Law, Literature, and Interdisciplinary Copia: A Response to Skeptics

Katie Rose Guest Pryal, University of North Carolina School of Law

Abstract

Today, a large part of the law and literature (L&L) enterprise consists of justifying its existence to skeptics. This article contributes yet another justification, one that takes into account the wise critiques of law and literature that have arisen in recent years from both legal and humanities scholars. As Jane B. Baron has pointed out, much rhetorical work has been done defining the parameters of L&L, often denigrating legal studies to justify bringing the humanities into law. I expand on Baron's assessment in an attempt to find a solution to the question that drives the debate I join: Why is L&L an appropriate interdiscipline for legal scholarship and pedagogy? I argue that the best approach to L&L is an expansive and generous one, one that does not rely upon the denigration of law to prove the appropriateness of the humanities to legal studies, nor use an overly simplistic view of law when bringing it into the humanities. In this article, I build upon Baron's critiques of current trends in L&L as a framework to reexamine what I call the "antagonistic dichotomy" of L&L discourse that privileges literature on one hand and denigrates law and doctrinal legal studies on the other. Then, after examining defenses of L&L by three leading scholars, and borrowing the concept of copia from an early modern rhetorician, I reframe this dichotomy in a way that is constructive and cyclical, rather than antagonistic.