Copyright (c) 2010 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/lawrence_atkinson Recent documents in L. Rush Atkinson en-us Thu, 04 Nov 2010 11:40:36 PDT 3600 http://works.bepress.com/lawrence_atkinson/3 http://works.bepress.com/lawrence_atkinson/3 Tue, 24 Aug 2010 05:46:10 PDT In foreign affairs law, many federal policies increase national security at the expense of national wealth, and vice versa. Courts have struggled to find a suitable framework for adjudicating cases arising out of such policy decisions. In the recent case United States v. Eurodif S.A., the Court abandoned its previous assumptions about security-wealth cases, relying instead on the Chevron framework commonly used in administrative law. This Note outlines the shift to Chevron and the relative merits of it vis-à-vis older frameworks for security-wealth cases. It concludes Chevron represents a profound change in the Court’s assumptions about international relations and predicts that this framework, if continued, will have a positive effect on foreign policymaking. L. Rush Atkinson Foreign Affairs Law http://works.bepress.com/lawrence_atkinson/2 http://works.bepress.com/lawrence_atkinson/2 Tue, 24 Aug 2010 05:37:49 PDT The Fourth Amendment protects the innocent only from “unreasonable” searches. In lieu of the limited nature of this constitutional safeguard, law abiders consistently take precautions to avoid government searches. This Article considers why constitutional jurisprudence limits the protection of the innocent to “unreasonable” searches, thereby forcing them to alter their behavior. The most satisfying answer derives from an often overlooked fact: Searches of innocent persons are often “bilateral accidents,” meaning that both the innocent suspect and the police can affect the likelihood of an erroneous search occurring. In bilateral conditions, a reasonableness rule induces both the searcher and searched to take optimal care to avoid mistaken searches, while other rules embodied in constitutional protections—like that within the Takings Clause—cannot.By assigning costs for erroneous-but-reasonable searches to the innocent, the Fourth Amendment functions as an important regulatory device, channeling law abiders away from activity that unintentionally masks others’ criminal enterprises. Thus, the Amendment regulates the very people that it protects from governmental intrusions. This Article refers to this duality as the “bilateral Fourth Amendment,” and argues the Amendment’s incentives for the innocent are best understood as a duty for law-abiding people to act reasonably. At the same time, identifying the “bilateral” nature of searches should influence the legal rules dictating what evidence police may use as grounds to search a suspect. Because the innocent alter their behavior based on which activities the government deems “suspicious,” rules about cause and suspicion cannot singly turn on evidence’s probative value; they must also account for the socially beneficial activity that is reduced by labeling behavior “suspicious.” Lawrence R. Atkinson V Criminal Law and Procedure http://works.bepress.com/lawrence_atkinson/1 http://works.bepress.com/lawrence_atkinson/1 Sat, 27 Jun 2009 07:51:26 PDT In its first years of operation, both the caseload and global role of the International Criminal Court (ICC) have steadily increased. The Court owes much of its success to a coalition of states that has championed a strong, independent judiciary to try heinous international crimes. These states have repeatedly clashed with the United States over a number of issues involving the ICC’s jurisdiction. This article examines the pro-ICC coalition and its strategies during these disputes. It argues that the coalition’s success stems from the make-up of its membership, which endows it with varied sources of power and tempers its principled positions with an understanding of the political realities of the international order. The ICC coalition also serves as a case study of the power politics behind the formation of international law. While international law continues to be forged under the forces of realpolitik, this coalition’s success indicates that power-forged international law does not have to be the handmaiden of the most powerful states. Lawrence R. Atkinson International Law