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<title>Larry A DiMatteo</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2013  All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/larry_dimatteo</link>
<description>Recent documents in Larry A DiMatteo</description>
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<title>Soft Law and the Principle of Fair and Equitable Decisionmaking in International Contract Arbitration</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/larry_dimatteo/12</link>
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<pubDate>Sun, 02 Jun 2013 16:52:00 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>This article provides a survey of the special relationship between international commercial arbitration and soft law instruments. It briefly traces the historical roots of the lex mercatoria to its present enunciation in the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts. It discusses the characteristic of the hardness and softness of laws in an international commercial law context. The CISG is studied not only as a hard law, but also as an example of soft law. The affinity between soft law and international commercial arbitration is explored, as well as the reasons why soft laws possess normative power. It also examines the importance of the use of multiple interpretive methodologies, including the use of soft law, by arbitrators in order to reach fair and reasonable decisions. Finally, it recognizes fair and equitable decision-making as the unifying principle that binds international commercial arbitration and soft law.</p>

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</description>

<author>Larry A. DiMatteo</author>


<category>Commercial Law</category>

<category>International Arbitration</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>An All of the Above Theory of Legal Development</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/larry_dimatteo/11</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/larry_dimatteo/11</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 02 Mar 2012 14:22:10 PST</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This paper reviews different theories of legal development in order to highlight their similarities and differences.  In the end, as in contract theories, no monist view of legal development possesses the explanatory power needed to understand how law has come to be and where it may take us in the future.  What we do have is a foundation built on at least two millennia of legal history.  The intellectual starting point for this project is Nathan Isaacs’ unfinished work on a cycle theory of legal development.  His view of legal development takes issue with Henry Sumner Maine’s thesis that development in advanced legal systems is progressive in nature. And, more importantly for the current undertaking, that this progression is linear in nature.  Instead, Isaacs’ review of thousands of years of Jewish legal development indicated that legal development perpetually progressed in cycles.</p>
<p>The legal evolution that Maine describes in Ancient Law is not directly challenged in this paper. Whether legal development is generally progressive begs the question.  The nature of that progression as a movement from status to contract is what cycle theory rejects.   Maine’s thesis is that progressive societies eventually strip away status-based relationships and replace status with a generic freedom of contract where the characteristics of the contracting parties become irrelevant.  Isaacs argues that taken from a broader historical context legal development is better characterized as cyclical in nature.  In sum, legal development is in perpetual motion moving between status and contract-based relationships.</p>
<p>This paper will focus mostly on the legal development of contract law.  Roger Cotterrell notes that, “at the most basic level contract is the legal concept which most directly links law and economy because of the significance of the numerous forms of exchange transactions for economic development.” Based upon this assessment, the development of contract law in the nineteenth to the twenty-first centuries will act as surrogate or example of legal development in general. The paper further argues that cycle theory collapses the dichotomies of contract law—formalism/realism, literalism/contextualism, facilitation/regulation, standards/rules—into an oscillating continuum between these opposite views of legal reasoning and views of contract law.  The idea of false dichotomies and non-monists views of contract theory may not be novel in nature but, their exploration through the prism of cycle theory presents a new perspective.</p>

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</description>

<author>Larry A. DiMatteo</author>


<category>Commercial Law</category>

<category>Legal History</category>

<category>Jurisprudence</category>

<category>Contracts</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>An &apos;All of the Above&apos; Theory of Legal Development (Revised)</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/larry_dimatteo/10</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/larry_dimatteo/10</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 20 Sep 2011 06:40:44 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>The paper provides a brief background of Nathan Isaacs, his work, and his theory of legal development.  Invariably, when analyzing Isaacs’ claim that history proves that law developments in cycles (status to contract to status) the role of Jewish legal history in the development of his thought will play an important role in understanding his theory.  Isaacs’ was that rare scholar knowledgeable in the common law, as well as, civil law.  A pragmatic realist, as well as a devote Jew.  He was a legal historian and very much a man of the present.  He possessed a Ph.D. in Economics, and S.J.D. from Harvard under the tutelage of Dean Roscoe Pound.  He was a Realist that was critical of the common law of the time, as well as, a firm believer in the ability of the common law to serve the needs of society.</p>
<p>Isaacs was a prolific secular scholar active from 1914 to 1940, as well as, a productive writer of Jewish literature.  He was a visionary in many areas of law.  He was the first to use the term standard form contracts in his 1917 article The Standardizing of Contract; he developed the now famous competing views of the role of the arbitrator—as agent versus as judge.  He recognized the flexibility of the agency and trust concepts, and their future expansion in law.  This came to pass with the development of fiduciary duty law. He forcefully argued that industrial society required tort law to recognize areas of strict liability.  This came to pass with the adoption of strict product liability.  Although, mostly forgotten, and residing deep in the shadows of Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank, Isaacs’ was a visionary who is still cited to the present in numerous areas of the law.</p>
<p>This paper will review a number of theories of legal development with a focus upon Henry Sumner Maine’s progression thesis and Nathan Isaacs’ cycle theory.  Contract law will provide the area to be tested by the different theories of legal development.  Other theories to be discussed include:  evolutionary efficiency, evolutionary biology, and Kuhnian theory.  In the end, the paper advances a theory of cyclical progression.  At the center of this theory is Isaacs’ belief in a principle-based evolution of a living, dynamic law.  An offshoot of this theory is the recognition that the dichotomies of contract law are false dichotomies.  A theory of “all of the above” accepts that elements of both sides of the dichotomies has always and will always exist in contract.  Contract law is formalistic and realistic; literal and contextual; facilitative and restrictive; represented by both standards and rules; and is both freedom and status-based.  Finally, contract law, and law generally, is both cyclical and progressive.</p>

