Copyright (c) 2009 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns Recent documents in Mara Olekalns en-us Tue, 21 Jul 2009 15:17:36 PDT 3600 http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/17 http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/17 Sun, 19 Jul 2009 17:32:47 PDT Representing negotiations as social exchanges highlights negotiators' implicit obligations to honor exchanges and the risk that they will fail to do so. Based on their representation of the underlying relationship, negotiators are oriented to one of four relational risks (failures in reliability, predictability, benevolence or integrity). The salience of a specific relational risk shifts negotiators' strategic focus and elicits a distinct strategic cluster (deterrence, co-ordination, obligation, collaboration) aimed at offsetting or neutralizing these relational risks. Mara Olekalns Trust in Negotiation http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/16 http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/16 Sun, 19 Jul 2009 17:22:04 PDT The examination of negotiation processes is seen by many researchers as an insurmountable task largely because the required methods are unfamiliar and labor-intensive. In this article, we shed light on a fundamental step in studying negotiation processes, the quantitative coding of data. Relying on videotapes as the primary source of data, we review the steps required to extract usable quantitative data and the lessons we've learned in doing so in our own research. We review our experience working with one large negotiation dataset, Towers Market II, to illustrate two steps within the larger research process: developing a coding scheme and coding the data. We then go on to discuss some of the issues that need to be resolved before data analysis begins. Laurie Weingart Tools for Analysing Negotiators' Communication http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/15 http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/15 Sun, 19 Jul 2009 17:18:29 PDT Markov chain analysis provides a way to investigate how the communication processes in dyadic negotiations are affected by features of the negotiating context and how, in turn, differences in communication processes among dyads affect the quality of the final settlement. In Markov models, the communication process is represented as a sequence of transitions between states, which describes how tactics are used and how they are reciprocated during the course of a negotiation. This article provides an introduction to Markov chain analysis and shows, using simulated data, how Markov chain models may be analyzed using widely-available loglinear modeling software. Model selection, assessment of the order of a chain, analysis of residuals, and sample size are discussed. Philip L. Smith Tools for Analysing Negotiators' Communication http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/14 http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/14 Sun, 19 Jul 2009 17:15:28 PDT Markov chain analysis provides a way to investigate how the communication processes in dyadic negotiations are affected by features of the negotiating context and how, in turn, differences in communication processes among dyads affect the quality of the final settlement. In Markov models, the communication process is represented as a sequence of transitions between states, which describes how tactics are used and how they are reciprocated during the course of a negotiation. This article provides an introduction to Markov chain analysis and shows, using simulated data, how Markov chain models may be analyzed using widely-available loglinear modeling software. Model selection, assessment of the order of a chain, analysis of residuals, and sample size are discussed. Mara Olekalns Tools for Analysing Negotiators' Communication http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/13 http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/13 Sun, 19 Jul 2009 17:08:35 PDT Communication is central to the experience and management of conflict. It is through communication that people express their desires, realize differences, and attempt to resolve those differences. While there is a rich tradition of research on conflict in organizational settings, the focus on the role communication is more recent. In 1987, Putnam and Poole wrote one of the first reviews of this literature, noting that "communication constitutes the essence of conflict in that it undergirds the formation of opposing issues, frames perceptions of the felt conflict, translates emotions and perceptions into conflict behaviors, and sets the stage for future conflicts" (p. 552). However, they also noted that studies of communication in conflict were relatively scarce at that time. Now, almost 20 years later, we readdress this literature. Our goal in this chapter is to review the advances made in the last 20 years in the arena of communication and conflict, assess progress made, and present options for future research. Mara Olekalns Communication Sequences in Negotiation http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/12 http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/12 Sun, 19 Jul 2009 17:04:28 PDT Using a bilateral negotiation, we examined the relationship between motivational orientation, cognitive maps and negotiators' outcomes. Cooperative and competitive negotiators bargained with a counterpart who held either the same or a different orientation. Compared to negotiators in mixed dyads, those in same-orientation dyads placed greater emphasis on cooperation, flexibility and trust; and, less emphasis on competition. Flexibility was critical to joint gain when at least one negotiator held competitive goals, but detrimental when both negotiators held cooperative goals. Negotiators in same orientation dyads reported a more positive experience than negotiators in mixed-orientation dyads. Mara Olekalns Negotiators' Cognition http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/11 http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/11 