Unions and Managerial Pay

John DiNardo, University of California-Irvine
Kevin F. Hallock, Cornell University
Jorn-Steffen Pischke, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Suggested Citation
DiNardo, J., Hallock, K., & Pischke, J. S. (1997). Unions and managerial pay. Retrieved [insert date], from Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labor Relations site:
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/workingpapers/94/

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Abstract

Unions compress the wage distribution among workers covered by union contracts. We ask whether unions also have an effect on the managers of unionized firms. To this end we collected and assembled data on unionization and managerial pay within firms and industries in the U.S. and across countries. Generally, we find a negative correlation between executive compensation and unionization in our cross-section data, but no relationship of changes in unionization on the growth of compensation of executives over time. Using NLRB elections data, we find that a loss of union members due to decertification elections is associated with higher CEO pay, although our estimates are imprecise. With CPS data we consistently find that where unions are stronger, fewer managers are employed.