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</description>

<author>Larry A. DiMatteo</author>


<category>Commercial Law</category>

<category>Legal History</category>

<category>Public Law and Legal Theory</category>

<category>Jurisprudence</category>

<category>Contracts</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>EMPLOYMENT, JUSTICE, AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACT</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/larry_dimatteo/8</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/larry_dimatteo/8</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 06 Mar 2011 11:00:49 PST</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>The manuscript is a interdisciplinary collaboration between contract law, employment law and management scholars and draws from the fields of law, management, and psychology.  One of the authors is currently Editor-in-Chief of the top-tier level ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL.  Because of his nationally-recognized expertise, the survey and statistical analysis is of the highest order.</p>
<p>After reviewing and noting the gaps in the employment and justice literatures, this article then presents the finding of a survey of 763 participants to measure whether certain variables—procedural and substantive fairness, as well as educating employees on the principle of employment at will—impact the propensities of employees to retaliate and litigate at the time of discharge.</p>
<p>The survey results are significant and striking.  We find statistically significant reductions in retaliation and litigation rates when survey respondents are shown scenarios where they are treated with substantive and procedural fairness.  We also find that when employees are given significant information about the law ahead of time, their propensity to retaliate and litigate decreases.  We learn from this study that when employee expectations are managed using fairness norms and education the outcomes of discharge are profoundly affected.  Such knowledge can have significant effects on the litigation and dispute resolution costs of employers who are faced with making difficult decisions regarding layoffs and retention.</p>
<p>The article then concludes by showing how our study in light of psychological contract theory can be used as a guide to reforming employment law.  The findings suggest the use of an expanded contextual analysis that serves to benefit employers and employees by matching their expectations and, at the same time, preventing the creation of perceptions of injustice at the time of employment termination.</p>
<p>We believe that this article breaks new ground in the debate over the value and justice of the employment at law rule.  The empirical survey and statistical analysis provided opens up new avenues of interdisciplinary research into the roles of norms, expectations, psychological biases, and perceptions of injustice as they relate to employment termination and related outcomes.</p>
<p>We would welcome the opportunity to publish with your journal.</p>

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</description>

<author>Larry A. DiMatteo et al.</author>


<category>Corporations</category>

<category>Employment Practice</category>

<category>Organizations</category>

<category>Psychology and Psychiatry</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>Policing Limited Liability Companies Under Contract Law</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/larry_dimatteo/7</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/larry_dimatteo/7</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 10 Feb 2011 12:47:39 PST</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>In 2004, Delaware amended its limited liability company law (Delaware Act) to allow for the contractual elimination of fiduciary duties.   The statute seeks to emphasize the contract basis of limited liability companies (LLCs).  It does this by providing the legal support for the incorporation of clauses that eliminate the traditional duties of care and loyalty (elimination clauses) found in corporate, agency, and trust law.  The only immutable principle enunciated by the Delaware Act is the covenant of good faith.   The primary focus of this paper will be on the ability of contract law to police the management and operation of LLCs.</p>

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</description>

<author>Larry A. DiMatteo</author>


<category>Commercial Law</category>

<category>Contracts</category>

<category>Organizations</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>Justice, Employment, and The Psychological Contract</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/larry_dimatteo/6</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/larry_dimatteo/6</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 10 Feb 2011 12:27:32 PST</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>The paper is a multidisciplinary collaboration between contract law, employment law and management scholars and draws from the fields of law, management, and psychology.  After reviewing and noting the gaps in the employment and justice literatures, this paper presents the findings of a survey of 763 participants to measure whether certain variables—procedural and substantive fairness, as well as educating employees on the principle of employment at will—impact the propensities of employees to retaliate and litigate at the time of discharge.</p>
<p>The survey results are significant and striking.  We find statistically significant reductions in retaliation and litigation rates when survey respondents are shown scenarios where they are treated with substantive and procedural fairness.  We also find that when employees are given significant information about the law ahead of time, their propensity to retaliate and litigate decreases.  We learn from this study that when employee expectations are managed using fairness norms and education the outcomes of discharge are profoundly affected.  Such knowledge can have significant effects on the litigation and dispute resolution costs of employers who are faced with making difficult decisions regarding layoffs and retention.</p>
<p>The paper then concludes by showing how our study in light of psychological contract theory can be used as a guide to reforming employment law.  The findings suggest the use of an expanded contextual analysis that serves to benefit employers and employees by matching their expectations and, at the same time, preventing the creation of perceptions of injustice at the time of employment termination.</p>

