Strengthening International Regulation Through "Transnational New Governance"

Kenneth W. Abbott, Arizona State University at the Tempe Campus
Duncan Snidal, University of Chicago

Abstract

A new kind of international regulatory system is emerging: “Transnational New Governance” (TNG). TNG is emerging spontaneously, largely out of dissatisfaction with the failure of international “Old Governance” (OG) – acting through treaties and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) – to adequately regulate international business. NGOs, business firms and other actors, singly and in novel combinations, are creating a plethora of innovative institutions to apply transnational norms to business, especially on worker rights, environmental protection and human rights. These institutions are predominantly private, and operate through voluntary codes and standards: private transnational “soft law.”

We depict the range and diversity of the new institutions on the “Governance Triangle,” which locates regulatory schemes according to the roles played by different types of actors, private and public, in their governance. To analyze this complex system, we draw on the “New Governance” (NG) model of regulation, which has been developed and applied primarily in domestic settings; scholars have not fully recognized its potential for international regulation. We develop a model of TNG and use it to evaluate the emerging system. TNG provides many benefits of NG, and is particularly suitable for international regulation because it is less demanding of states and IGOs than mandatory OG. However, TNG requires states and IGOs to act more subtly as orchestrators of the system, which currently suffers from a significant orchestration deficit. By expanding “facilitative” orchestration of the new institutions, states and IGOs could strengthen the entire international regulatory system and better achieve their own regulatory goals. Of course, TNG is no panacea, and we discuss its limitations.