Kelly M Kadera Copyright (c) 2012 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera Recent documents in Kelly M Kadera en-us Sun, 25 Nov 2012 05:12:07 PST 3600 Evolution/History of the Scientific Study of International Processes http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/13 http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/13 Fri, 16 Sep 2011 09:45:54 PDT Kelly M. Kadera et al. The Origins and Evolution of SSIP: How Methods Met Models, with a Short Interlude http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/12 http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/12 Tue, 23 Aug 2011 08:28:09 PDT Kelly M. Kadera The Power-Conflict Story A Dynamic Model of Interstate Rivalry http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/11 http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/11 Thu, 15 Oct 2009 13:33:42 PDT The Power-Conflict Story explains patterns of behavior in major world rivalries since 1816. Kelly M. Kadera carefully lays out the dynamic connections between two rival nations' power relationship and their conflictual interactions with one another. Rivals accumulate power and use conflict as a method of reducing their opponent's power level. But conflict is costly because it invites reciprocation from the opponent who has similar motives. Applying the formal model that she has developed, Kadera makes some interesting and novel predictions about which types of rivals win and what strategies they use. The empirical record on national power levels and interstate conflict convincingly support these predictions. Examples include the rise of the United States as a world power and the corresponding fall of British hegemony near the turn of the last century; Germany's unsuccessful attempt to overtake Britain during the Second World War; and Russia's rivalry with China during the early 1900s.

]]> Kelly M. Kadera Transmission, Barriers, and Constraints: A Dynamic Model of the Spread of War http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/10 http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/10 Thu, 15 Oct 2009 09:34:41 PDT This article offers a systemic and dynamic model of the spread of civil and interstate war. The model is based on three components: transmission mechanisms, barriers, and resource constraints. Trasmission mechanisms and barriers are based on our existing notions about the contagious effects of alliances and borders. Resource constraints are designed to capture the social welfare trade-off associated with military spending. Deductions from the model include a positive equilibrium value for the amount of war and the level of resources devoted to war fighting and preparations, the finding that additional transmission mechanisms increase the equilibrium level as well as the speed at which the equilibrium level is approached, and the conclusion that extraordinarily high levels of war will eventually decrease. Recommendations for decreasing a high-war equilibrium focus on the strengths of constraints relative to barriers

]]> Kelly M. Kadera The Power-Conflict Story: a Synopsis http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/9 http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/9 Thu, 15 Oct 2009 09:30:32 PDT The focus of this article is the development of a differential equations model that integrates balance of power and power transition theories. This integration is achieved by proposing three different conditions, each of which is associated with specialized conflict behavior. Extrapolation from the traditional theories' arguments about war to the forces governing the ebb and flow of conflict is another integration technique. Most notably, the formal model predicts three types of power transitions: deflections, tortoise and hare transitions, and single transitions. Only the single transition is similar to the type of transition predicted by power transition theory. The other two types are important because they account for unsuccessful challenges. Important differences in conflict patterns also distinguish the three transition types from one another. The model also makes predictions concerning the relationship between two rivals' conflict levels and the timing of conflict peaks.

Using a case study for each of the three types of transitions, the predictions are tested using MID data supplemented with historical analyses. Empirical support is strong. Substantive conclusions include recommendations for slowing rates of reaction, cautions concerning the dangers of the post-transition phase, and advice for tortoises to conserve their resources. This project also advocates the usefulness of a broader collection of events data than is currently available and the possible need for variables that trace the evolution of bonds that tie nations together.

]]> Kelly M. Kadera Democratic Survival, Peace, and War in the International System http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/8 http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/8 Thu, 15 Oct 2009 09:25:27 PDT Post-World War II Western foreign policies are often based on the claim that the spread of democracy will result in global peace. Our understanding of how this propagation can bring about peace is limited, and we have little reason to believe that the causal arrow points only in one direction. We tackle these issues by modeling the linkages between states' regime types, interstate conflict, and the strength of the democratic community relative to the autocratic community. Analysis of our model suggests initial increases in the strength of the democratic community increase the level of conflict in a system. Beyond a threshold of democratic strength, however, conflict wanes as the democratic community waxes. Our model also suggests that the survival rate of democracies increases as the material strength of the democratic community increases and decreases as systemic conflict rises. Empirical analyses offer support for the survival propositions

]]> Kelly M. Kadera Measuring National Power http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/7 http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/7 Thu, 15 Oct 2009 09:17:50 PDT Power's central role in international relations theory is unsurpassed, yet considerable debate persists over the quality of its most commonly used indicator, the Correlates of War project's Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC). At issue is whether CINC's main feature, its ability to measure a nation's power relative to other nations' power levels, inadvertently creates errors when membership in the comparison group fluctuates. Using mathematical proofs and an empirical investigation of the major power system, we show that Organski and Kugler (1980) and Gleditsch and Ward (1999) are correct: changes in the comparison group do create errors in CINC. In particular, CINC inadvertently mismeasures dyadic power distributions. Using power transition theory as a context within which to evaluate CINC, we find that it creates artificial power transitions, masks actual transitions, changes the timing of transitions, alters the magnitude by which one state overtakes another, and produces specious relationships between transitions and conflict. We also offer a viable alternative measure, called the Geometric Indicator of National Capabilities (GINC), and demonstrate how its use of the geometric mean retains CINC's notion of systemically-based relative power and immunizes it from the problems afflicting CINC. GINC is strongly recommended for dyadic analyses, especially when membership in the comparison group fluctuates frequently.

