Welcome to my academic website. I am a Research Associate affiliated to the Institut für Mikroökonomische Theorie, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. I received my Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Amsterdam (2011, cum laude), Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics. My thesis "Vertical Relations in Cartel Theory" is available for download at carteltheory.com. In February 2012, it was awarded the 2012 Concurrences PhD Thesis Award at the annual conference of the Concurrences Journal and the Institute of Competition Law in Paris. Prior to my Ph.D., I obtained an M.Sc. in Econometrics and Mathematical Economics (2007, with distinction) from the London School of Economics (LSE), a B.Sc. in Econometrics (2006, cum laude), an M.Sc. in Medicine (2005), and a propaedeutics in Cultural Studies (2003) from the University of Amsterdam. My research interests are in Industrial Organization, Competition Policy, Contract Theory and Law & Economics. I have a special interest in managerial incentives in cartels. In April 2011, my co-author Charles Angelucci (Toulouse / Harvard) and I have been awarded the 2011 Robert F. Lanzillotti Prize for the Best Paper in Antitrust Economics at the International Industrial Organization Conference (IIOC) in Boston for our paper "Monitoring Managers Through Corporate Compliance Programs".
Managerial Incentives in Cartels
Short-Term Managerial Contracts and Cartels (2011)
This paper shows how a series of commonly observed short-term CEO employment contracts can improve...
Strategic Delegation Improves Cartel Stability (2011)
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) show that strategic delegation reduces firm profits in...
Monitoring Managers Through Corporate Compliance Programs (with Charles Angelucci), Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2010-14 (2010)
Compliance programs entail monitoring of employees' behavior with the claimed objective of fighting corporate crime....
Buyer Groups & Cartels
Efficient Cartelization Through Buyer Groups (with Chris Doyle), Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2009-03 (2012)
In industries with unobservable wholesale contracting, retailers may enjoy cartel rents in their output market...
Antitrust Damages
The Overcharge as a Measure for Antitrust Damages (with Maarten Pieter Schinkel and Jan Tuinstra), Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper Series 2008-08 (2008)
Victims of antitrust violations can recover damages in court. Yet, the quantification of antitrust damages...