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<title>W. Mark C. Weidemaier</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2012  All rights reserved.</copyright>
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<title>Judging Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mark_weidemaier/8</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 09 Jan 2012 12:54:10 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>Common wisdom has it that arbitrators neither follow nor make precedent, with potentially dire consequences. These include the failure to enforce individual rights and the possibility that, over time, widespread use of arbitration will result in the decay or destruction of the law itself. Although difficult to test directly, this common wisdom can be explored indirectly by analyzing arbitrators’ citation practices. This article conducts such an analysis using a unique dataset of published arbitration awards from four US arbitration regimes: securities, labor, employment, and class action arbitration. It explores how arbitrators use precedent and where that precedent comes from, and it attempts a tentative comparison between the citation practices of judges and arbitrators.</p>
<p>Outside of securities and (to some extent) labor arbitration, the arbitrators in the sample routinely wrote lengthy awards that were substantially devoted to legal analysis and that made extensive use of precedent. The vast majority of cited precedent, moreover, came from published judicial opinions. Arbitrators did cite to past arbitration awards, but primarily to fill gaps in the law created by government actors. On the whole, the evidence provides little support for the view that arbitrators and judges engage in qualitatively different kinds of decision-making or opinion-writing.</p>

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<author>W. Mark C. Weidemaier</author>


<category>Articles</category>

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<title>How Markets Work: The Lawyer&apos;s Version</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mark_weidemaier/7</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 26 Jul 2011 08:39:28 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>In this article, we combine two sources of data to shed light on the nature of transactional legal work. The first consists of stories about contracts that circulate widely among elite transactional lawyers. Surprisingly, the stories portray lawyers as ineffective market actors who are uninterested in designing superior contracts, who follow rather than lead industry standards, and who depend on governments and other outside actors to spur innovation and correct mistakes. We juxtapose these stories against a dataset of sovereign bond contracts produced by these same lawyers. While the stories suggest that lawyers do not compete or design innovative contracts, their contracts suggest the contrary. The contracts, in fact, are entirely consistent with a market narrative in which lawyers engage in substantial innovation despite constraints inherent in sovereign debt legal work. This raises a puzzle: Why would lawyers favor stories that paint them in a negative light and deny them a potent role as market actors? We conclude with some conjectures as to why this might be so.</p>

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<author>W. Mark C. Weidemaier et al.</author>


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<title>Contracting for State Intervention</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mark_weidemaier/6</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 28 Feb 2011 12:38:45 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>Most models of contracting behavior assume that contract terms are meant to be enforced, whether through legal or relational means. That assumption extends to dispute resolution terms like arbitration clauses. According to theory, contracting parties adopt arbitration clauses because they want to arbitrate disputes and because they believe that a counter-party who has agreed to arbitrate will keep that promise rather than incur the resulting legal or extra-legal sanction.</p>
<p>In this article, I describe how this standard account cannot explain the origins of arbitration clauses in sovereign bond contracts. Drawing on original archival research and secondary sources, the article traces the routine use of arbitration clauses to U.S. dollar diplomacy in the first decades of the 20th century and shows that these early clauses were not designed to facilitate an arbitration between lender and borrower. Instead, the clauses were designed to justify intervention by capital-exporting states on behalf of disappointed citizen-investors and to convince prospective investors that the prospect of such intervention would deter default. These early arbitration clauses, then, were little more than efforts to signify and project power by capital-exporting states. The article traces the evolution of arbitration clauses over the first half of the century and concludes that lenders often hoped (typically in vain) that these clauses would enable them to harness the enforcement capacity of state actors.</p>

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<author>W. Mark C. Weidemaier</author>


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<title>Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mark_weidemaier/5</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 23 Apr 2010 10:52:28 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>The claim that arbitrators do not create precedent recurs throughout the arbitration literature. As an empirical matter, however, it is increasingly clear that, in some arbitration systems, arbitrators often cite to other arbitrators, claim to rely on past awards, and promote adjudicatory consistency as an important system norm. Much like courts, then, arbitrators can (but do not always) create precedent that guides future behavior and provides a language in which disputants, lawyers, and adjudicators can express and resolve grievances. This Article provides a theoretical foundation for understanding the conditions under which such precedent will (or will not) arise. It identifies three considerations that may account for the development of precedent across a range of arbitration systems: (1) whether the arbitration system is structurally conducive to the creation of precedent; (2) whether arbitral precedent functions to fill gaps in (or displace) state-supplied law; and (3) whether arbitrators are likely to be viewed as legitimate producers of law in the relevant context. After explaining the relevance of these considerations, the Article explores how they might apply in different arbitration contexts and sets forth a research agenda capable of shedding light on arbitration not only as a mechanism for resolving disputes, but also as a mechanism for generating robust systems of privately made law.</p>

