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<title>Mara Olekalns</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2009  All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns</link>
<description>Recent documents in Mara Olekalns</description>
<language>en-us</language>
<lastBuildDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2009 17:44:59 PST</lastBuildDate>
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<title>The Relational Foundations Of  Strategic Choice  In Negotiation</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/17</link>
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<pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2009 17:32:47 PDT</pubDate>
<description>Representing negotiations as social exchanges highlights negotiators' implicit obligations to honor exchanges and the risk that they will fail to do so.    Based on their representation of the underlying relationship,  negotiators are oriented to one of four relational risks (failures in reliability, predictability, benevolence or integrity).   The salience of a specific relational risk shifts negotiators' strategic focus and elicits a distinct strategic cluster (deterrence, co-ordination, obligation, collaboration) aimed at offsetting or neutralizing these relational risks.</description>

<author>Mara Olekalns</author>


<category>Trust in Negotiation</category>

</item>


<item>
<title>Quantitative coding negotiation processes</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/16</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/16</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2009 17:22:04 PDT</pubDate>
<description>The examination of negotiation processes is seen by many researchers as an insurmountable task largely because the required methods are unfamiliar and labor-intensive. In this article, we shed light on a fundamental step in studying negotiation processes, the quantitative coding of data.  Relying on videotapes as the primary source of data, we review the steps required to extract usable quantitative data and the lessons we've learned in doing so in our own research. We review our experience working with one large negotiation dataset, Towers Market II, to illustrate two steps within the larger research process: developing a coding scheme and coding the data.  We then go on to discuss some of the issues that need to be resolved before data analysis begins.</description>

<author>Laurie Weingart</author>


<category>Tools for Analysing Negotiators&apos; Communication</category>

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<item>
<title>Markov chain analyses of communication processes in negotiation</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/15</link>
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<pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2009 17:18:29 PDT</pubDate>
<description>Markov chain analysis provides a way to investigate how the communication processes in dyadic negotiations are affected by features of the negotiating context and how, in turn, differences in communication processes among dyads affect the quality of the final settlement. In Markov models, the communication process is represented as a sequence of transitions between states, which describes how tactics are used and how they are reciprocated during the course of a negotiation. This article provides an introduction to Markov chain analysis and shows, using simulated data, how Markov chain models may be analyzed using widely-available loglinear modeling software. Model selection, assessment of the order of a chain, analysis of residuals, and sample size are discussed.</description>

<author>Philip L. Smith</author>


<category>Tools for Analysing Negotiators&apos; Communication</category>

</item>


<item>
<title>Markov chain analyses of communication processes in negotiation</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/14</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/14</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2009 17:15:28 PDT</pubDate>
<description>Markov chain analysis provides a way to investigate how the communication processes in dyadic negotiations are affected by features of the negotiating context and how, in turn, differences in communication processes among dyads affect the quality of the final settlement. In Markov models, the communication process is represented as a sequence of transitions between states, which describes how tactics are used and how they are reciprocated during the course of a negotiation. This article provides an introduction to Markov chain analysis and shows, using simulated data, how Markov chain models may be analyzed using widely-available loglinear modeling software. Model selection, assessment of the order of a chain, analysis of residuals, and sample size are discussed.</description>

<author>Mara Olekalns</author>


<category>Tools for Analysing Negotiators&apos; Communication</category>

</item>


<item>
<title>Communication and conflict</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/13</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/13</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2009 17:08:35 PDT</pubDate>
<description>Communication is central to the experience and management of conflict.  It is through communication that people express their desires, realize differences, and attempt to resolve those differences.  While there is a rich tradition of research on conflict in organizational settings, the focus on the role communication is more recent.  In 1987, Putnam and Poole wrote one of the first reviews of this literature, noting that "communication constitutes the essence of conflict in that it undergirds the formation of opposing issues, frames perceptions of the felt conflict, translates emotions and perceptions into conflict behaviors, and sets the stage for future conflicts" (p. 552). However, they also noted that studies of communication in conflict were relatively scarce at that time.  Now, almost 20 years later, we readdress this literature. Our goal in this chapter is to review the advances made in the last 20 years in the arena of communication and conflict, assess progress made, and present options for future research.</description>