Sun, 19 Jul 2009 17:02:08 PDT This research tested the relationships between turning points, cognitive and affective trust, and negotiation outcomes. After completing a simulated negotiation, participants identified turning points from videotape. Turning points were then classified as substantive (interest, offer), characterization (positive, negative), or procedural (positive, negative). Pre-negotiation affective trust predicted subsequent turning points whereas pre-negotiation cognitive trust did not, suggesting that different cues influence the two types of trust. Post-negotiation cognitive trust was increased by the occurrence of interest, positive characterization, and positive procedural turning points and decreased by negative characterization turning points. Affective trust was increased by positive procedural turning points. Finally, interest turning points resulted in higher joint outcomes, whereas negative characterization turning points resulted in lower joint outcomes. We conclude that there are two paths to building trust and increasing joint gain, one through insight and one through signaling good faith intentions. Mara Olekalns Turning Points in Negotiation http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/10 http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/10 Sun, 19 Jul 2009 16:59:02 PDT Negotiators' social motives (cooperative versus individualistic) influence their strategic behaviors. This study used multi-level modeling and analyses of strategy sequences to test hypotheses regarding how negotiators' social motives and the composition of the group influence group members' negotiation strategies. Four-person groups negotiating a 5 issue mixed-motive decision making task were videotaped, transcribed, and coded. Group composition included two homogeneous conditions (all cooperators and all individualists) and three heterogeneous conditions (3 cooperators/1 individualist; 2 cooperators/2 individualists; 1 cooperator/3 individualists). Results showed that cooperative negotiators adjusted their use of integrative and distributive strategies in response to the social motive composition of the group, but individualistic negotiators did not. Results from analyses of strategy sequences showed that cooperators responded more systematically to others' behaviors than individualists. They also redirected the negotiation depending on group composition. Laurie Weingart Communication Sequences in Negotiation http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/9 http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/9 Sun, 19 Jul 2009 16:54:35 PDT This research examined how trust affected resource allocation in a 3-party negotiation. Negotiators were presented with an empty core problem in which their theoretical share of resources exceeded the resources available for distribution. We tested which of three components of trust - reliability, predictability and empathy - predicted negotiators' outcomes. We distinguished between absolute and relative trust. We found that relative trust was a more consistent predictor of individual outcomes than absolute trust and that the most trusted party in a network obtained the highest individual outcomes. This finding highlights the importance of social context in shaping trust judgements. The component of trust that predicted individuals' outcomes was affected by structural power. High and low power negotiators benefited from conveying empathy (identity-based trust), whereas moderate power negotiators benefited from conveying predictability (knowledge-based trust). Low power parties also benefited from appearing unreliable (low calculus-based trust). Mara Olekalns Trust in Negotiation http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/8 http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/8 Sun, 19 Jul 2009 16:50:42 PDT In this chapter we examine how social stereotypes affect the perception of women who strive to improve their economic outcomes through negotiation. We discuss how gender affects negotiation process and outcomes by: (a) describing how men and women differ in their approach to negotiation (b) highlighting the social consequences for women who adopt a more competitive negotiation style; and (c) articulating the process by which counter-normative behaviour influences negotiation outcomes. Throughout this chapter, we describe the strategies that enable women to preserve ongoing organisational relationships and simultaneously improve their economic outcomes. Mara Olekalns Gender Stereotypes and Negotiation Strategies http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/7 http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/7 Sun, 19 Jul 2009 16:35:04 PDT A negotiation's opening moments are characterized by high levels of uncertainty. During this phase, individuals screen each other's behavior for clues about underlying goals and motives. Much of this information is conveyed implicitly by the language that negotiators use. The words they choose and the way they respond to the other party provide important clues about negotiators' dominant goals and strategy preferences. At the same time, negotiators use incoming information to assess the other party's intentions. In negotiation, this uncertainty resolves itself into questions about the other party's trustworthiness. Because negotiations are characterized by a vulnerability to the actions of another person, individuals need to resolve uncertainty about the other party's intentions, especially the question of whether the other party will act exploitatively. Consequently, as negotiators monitor the stream of communication, one of their tasks is to determine the likelihood that the other party will act in a self-interested way and claim a greater share of available resources. Mara Olekalns Trust in Negotiation http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/6 http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/6 Sun, 19 Jul 2009 16:29:54 PDT Negotiation is a dynamic process in which negotiators change their