening the results of computational ‘knowledge’ to citizens’ scrutiny?</p>

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<author>Mireille Hildebrandt</author>


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<title>Controlling Security in a Culture of Fear</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/26</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 26 Jan 2010 14:00:38 PST</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Who controls security in a culture of fear? The erosion of traditional safeguards in the quest for security raises questions about the meaning of justice, public protection, legal safeguards and resilience. The book presents a cross-disciplinary exchange on the notion of fear and its influence on international criminal, economic and security policy. The authors chart new lines of research as they proffer a variety of perspectives on the problems and trends that are emerging from national and international responses to insecurity. The diversity of the views expressed in this volume underscores the complexities of assuring security in a world beset by a culture of fear.   In attach please find an earlier version of the introduction</p>

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</description>

<author>Mireille Hildebrandt</author>


<category>Philosophy of Criminal Law</category>

<category>Safety and Justice</category>

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<title>Bridging the Accountability Gap: Rights for New Entities in the Information Society?</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/25</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 31 Jul 2009 14:10:01 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>New entities in the information society that operate at increasing distance from the physical persons ‘behind’ them, such as pseudonyms, avatars, software agents, and robots, challenge the law. One way of addressing this challenge is to attribute legal rights and/or duties in some contexts to non-humans, thus creating entities that are addressable in law themselves rather than the persons ‘behind’ them. In this article, we review existing literature on rights for non-humans, with a particular focus on emerging entities in the information society. We discuss three strategies for the law to deal with the challenge of these new entities: interpreting and extending existing law, introducing limited legal personhood with strict liability, and granting full legal personhood. Full legal personhood implies that entities can be held liable for culpable and wrongful action and can claim (post)human rights like freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial. To assess these strategies, we distinguish between different types of persons (natural, legal, and moral) and different types of agency (automatic, autonomic, and autonomous). We conclude that interpretation and extension of the law seems to work well enough with today’s emerging entities, but that sooner or later, attributing limited legal personhood with strict liability is probably a good solution to bridge the accountability gap for autonomic entities; for software agents, this may be sooner rather than later. The technology underlying new entities will, however, have to develop considerably further from facilitating autonomic behaviour to affording autonomous action, before it becomes legally relevant to attribute ‘posthuman’ rights to new entities.</p>

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</description>

<author>Mireille Hildebrandt et al.</author>


<category>Legal Implications of Emerging Technologies</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>Profiling and AmI</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/24</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/24</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 14 Jun 2009 04:17:15 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Some of the most critical challenges for ‘the future of identity in information society’ must be located in the domain of automated profiling practices. Profiling technologies enable the construction and application of group profiles used for targeted advertising, anti-money laundering, actuarial justice, etc. Profiling is also the  conditio sine qua non for the realisation of the vision of Ambient Intelligence. Though automated profiling seems to provide the only viable answer for the increasing information overload and though it seems to be a promising tool for the selection of relevant and useful information, its invisible nature and pervasive character may affect core principles of democracy and the rule of law, especially privacy and non-discrimination. In response to these challenges we suggest  novel types of protection next to the existing data protection regimes. Instead of focusing on the protection of personal data, these novel tools focus on the protection against invisible or unjustified profiling. Finally, we develop the idea of Ambient Law, advocating a framework of technologically embedded legal rules that guarantee a transparency of profiles that should allow European citizens to decide which of their data they want to hide, when and in which context.</p>

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</description>

<author>Mireille Hildebrandt</author>


<category>Legal Implications of Emerging Technologies</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>Who is Profiling Who? Invisible Visibility</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/23</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/23</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 14 Jun 2009 03:56:32 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Asking the question whether the fundamental concepts of the Data Protection regulation are still adequate presumes that data protection should be our prime concern. In this paper I will argue that autonomic profiling, based on advanced forms of pattern recognition, produces a type of knowledge that requires both more and less than the protection of personal data. Taking into account the role played by new – non-human – actors such as intelligent agents and distributed multi-agent systems, the legal framework needs a more fundamental reconstruction. Privacy should not be reduced to the hiding of personal data and autonomy should not be reduced to the right to withhold consent in a situation whereas people have no idea of the consequences of the processing of their data. Besides, the invisible visibility of lifestyles, health-risks, earning capacity and other personalised profiles creates the possibility for sophisticated social sorting, requiring concern for illegitimate discrimination. Above all, however, the invisivle visibility warrants legal and technological transparency tools that are lacking in both the legal framework and the design of technological infrastructure of smart environments.</p>

