Copyright (c) 2010 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/kenworthey_bilz Recent documents in Kenworthey Bilz en-us Thu, 04 Feb 2010 14:34:20 PST 3600 http://works.bepress.com/kenworthey_bilz/7 http://works.bepress.com/kenworthey_bilz/7 Sun, 15 Feb 2009 12:59:48 PST The "narrative" model of legal judging argues that legal decision makers both do and should render judgments by assembling sensible sto-ries out of evidence (as opposed to using Bayesian-type, linear models). This model is usually understood to demand that before one may judge a situation, one must give the parties the opportunity to tell their story in a manner that invites, or at least allows, empathy from the judger. This Article refers to this as the "inclusionary approach" to the narrative model of judging. Using psychological research in emotions and perspective-taking and the more intuitive techniques of literary criticism, this Article challenges the inclusionary narrative approach, arguing that, in practice, the law gives equal weight to an "exclusionary approach." That is, in order to render sound, legitimate legal judgments, the law deliberately limits the sort of stories parties are allowed to tell--and does so on moral grounds, not, or at least not only, to improve the "accuracy" of the legal judgment. That is, as both a descriptive and normative matter, impoverished narratives can be better than enriched ones in leading decision makers to morally acceptable legal judgments. Kenworthey Bilz Criminal Law and Procedure Psychology Evidence Legal Theory Psychology and Psychiatry Public Law and Legal Theory http://works.bepress.com/kenworthey_bilz/5 http://works.bepress.com/kenworthey_bilz/5 Fri, 08 Aug 2008 09:23:25 PDT Confessions have historically been the most compelling evidence the state could offer at a criminal trial. However, improvements in forensic technologies have led to increased use of scientific evidence, such as DNA typing, pattern-recognition software, location tracking devices, and the like, with very impressive rates of reliability. The reliability of these methods has become so impressive, in fact, that it should lead to a reduced reliance on confessions (and other nonscientific evidence, such as eyewitness identifications) in criminal prosecutions. However, this does not mean that the doctrine of self-incrimination, which regulates the acquisition and use of confessions, will no longer be relevant. The same anxieties that animated the need for a doctrine limiting and regulating confessions, should now shape the development of the very evidence that replaces them. As such, while scientific evidence doctrine is fairly clear and straightforward today (with an almost exclusive focus on "reliability"), it is destined to become as complicated and indeterminate as self-incrimination doctrine ever was. This process (of first, the replacement of confessions with scientific evidence, and second, of the development of a doctrine for scientific evidence that aims to protect the same values that self-incrimination doctrine protects), while still in its infancy, has already begun. Kenworthey Bilz Criminal Law and Procedure Psychology Evidence Legal Theory Public Law and Legal Theory http://works.bepress.com/kenworthey_bilz/4 http://works.bepress.com/kenworthey_bilz/4 Fri, 08 Aug 2008 09:19:53 PDT This book review-essay of Solan & Tiersma's SPEAKING OF CRIME argues that with the advent of new technologies such as improvements in DNA identification, fMRI 'lie detector' tests, and the like, courts will rely less and less on confessions altogether, rendering obsolete much of the doctrine that currently surrounds linguistic interpretation (and other markers) of consent and coercion. Kenworthey Bilz Criminal Law and Procedure Psychology Evidence Legal Theory http://works.bepress.com/kenworthey_bilz/3 http://works.bepress.com/kenworthey_bilz/3 Fri, 08 Aug 2008 09:07:16 PDT This paper argues that both consequentialist and retributivist punishment philosophies rest on similar analyses of the social value of punishable behavior; that is, they both rest on definitions of what counts as a "harm" of crime. The different outcomes the different philosophies produce stem from competing conclusions about which of those harms are empirically valid or morally legitimate. Once we have spelled out what counts as the harms of crime, however, retributivist and consequentialist philosophies add little to the equation. Alternative punishment regimes at their best are up front about offering a distinctive account of the harms of crime. When such regimes instead try to fit themselves into the mold of traditional punishment philosophies, their relative advantage is lost. We argue that restorative justice is at risk of going this route. Kenworthey Bilz Criminal Law and Procedure Economics Psychology Legal Theory http://works.bepress.com/kenworthey_bilz/2 http://works.bepress.com/kenworthey_bilz/2 Fri, 08 Aug 2008 08:59:53 PDT In a democratic society, law is an important means to express, manipulate, and enforce moral codes. Demonstrating empirically that law can achieve moral goals is difficult. Nevertheless, public interest groups spend considerable energy and resources to change the law with the goal of changing not only morally-laden behaviors, but also morally-laden cognitions and emotions. Additionally, even when there is little reason to believe that a change in law will lead to changes in behavior or attitudes, groups see the law as a form of moral capital that they wish to own, to make a statement about society. Examples include gay sodomy laws, abortion laws, and Prohibition. In this Chapter, we explore the possible mechanisms by which law can influence attitudes and behavior. To this end, we consider informational and group influence of law on attitudes, as well as the effects of salience, coordination, and social meaning on behavior, and the behavioral backlash that can result from a mismatch between law and community attitudes. Finally, we describe two lines of psychological research--symbolic politics and group identity--that can help explain how people use the law, or the legal system, to effect expressive goals. Kenworthey Bilz Economics Psychology Legal Theory http://works.bepress.com/kenworthey_bilz/1 http://works.bepress.com/kenworthey_bilz/1 Mon, 05 Mar 2007 04:41:04 PST Why should people ever be satisfied when a third party punishes in their name, as opposed to having the opportunity to exact revenge personally? When theories of delegated revenge are offered at all, they explain why a well-ordered society needs centralized punishment as a matter of practicality. But this doesn't adequately explain why they actually the public actually prefers it, and why they accept some forms of delegated agents more than others. Moreover, these theories do not have a good explanation for why or when delegated revenge will fail to satisfy victims, nor when the state will indulge this preference, as it often does. In this article, I offer a novel explanation for the phenomenon of delegated revenge. Namely, I argue that victims regard punishment as an important device for restoring the losses to their self-worth and social status they suffered as a direct result of their victimization. This approach not only explains why victims delegate their revenge, but also predicts when they won't. Finally, I use this theory to propose ways we can reestablish the government's monopoly on punishment when individuals or even whole communities balk at notion of the state as an appropriate agent of their revenge. Kenworthey Bilz Criminal Law and Procedure Economics Psychology Legal Theory