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<author>W. Mark C. Weidemaier</author>


<category>Articles</category>

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<title>From Court-Surrogate to Regulatory Tool: Re-Framing the Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mark_weidemaier/4</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 11 Feb 2009 14:55:02 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>A growing body of empirical research explores the use of arbitration to resolve employment disputes., typically by comparing arbitration to litigation using relatively traditional outcome measures: who wins, how much, and how quickly. On the whole, this research suggests that employees fare reasonably well in arbitration. Yet there remain sizeable gaps in our knowledge. This Article explores these gaps with two goals in mind. The first and narrower goal is to explain why it remains exceedingly difficult to assess the relative fairness of arbitration and litigation. The outcome research does not account for a variety of “filtering” mechanisms that influence the relative merits of the cases adjudicated in each system. This Article explores these filters, focusing on one in particular: most employee grievances are resolved within the workplace through relatively informal procedures. Workplace structures thus filter out most employee grievances before they reach arbitration. This fact has significant implications for efforts to interpret the arbitration outcome research. It also highlights the significance of the workplace as a locus of dispute resolution activity. Indeed, a growing body of research focuses directly on workplace compliance and grievance procedures.</p>
<p>Recognizing the significance of workplace dispute resolution leads to this Article’s broader goal. That goal is to expose, and hopefully bridge, an artificial conceptual divide that separates arbitration research from research into workplace dispute resolution. Many researchers view internal compliance and grievance procedures as a means of harnessing the employer’s own regulatory capacity. This conception drives a research agenda that explores the role of workplace structures in generating private norms and in implementing (or subverting) public norms like anti-discrimination. By contrast, the arbitration outcome research conceives of arbitration narrowly as a court surrogate, one that should ideally yield equivalent outcomes at lower cost. Although legitimate to a degree, this conception artificially separates arbitration from other employer-structured disputing procedures and yields an empirical agenda that leaves fundamental questions unanswered. This Article closes by discussing two of these questions: First, do arbitrators play a meaningful regulatory role, either by shaping other arbitrators’ practices or by shaping the terms of arbitration contracts? Second, under what circumstances do arbitrators effectively generate and enforce norms?</p>

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<author>W. Mark C. Weidemaier</author>


<category>Articles</category>

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<title>Disputing Boilerplate</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mark_weidemaier/3</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 11 Feb 2009 14:38:10 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>Sovereign bond contracts are thought to consist mostly of boilerplate. That is, except for a handful of custom terms, the contracts are assumed to adopt standard terms that are functionally if not literally identical to those used in other bond contracts. This characterization has important theoretical implications, for standardized terms may be “sticky.” The implication is that market participants may select widely-used terms over terms that would be optimal on their own merits.</p>
<p>This article explores the phenomenon of standardization in the context of a particular contracting choice: whether to include an arbitration clause in a sovereign bond contract. Most observers take for granted that sovereign bonds adopt boilerplate dispute resolution provisions calling for litigation in foreign courts, typically in New York or in England, even though some parties (by hypothesis) would prefer arbitration. The usual explanation for this discrepancy invokes the inherent “stickiness” of standard terms. This article contests this explanation, demonstrating as an empirical matter that sovereign bond contracts in fact adopt varied dispute resolution terms and arguing that a general preference for litigation, rather than default rule stickiness, best explains the relatively infrequent use of arbitration. In the process, the article raises broader implications for sovereign debt research and for research into contract innovation and change.</p>

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<author>W. Mark C. Weidemaier</author>


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<title>The Arbitration Clause in Context: How Contract Terms do (and do not) Define the Process</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mark_weidemaier/2</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 25 Sep 2008 06:49:52 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>W. Mark C. Weidemaier</author>


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<title>Arbitration and the Individuation Critique</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mark_weidemaier/1</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 25 Sep 2008 06:47:14 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>W. Mark C. Weidemaier</author>


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