<author>Mara Olekalns</author>


<category>Communication Sequences in Negotiation</category>

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<item>
<title>Cognitive representations of negotiation</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/12</link>
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<pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2009 17:04:28 PDT</pubDate>
<description>Using a bilateral negotiation, we examined the relationship between motivational orientation, cognitive maps and negotiators' outcomes.   Cooperative and competitive negotiators bargained with a counterpart who held either the same or a different orientation.  Compared to negotiators in mixed dyads, those in same-orientation dyads placed greater emphasis on cooperation, flexibility and trust; and, less emphasis on competition.   Flexibility was critical to joint gain when at least one negotiator held competitive goals, but detrimental when both negotiators held cooperative goals.   Negotiators in same orientation dyads reported a more positive experience than negotiators in mixed-orientation dyads.</description>

<author>Mara Olekalns</author>


<category>Negotiators&apos; Cognition</category>

</item>


<item>
<title>Moments in Time: Metacognition, Trust and Outcomes in Negotiation</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/11</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/11</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2009 17:02:08 PDT</pubDate>
<description>This research tested the relationships between turning points, cognitive and affective trust, and negotiation outcomes.   After completing a simulated negotiation, participants identified turning points from videotape.  Turning points were then classified as substantive (interest, offer), characterization (positive, negative), or procedural (positive, negative).  Pre-negotiation affective trust predicted subsequent turning points whereas pre-negotiation cognitive trust did not, suggesting that different cues influence the two types of trust.  Post-negotiation cognitive trust was increased by the occurrence of interest, positive characterization, and positive procedural turning points and decreased by negative characterization turning points.  Affective trust was increased by positive procedural turning points.  Finally, interest turning points resulted in higher joint outcomes, whereas negative characterization turning points resulted in lower joint outcomes.   We conclude that there are two paths to building trust and increasing joint gain, one through insight and one through signaling good faith intentions.</description>

<author>Mara Olekalns</author>


<category>Turning Points in Negotiation</category>

</item>


<item>
<title>Conflicting Social Motives in Negotiating Groups</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/10</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/10</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2009 16:59:02 PDT</pubDate>
<description>Negotiators' social motives (cooperative versus individualistic) influence their strategic behaviors. This study used multi-level modeling and analyses of strategy sequences to test hypotheses regarding how negotiators' social motives and the composition of the group influence group members' negotiation strategies. Four-person groups negotiating a 5 issue mixed-motive decision making task were videotaped, transcribed, and coded. Group composition included two homogeneous conditions (all cooperators and all individualists) and three heterogeneous conditions (3 cooperators/1 individualist; 2 cooperators/2 individualists; 1 cooperator/3 individualists). Results showed that cooperative negotiators adjusted their use of integrative and distributive strategies in response to the social motive composition of the group, but individualistic negotiators did not. Results from analyses of strategy sequences showed that cooperators responded more systematically to others' behaviors than individualists. They also redirected the negotiation depending on group composition.</description>

<author>Laurie Weingart</author>


<category>Communication Sequences in Negotiation</category>

</item>


<item>
<title>Resolving The Empty Core: Trust As A Determinant Of Outcomes In Three-Party Negotiations</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/9</link>
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<pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2009 16:54:35 PDT</pubDate>
<description>This research examined how trust affected resource allocation in a 3-party negotiation.   Negotiators were presented with an empty core problem in which their theoretical share of resources exceeded the resources available for distribution.   We tested which of three components of trust - reliability, predictability and empathy - predicted negotiators' outcomes.  We distinguished between absolute and relative trust.   We found that relative trust was a more consistent predictor of individual outcomes than absolute trust and that the most trusted party in a network obtained the highest individual outcomes. This finding highlights the importance of social context in shaping trust judgements. The component of trust that predicted individuals' outcomes was affected by structural power.   High and low power negotiators benefited from conveying empathy (identity-based trust), whereas moderate power negotiators benefited from conveying predictability  (knowledge-based trust).   Low power parties also benefited from appearing unreliable (low calculus-based trust).</description>

<author>Mara Olekalns</author>


<category>Trust in Negotiation</category>

</item>


<item>
<title>Sugar &apos;n&apos; Spice and All Things Nice: Gender and Strategy Choices in  Negotiation</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/8</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/8</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2009 16:50:42 PDT</pubDate>
<description>In this chapter we examine how social stereotypes affect the perception of women who strive to improve their economic outcomes through negotiation.  We discuss how gender affects negotiation process and outcomes by: (a) describing how men and women differ in their approach to negotiation (b) highlighting the social consequences for women who adopt a more competitive negotiation style; and (c) articulating the process by which counter-normative behaviour influences negotiation outcomes.  Throughout this chapter, we describe the strategies that enable women to preserve ongoing organisational relationships and simultaneously improve their economic outcomes.</description>

<author>Mara Olekalns</author>


<category>Gender Stereotypes and Negotiation Strategies</category>

</item>



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