Copyright (c) 2010 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/margaret_raymond Recent documents in Margaret Raymond en-us Thu, 26 Aug 2010 01:34:58 PDT 3600 http://works.bepress.com/margaret_raymond/2 http://works.bepress.com/margaret_raymond/2 Tue, 24 Aug 2010 14:59:35 PDT In Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008), the Supreme Court indicated that whether police comply with state law is irrelevant to whether they have acted reasonably under the Fourth Amendment. That’s an overstatement; there are times when the content of state law is critically relevant to whether police actions violate the constitution. One is the traffic stop. Federal courts assessing the constitutionality of traffic stops have developed a body of what might be deemed “federal traffic law” to determine the legality of such stops. The article analyzes and articulates the norms that the federal courts have developed to deal with a variety of recurring situations in which it is claimed that a stop was initiated because the driver violated state traffic law. As the article shows, the courts deem stops reasonable where drivers actually violated state traffic law, but also deem them reasonable in a range of situations where in fact drivers did not violate the law. These situations are typically the product of law enforcement mistakes. While the federal courts take a consistent approach to mistakes regarding facts or mistakes regarding which law applied to particular behavior, they are in conflict about situations in which the law enforcement officer conducting the stop was mistaken about whether the actor’s conduct was unlawful. The article concludes that these situations, where no law rendered the driver’s conduct unlawful, constitute one situation in which state law should conclusively determine the reasonableness of police conduct under the Fourth Amendment. Margaret Raymond Criminal Law and Procedure http://works.bepress.com/margaret_raymond/1 http://works.bepress.com/margaret_raymond/1 Fri, 14 Aug 2009 11:30:56 PDT This article addresses when an actor can be denied a claim of self-defense based on the fact that, at an earlier point in time, she could have avoided the ultimate violent encounter in which she resorted to the use of lethal force. The article analyzes the issue as a problem of “framing,” relying on research from the area of cognitive psychology to point out the critical importance of the framing of an issue to its ultimate resolution. It then identifies a persistent error in the writing of many scholars about this problem. While most commentators assert that the law draws the frame narrowly and that defendants are never denied a claim of self-defense because of their failure to avoid a dangerous situation, they are wrong; a range of cases—both historical and contemporary—deny self-defense claims as a matter of law on the ground that the actor was “looking for trouble” and should have avoided the situation entirely. The article then argues that broadly framing the self-defense inquiry improperly encroaches on the actor’s fundamental right to freedom of choice and movement, defined as the actor’s dignitary interest. Not only does the broad frame impose liability on such an actor without reference to the actor’s culpability, but it permits the subjugation of that actor by a violent aggressor. The article concludes that broad framing impermissibly invades the actor’s dignitary interest. Margaret Raymond Criminal Law and Procedure