Copyright (c) 2009 Melbourne Business School All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/mbs Recent documents in Melbourne Business School en-us Sun, 22 Nov 2009 07:15:56 PST 3600 http://works.bepress.com/hakan_tarakci/11 http://works.bepress.com/hakan_tarakci/11 Sun, 22 Nov 2009 05:54:20 PST We study the effects of learning and forgetting on maintenance outsourcing in this paper. This is an extension of the paper by Tarakci et al. (2009), which analyzed the effects of learning on maintenance outsourcing. In our model, a manufacturer offers a short-term outsourcing contract, where payment includes a fixed value along with cost subsidization for each preventive maintenance activity, to an external contractor. The contractor schedules and performs preventive maintenance activities as well as repairs the system if there is a failure. We consider two types of learning: natural learning and learning by costly efforts. We then analyze the system when forgetting takes place under each learning type. We assume that the forgetting follows the "realistic forgetting function" properties. We demonstrate that a well-designed payment scheme can motivate the contractor to select the maintenance schedule that maximizes the manufacturer's profit. Hakan Tarakci BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, MANAGEMENT (0454) OPERATIONS RESEARCH (0796) ECONOMICS, COMMERCE-BUSINESS (0505) http://works.bepress.com/hakan_tarakci/10 http://works.bepress.com/hakan_tarakci/10 Sun, 22 Nov 2009 05:38:52 PST In this paper we consider a production-maintenance problem in which a buyer and a supplier have already entered into a contractual relationship for a firm delivery date. Our focus is on the production-related decisions of the supplier rather than the nature of the contract itself. We assume that production rate is actually constant as long as the system is up and running but randomness arises in production due to downtimes as a result of unpredictable failures (breakdowns) and scheduled preventive maintenance activities. Production maintenance is outsourced. As production output is random due to unreliable production facilities, the supplier needs to make two important decisions: (i) how much time to allow for production taking into account the trade off between the penalty fee if actual production time turns out to be longer than the allowed time and the inventory holding cost if the production time is shorter than the allowed time and (ii) how to design the maintenance outsourcing contract to maximize its own profit while satisfying the contractor's reservation (minimum) profit requirements. This is a finite horizon optimization problem. A regenerative stochastic process is identified and analyzed to develop the cost function over the finite horizon. The optimization problem is illustrated through numerical examples. Some managerial insights with regard to coordination are also provided. Sharafali Moosa BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, MANAGEMENT (0454) OPERATIONS RESEARCH (0796) ECONOMICS, COMMERCE-BUSINESS (0505) http://works.bepress.com/hakan_tarakci/9 http://works.bepress.com/hakan_tarakci/9 Sun, 22 Nov 2009 05:31:29 PST This paper presents a study on the convergence of workers' skill levels under learning and forgetting in processing time in a batch-manufacturing environment. The convergence properties are examined under assumptions of an infinite horizon, a constant demand rate, and a fixed lot size. Our work extends the convergence results of Teyarachakul, Chand, and Ward (2008) beyond Globerson and Levin's (1987) exponential forgetting function and Wright's (1936) learning curve to more general classes of learning and forgetting functions. We also discuss why early papers other than Teyarachakul, Chand, and Ward (2008) did not find other types of long-term behaviors beyond convergence to a fixed point, and illustrate how our model could be modified and applied to other circumstances. Sunantha Teyarachakul BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, MANAGEMENT (0454) OPERATIONS RESEARCH (0796) ECONOMICS, COMMERCE-BUSINESS (0505) http://works.bepress.com/amanda_sinclair/5 http://works.bepress.com/amanda_sinclair/5 Wed, 18 Nov 2009 15:53:40 PST This article argues that leadership development is a process of seduction.Drawing on some stories of leadership development from my experience as participant, observer and teacher I show the ways in which certain sorts of highly valued leadership teaching contain seductive elements, including sweeping audiences off their feet and, in some contexts, forestalling critique about the content that is offered. The article also considers the extent to which seduction is a gendered performance. I conclude that, while gender and power are defining elements and constraints in how seductive pedagogical relations are constructed, there are opportunities for experimentation and display that potentially subvert gendered stereotypes. Seeing the seduction in leadership can help us understand leadership and leadership teaching better, and can open the way to doing it differently -- to experimentation and innovation. Amanda Sinclair