Martin Gaynor

A Bargain at Twice the Price? California Hospital Prices in the New Millennium

Yaa Akosa Antwi et al. — Sat, 05 Jun 2010 10:17:52 PDT

We use data from California to document and offer possible explanations for the sharp increase in hospital prices charged to private payers after 1999. We find a downward trend in price for private pay patients in the 1990s and a rapid upward trend beginning in 1999, amounting to an annual average increase of 10.6% per year over 1999-2005. Prices in 2006 were almost double prices in 1999. By contrast, there was little discernable trend in prices for Medicare and Medicaid patients, although these prices varied from year-to-year. Surprisingly, the increase in prices is not correlated, geographically, with the change in hospital market concentration. For example, the greatest price rises came from hospitals in monopoly and highly concentrated counties which experienced little or no change over our sample period. Two recent California state hospital regulations, the seismic retrofit mandate and the mandatory nurse staffing ratio affected hospital costs. However, the cost increases due to the nursing staffing regulations are not large enough to account for the price increase, and the price increase is not substantially correlated with the costs of compliance with the seismic retrofit mandate. Therefore, the source of the near-doubling of California hospital prices remains something of a mystery.

Does the Profit Motive Make Jack Nimble? Ownership Form and the Evolution of the U.S. Hospital Industry

Sujoy Chakravarty et al. — Sat, 05 Jun 2010 10:17:52 PDT

We examine the evolving structure of the U.S. hospital industry since 1970, focusing on how ownership form influences entry and exit behavior. We develop theoretical predictions based on the model of Lakdawalla and Philipson, in which for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals differ regarding their objectives and costs of capital. The model predicts for-profits would be quicker to enter and exit than not-for-profits in response to changing market conditions. We test this hypothesis using data for all U.S. hospitals from 1984 through 2000. Examining annual and regional entry and exit rates, for-profit hospitals consistently have higher entry and exit rates than not-for-profits. Econometric modeling of entry and exit rates yields similar patterns. Estimates of an ordered probit model of entry indicate that entry is more responsive to demand changes for for-profit than not-for-profit hospitals. Estimates of a discrete hazard model for exit similarly indicate that negative demand shifts increase the probability of exit more for for-profits than not-for-profits. Finally, membership in a hospital chain significantly decreases the probability of exit for for-profits, but not not-for-profits.

Substitution, Spending Offsets, and Prescription Drug Benefit Design

Martin Gaynor et al. — Sat, 05 Jun 2010 10:17:51 PDT

Many U.S. employers have recently adopted less generous prescription drug benefits. In addition, in 2006 the U.S. began to offer prescription drug insurance to approximately 42 million Medicare beneficiaries. We used data on individual health insurance claims and benefit data from 1997 to 2003 to study how changes in consumers’ co-payments for prescription drugs affect use of and expenditure on prescription drugs, inpatient care, and outpatient care. We analyzed the effects both in the year of the co-payment change and in the year following the change. Our results show that increases in prescription drug prices reduce both use of and spending on prescription drugs. They also show that consumers substitute the use of outpatient care for prescription drug use and that about 35% of the expenditure reductions on prescription drugs are offset by increases in other spending.