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</description>

<author>Larry DiMatteo et al.</author>


<category>Commercial Law</category>

<category>Jurisprudence</category>

<category>Contracts</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCY IN INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/larry_dimatteo/5</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/larry_dimatteo/5</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 19:26:49 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>The article employs the method of the economic analysis of law (EAL) in a comparative context.  In particular, it assesses the efficiency of select provisions of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG).  The CISG is the law of the United States and over 70 other countries.  It reflects a culmination of a century-old process of failed attempts to achieve an international sales law.  The drafting process involved intense negotiation and compromise between representatives of the common and civil law legal traditions.  As a result, the CISG provides in an interesting amalgam of civil and common law rules.  This article analyzes whether the more efficient rules were chosen from the civil and common law alternatives.</p>
<p>The article begins by surveying the policy choices incumbent in drafting the CISG and by reviewing the basic tenets of EAL.  These tenets are then used as a metric for measuring the efficiency of specific CISG rules.  The article examines both the efficiency of rules taken in isolation and the global efficiency of the CISG as an international sales law generally.  The rules selected for analysis come from two categories (1) instances where the common and civil laws conflicted and one of the conflicting rules was adopted and (2) instances where the drafters created a new rule unique to the CISG.  Specific rules analyzed include writing and evidentiary rules, contract formation rules, contract interpretation rules, and the law of liquidated damages.</p>
<p>The article concludes by offering a practical scheme limiting the role of contract interpretation, as well as assessing the value of Comparative EAL.  In the area of contract ambiguity and interpretation, the article articulates a theory of particularized consent to narrow the gap between subjective and objective consent.  The article also illustrates that Comparative EAL in relation to the CISG can be used at three levels of analysis—two descriptive and one normative.  The first level of analysis asks given the choices that the drafters were presented did they adopt the efficient options?  The second level of analysis asks whether jurisprudential developments in the application of CISG rules have made the rules more or less efficient.  The normative analysis involves taking the findings of the comparative efficiency analysis to ask what changes should be considered to make international sales law more efficient?</p>

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</description>

<author>Larry A. DiMatteo et al.</author>


<category>Commercial Law</category>

<category>Comparative Law</category>

<category>Contracts</category>

<category>International Law</category>

<category>Law and Economics</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>Comparative Efficiency in Internatonal Sales Law</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/larry_dimatteo/4</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/larry_dimatteo/4</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 18:44:04 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>The article employs the method of the economic analysis of law (EAL) in a comparative context.  In particular, it assesses the efficiency of select provisions of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG).  The CISG is the law of the United States and over 70 other countries.  It reflects a culmination of a century-old process of failed attempts to achieve an international sales law.  The drafting process involved intense negotiation and compromise between representatives of the common and civil law legal traditions.  As a result, the CISG provides in an interesting amalgam of civil and common law rules.  This article analyzes whether the more efficient rules were chosen from the civil and common law alternatives.</p>
<p>The article begins by surveying the policy choices incumbent in drafting the CISG and by reviewing the basic tenets of EAL.  These tenets are then used as a metric for measuring the efficiency of specific CISG rules.  The article examines both the efficiency of rules taken in isolation and the global efficiency of the CISG as an international sales law generally.  The rules selected for analysis come from two categories (1) instances where the common and civil laws conflicted and one of the conflicting rules was adopted and (2) instances where the drafters created a new rule unique to the CISG.  Specific rules analyzed include writing and evidentiary rules, contract formation rules, contract interpretation rules, and the law of liquidated damages.</p>
<p>The article concludes by offering a practical scheme limiting the role of contract interpretation, as well as assessing the value of Comparative EAL.  In the area of contract ambiguity and interpretation, the article articulates a theory of particularized consent to narrow the gap between subjective and objective consent.  The article also illustrates that Comparative EAL in relation to the CISG can be used at three levels of analysis—two descriptive and one normative.  The first level of analysis asks given the choices that the drafters were presented did they adopt the efficient options?  The second level of analysis asks whether jurisprudential developments in the application of CISG rules have made the rules more or less efficient.  The normative analysis involves taking the findings of the comparative efficiency analysis to ask what changes should be considered to make international sales law more efficient?</p>

