№ 87‑ФЗ: Political Machination or Procedural Reform?

Kirill G. Ershov, University of California - Los Angeles

Abstract

Law #87‑ФЗ was signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin six months prior to the presidential election. #87-Ф3 rearranged the division of functions between the Investigator and the Procurator during the preliminary investigation. It also saw the creation of the Investigative Committee within the Procuracy, which would have exclusive supervision of all investigations within that branch. Because of the Commitee’s personal jurisdiction over investigations involving individuals with official immunity and agents of Russia’s power structures, both Russian media and Western academy saw the law as being politically motivated by the upcoming transfer of power. This paper examines the political rationalizations for #87-Ф3 reforms and points out their flaws. While not denying validity of the law’s justifications, this paper posits that such explanations are unverifiable. The paper concludes by providing procedural justifications for #87-Ф3. #87-Ф3 is seen as a further step in Russia’s transition away from a Soviet Procurator-centered criminal procedure system and towards Judicial Oversight model consistent with adversarial principles.