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</description>

<author>Mireille Hildebrandt</author>


<category>Legal Implications of Emerging Technologies</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>JUSTICE AND POLICE: REGULATORY OFFENSES AND THE CRIMINAL LAW</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/22</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/22</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 13 May 2009 07:07:06 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This contribution stems from a workshop on foundational issues in the philosophy of criminal law. This may raise expectations for a discussion of the core business of what is called substantive criminal law: the structure of crime, the concept of intention, complicity and participation, attempt and preparation; acts and omissions; or causation.However, most punitive sanctions— especially ﬁnes—concern regulatory offenses that are structured to a much lesser extent by such moral notions as culpability and wrongfulness, while the applicable burden of proof does not even come close to the presumption of innocence in the case of criminal offenses. This raises the question of how the difference between regulatory and criminal offenses is to be understood and of the extent to which regulatory offenses (should) fall within the scope of the criminal law. The answers to these questions will be derived from an exploration of the historicity of crimes and regulatory offenses, and their relationship to the (modern) state. I will start off with tracing the emergence of contraventionsand criminain the course of the early and late Middle Ages and the subsequent advent of a domain of “police” at the threshold of modernity next to the already existing domain of “justice.” After this the strict separation of the domains of “police” (covering Polizeidelikten) and “justice” (covering Verbrechen and Vergehen) in nineteenth-century Germany will be discussed as well as the relationship of both domains to different conceptions of the Rechtsstaat and the État de droit. The main argument will be that understanding the difference between criminal and regulatory offenses in essentialist terms, such as the medieval malum in se and malum prohibitum,does not make sense. Building on a nonessentialist difference I will suggest that differential procedural constraints should be based on pragmatic arguments, which, however, do not equate with utilitarian arguments. In line with philosophical pragmatism the separation of means and end that characterizes utilitarianism is rejected and replaced by a pragmatic approach grounded in the normative position of a constitutional democracy in the sense of an État de droit or a substantive conception of the Rechtsstaat. This implies that the aim of punishing regulatory offenses is to sustain an effective domain of “police” under the rule of law, meaning that the punishment of regulatory offenses will have to be regulated by the same principles that inform the “fair trial.” This will allow the state to impose punitive sanctions to prevent and retaliate violations of speciﬁc legal norms, while enabling citizens to contest the incriminated violation as well as the lawfulness of the violated legal rule.</p>

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</description>

<author>Mireille Hildebrandt</author>


<category>Philosophy of Criminal Law</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>Profiling: from data to knowledge. Challenges of a crucial technology</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/21</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/21</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 19 Apr 2009 03:30:19 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Profling is not about data but about knowledge. It provides a crucial technology for a society that is flooded with noise and information. Profiling is another term for sophisticated pattern recognition, and the enabling technolgy for Ambient Intelligence. It confronts us with a new type of inductive knowledge, inferred by means of automated algorithms. To the extent that decisions that impact our lives are based on this knowledge, we need to develop the means to make it accessible for individual citizens and provide them with the legal and technological tools to anticipate and contest these knowledge claims or to challenge their implications.</p>

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</description>

<author>Mireille Hildebrandt</author>


<category>Legal Implications of Emerging Technologies</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>Vrijheid en straf. Ontstaan en ontwikkeling van straf en strafrecht in het denken van P.W.A. Immink (1908-1965)</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/20</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/20</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 14 Apr 2009 01:14:28 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Internationaal terrorisme en ander vormen van grensoverschrijdend geweld roepen oude en nieuwe vragen op ten aanzien van de relatie tussen wraak, straf, vete en oorlog. Waar houdt het strafrecht op en wat wacht ons daarna: een rechtsvrije ruimte, oorlog(srecht) en/of alternatieve geschillenbeslechting? In hoeverre kunnen de instrumentele en rechtsbeschermende aspecten van het strafrecht vorm krijgen in crisissituaties die de macht van de nationale staat lijken uit te hollen? In hoeverre beschermt het strafrecht onze vrijheid en (hoe) kan die vrijheid vorm krijgen buiten het gezag van de staat? In 'Vrijheid en straf' wordt studie gemaakt van het werk van de Groningse rechtshistoricus Immink, die zich bezighield met het ontstaat van straf en strafrecht vóór en in de vroege middeleeuwen. Wat Immink interesseert is vooral de overgang van de Oudgermaanse niet-statelijke samenleving naar het Frankische rijk. In die overgang situeert hij het ontstaan van de straf en een omwenteling in de vrijheid die uiteindelijk mede ten grondslag ligt aan ons vrijheidsbegrip. Hoewel zijn onderzoek geen rechtstreeks antwoord geeft op bovenstaande vragen, biedt het een gedegen zicht op de historische achtergronden van de relatie tussen strafrecht en soevereiniteit.</p>

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</description>

<author>Mireille Hildebrandt</author>


<category>Philosophy of Criminal Law</category>

</item>





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