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</description>

<author>Larry A. DiMatteo et al.</author>


<category>Commercial Law</category>

<category>Law and Economics</category>

<category>Contracts</category>

<category>International Law</category>

<category>Comparative Law</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>STRATEGIC CONTRACTING:  CONTRACT LAW AS A SOURCE OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/larry_dimatteo/3</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/larry_dimatteo/3</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 28 Dec 2009 22:01:09 PST</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This paper uses sources taken from the legal literature, as well as literature from strategy and human resource management. It explores Professor Gilson’s noted remark in the Yale Law Journal that “business lawyers serve as transaction cost engineers and this function has the potential for creating value.”  This exploration focuses on the strategic use of contract law in gaining a competitive advantage and to create value.  It begins by differentiating two frames of the contract paradigm. One is the internal frame in which contract law’s inherent flexibility allows for its use as a source of competitive advantage.  The second frame is external since it focuses on the use of the contract paradigm in non-contractual contexts.</p>
<p>The paper examines the use of contract to create value and uses for examples, the commodification of information, licensing and IT outsourcing, and franchising.  From there, the paper explores the use of contracts to sustain a competitive advantage (strategic contracting) and to create shared competitive advantages (strategic collaboration).  It uses the creation and use of patent pools to illustrate both strategic uses of contract law.  The next part focuses on the use of contracts to mitigate uncertainty in business transactions.  It explores the strategic use of existing contract doctrines, the use contracts to insure performance and to deter opportunistic behavior, and the use of contracts to develop a preventive legal strategy. This is followed by the examination of contracting for innovation and contracts’ role in creating private governance structures, such as strategic joint venturing.</p>
<p>The final parts explore the use of contract as metaphor in nexus of contact theory in corporate law, psychological contract theory in employment law, and the potential abuse of the freedom of contract paradigm in limited liability company law. The paper then examines strategic responses to regulation by asking whether strategic avoidance or non-compliance to regulations has a place in a company’s legal strategy?  The paper concludes by asking how does strategic contracting impact contract law?  It answers the question by arguing that contract law change is inevitable due to a feedback loop.</p>

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</description>

<author>Larry A. DiMatteo</author>


<category>Partnerships</category>

<category>Contracts</category>

<category>Intellectual Property Law</category>

<category>Organizations</category>

<category>Corporations</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>&quot;Beyond Rules&quot;</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/larry_dimatteo/2</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/larry_dimatteo/2</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 08 Mar 2009 14:01:36 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Our article, in contrast to the predominant scholarly view, contends that the influential Legal Realist Movement of the 1930s was actually two movements—radical legal realism and conservative legal realism (CLR).  CLR is best understood through the works of Nathan Isaacs.  This article will investigate the legitimacy and determinacy of the legal order through the lens of CLR as represented by Isaacs.</p>
<p>Isaacs and CLR are especially worthy subjects for study given the current economic crisis.  It is a crisis, much like the Great Depression, that has spurred many people to question core capitalistic premises, such as the superiority of minimal government regulation of business and the structuring of financial instruments through freedom of contract.  CLR’s merger of anti-formalism and an idealism inspired by the Jewish legal tradition resulted in its rejection of Lochner-era judicial decision-making while supporting an attack on the constitutionality of New Deal interventionism.</p>
<p>CLR asserts that although legal rules provide indeterminate answers in hard cases, principled-guided rules will lead to a correct answer.  CLR calls on judges to continuously strive to uncover underlying objective principles and to understand their historical evolution.  Isaacs sought to blend an evolving, but cyclical, organic theory of legal development with the pragmatism needed to make rules workable. To do this, the contingent nature of law must be contained within a framework of moral, political, and cultural values.  This framework characterizes CLR as both a critical and positive theory of the legal order. This fusion of an organic natural law with the inherent indeterminacy of legal conceptualism moves beyond rules to a principle-based contextualism.</p>
<p>We use previously neglected archival material, found in the Harvard Law and Harvard Business School’s “Special Collections,” as well as other archives, to connect Isaacs to major figures in the Legal Realist Movement. Isaacs’ broad contextual framework allowed him to play a pioneering role in the development of the social-scientific study of law and the critique of legal formalism that was the basis for the Legal Realist Movement.  However, his belief in the integrity of the legal order moved him beyond rule skepticism.  His understanding of the dynamic nature of law provided insights into constitutional interpretation, cycle theory of legal development, status-based regulation of standard form contracts, re-conceptualization of law, and the need for an interdisciplinary approach to law study and reform.</p>

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<author>Larry A. DiMatteo et al.</author>


<category>Constitutional Law</category>

<category>Public Law and Legal Theory</category>

<category>Jurisprudence</category>

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