]]> Kelly M. Kadera et al. The Conditions and Consequences of Dyadic Power Transitions: Deductions from a Dynamic Model http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/6 http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/6 Tue, 11 Aug 2009 07:55:34 PDT Kelly M. Kadera The Power-Conflict Story: A Dynamic Model of Interstate Rivalry http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/5 http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/5 Tue, 11 Aug 2009 07:45:08 PDT The Power-Conflict Story explains patterns of behavior in major world rivalries since 1816. Kelly M. Kadera carefully lays out the dynamic connections between two rival nations' power relationship and their conflictual interactions with one another. Rivals accumulate power and use conflict as a method of reducing their opponent's power level. But conflict is costly because it invites reciprocation from the opponent who has similar motives. Applying the formal model that she has developed, Kadera makes some interesting and novel predictions about which types of rivals win and what strategies they use. The empirical record on national power levels and interstate conflict convincingly support these predictions. Examples include the rise of the United States as a world power and the corresponding fall of British hegemony near the turn of the last century; Germany's unsuccessful attempt to overtake Britain during the Second World War; and Russia's rivalry with China during the early 1900s.

One of the central contributions of the book's explanation of interstate rivalry is the integration of two opposing schools of thought, balance of power theory and power transition theory. This integration is accomplished by the author's dynamic formal model that emphasizes fluctuations in conflict behavior under different power relationships as well as shifts in power levels resulting from natural growth and resource depletion. The formal model and its analysis are presented in a conversational manner, making it accessible to the reader.

The Power-Conflict Story will appeal to students and scholars of international relations, world history, formal modeling, applied mathematics, numerical methods, and research methodology.

]]> Kelly M. Kadera The Trade-Offs of Fighting and Investing: A Model of the Evolution of War and Peace Science http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/4 http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/4 Tue, 11 Aug 2009 07:30:59 PDT International competition occurs in many different forms. Just as a state would be in danger if it allowed its opponent to gain a military advantage, one that falls behind a rival in an economic contest similarly faces risks. States must weigh the trade-offs between economic and military growth, as well as deciding on the best strategy to follow should war erupt.We use a formal, dynamic model to explicitly capture the tradeoffs that states face in their search for security and dominance. The deductions from the model demonstrate that by considering the long-run results of a peacetime rivalry, weaker states might conclude that their only hope of winning or surviving a rivalry lies in fighting a counterforce war, explain why and how stalemates evolve during counterforce wars, and indicate that targeting industrial objectives shortens the duration of wars.

]]> Kelly M. Kadera et al. Manna from Heaven or Forbidden Fruit? The (Ab) Use of Control Variables in Research on International Conflict http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/3 http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/3 Mon, 10 Aug 2009 13:27:03 PDT Kelly M. Kadera et al. A Supply Side Theory of Mediation http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/2 http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/2 Mon, 10 Aug 2009 12:51:50 PDT We develop and test a theory of the supply side of third party conflict management. Building on an existing formal model of mediation (Kydd 2003), we consider several factors that increase the pool of potential neutral mediators and the frequency of mediators’ efforts to manage interstate conflicts. First, we argue that democratic mediators face greater audience costs for deception in the conflict management process because the media in democratic states is more likely to uncover attempts by democratic mediators to provide false information. Second, we argue that information in the global mediation marketplace becomes more accurate as the international system becomes more democratic because there is a wider network of vigilant free presses, which increases the costs of deception for potential mediators. Third, as disputants’ ties to international organizations increase, this also raises the costs that mediators incur for dishonesty in the conflict management process because these institutions provide more frequent and accurate information about the disputants’ capabilities and resolve. Empirical analyses of data on contentious issues (1816-2001) provide support for our theory, with third party conflict management occurring more frequently if a potential mediator is a democracy, and as the average global democracy level and the number of shared IO memberships between disputants rises. We also find that powerful states serve as mediators more often, and that trade ties, alliances, issue salience, and distance influence third party decisions to mediate.

]]> Mark J.C. Crescenzi et al. Heeding Ray's Advice: An Exegesis on Control Variables in Systemic Democratic Peace Research http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/1 http://works.bepress.com/kelly_kadera/1 Mon, 10 Aug 2009 12:51:49 PDT We submit our recent systemic democratic peace research to the control variable doctrine of James Lee Ray, as codified in his 2003 treatise. In particular, we seek to determine whether international institutions intervene in the relationship between the democratic community's strength and the use and effectiveness of third party conflict management, whether hegemony is a competing explanation of third party settlement, and whether our extant model is robust when several control variables are specified. Two important conclusions are reached: (1) the democratic community's strength and institutional vitality promote third party mediation and its success, regardless of hegemonic might and other controls; and 2) Ray's teaching is properly understood as an exhortation for scholars to more carefully consider the theoretical role of each control variable and its proper treatment in statistical models, not as an edict banning the use of control variables.

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