strategies in response to each other. We believe mutual adaptation is best conceptualized as an emergent process and is a critical determinant of negotiators' abilities to identify mutually beneficial solutions. We argue that two factors drive the process of negotiation and influence the quality of agreements: alignment of negotiators' strategies across individuals (strategy sequences) and with the negotiation-wide dynamic (phases) and congruence of negotiators' goals. Mara Olekalns Communication Sequences in Negotiation http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/5 http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/5 Sun, 19 Jul 2009 16:25:53 PDT This paper is the introduction to a Special Issue of Group Decision and Negotiation, focusing on emotion in negotiation. Mara Olekalns Emotion in Negotiation http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/4 http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/4 Sun, 19 Jul 2009 16:21:21 PDT A number of studies have shown that certain events that occur during a negotiation can alter its course. Referred to as "turning points," these events are precipitated by actions taken either outside or inside the talks that have consequences for outcomes. In this article, we report the results of two experiments designed to examine the impacts of two types of precipitating actions, external and internal. In the first experiment, which focused on external actions, we found that crises -- as opposed to breakthroughs -- produced more movement in negotiations in which parties viewed the social climate positively (high trust, low power). We found that parties achieved less movement in negative social climates (low trust, high power).In the second experiment, which focused on internal actions, we found that cooperative precipitants (factors inducing change) were more likely to occur when parties negotiated in the context of positive social climates. Negotiation outcomes were also influenced by the climate: we found better individual outcomes for negotiations that occurred in positive climates (high trust, cooperative orientations). Inboth experiments, the social climate of the negotiation moderated the effects of precipitating factors on negotiation outcomes. Perceptions of trust and power filter the way negotiators interpret actions that occur outside or are taken inside a negotiation, which can lead to agreements or impasses. Dan Druckman Turning Points in Negotiation http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/3 http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/3 Sun, 19 Jul 2009 16:11:18 PDT Using a simulated, two-party negotiation, we examined how characteristics of the actor, target, and situation affected deception. To trigger deception, we used an issue that had no value for one of the two parties (indifference issue). We found support for an opportunistic betrayal model of deception: deception increased when the other party was perceived as benevolent, trustworthy and as having integrity. Negotiators' goals also affected the use of deception. Individualistic, cooperative and mixed dyads responded differently to information about the other party's trustworthiness, benevolence and integrity when deciding to either misrepresent or leverage their indifference issue. Mixed dyads displayed opportunistic betrayal. Negotiators in all-cooperative and all-individualistic dyads used different information in deciding whether to leverage their indifference issues and used the same information (benevolence) differently in deciding whether to misrepresent the value of their indifference issue. Mara Olekalns Deception http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/2 http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/2 Sun, 19 Jul 2009 16:07:44 PDT Using a simulated two-party negotiation, we examined how trustworthiness and power balance affected deception. To trigger deception, we used an issue that had no value for one of the two parties. We found that high cognitive trust increased deception whereas high affective trust decreased deception. Negotiators who expressed anxiety also used more deception whereas those who expressed optimism also used less deception. The nature of the negotiating relationship (mutuality and level of dependence) interacted with trust and negotiators' affect to influence levels of deception. Deception was most likely to occur when negotiators reported low trust or expressed negative emotions in the context of non-mutual or low dependence relationships. In these relationships, emotions that signaled certainty were associated with misrepresentation whereas emotions that signaled uncertainty were associated with concealment of information. Negotiators who expressed positive emotions in the context of non-mutual or high dependence relationship also used less deception. Our results are consistent with a fair trade model in which negotiator increase deception when contextual and interpersonal cues heighten concerns about exploitation and decrease deception when these cues attenuate concerns about exploitation. Mara Olekalns Deception http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/1 http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/1 Sun, 19 Jul 2009 15:53:02 PDT Professional women earn less than their male counterparts and this salary gap largely results from the ways men and women negotiate employment terms. We integrate the Stereotype Content Model and Expectancy Violation Theory to explain why traditional "best practice" negotiation behaviors benefit male negotiators but backfire for female negotiators. Gender counter-normative behaviors create negative expectancy violations for women, generating cognitive and emotional backlash from their negotiation partners. We use this theoretical integration to identify alternative strategies that female employees and their employers can use to avoid negative expectancy violations and ensure that women are not disadvantaged in workplace negotiations. Mara Olekalns Gender Stereotypes and Negotiation Strategies