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<title>Kathleen Mullen</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2012  All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/kathleen_mullen</link>
<description>Recent documents in Kathleen Mullen</description>
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<lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Jan 2012 14:46:29 PST</lastBuildDate>
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<title>Does Disability Insurance Receipt Discourage Work? Using Examiner Assignment to Estimate Causal Effects of SSDI Receipt</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/kathleen_mullen/7</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 06 Jan 2011 06:33:04 PST</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>We present the first estimates of the causal effect of SSDI receipt on the labor supply generalizable to the entire population of program entrants in the present day system. We take advantage of a unique workload management database to match Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) applicants to disability examiners, and use natural variation in examiners’ allowance rates to estimate the labor supply effects of SSDI. Because applicants are randomly assigned to examiners (conditional on observable characteristics), examiner-specific allowance rates can be used to instrument for the allowance decision in a labor supply equation contrasting denied vs. allowed applicants. We find that the labor force participation rate of the marginal entrant would be on average 21 percentage points greater in the absence of SSDI benefit receipt. His or her likelihood of engaging in substantial gainful activity as defined by the SSDI program would be on average 13 percentage points higher, and he or she would earn $1,600 to $2,600 more per year on average in the absence of SSDI benefit receipt. The marginal entrant is likely to have a mental impairment, be young, and have low pre-onset earnings. Importantly, the disincentive effect varies across individuals with impairments of different degrees of unobservable severity, ranging from a low of 10 percentage points for those with more severe impairments to a high of 60 percentage points for entrants with relatively less severe impairments.</p>

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<author>Nicole Maestas et al.</author>


<category>Health</category>

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<title>Toward a Culture of Consequences: Performance-Based Accountability Systems for Public Services</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/kathleen_mullen/6</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 09 Aug 2010 14:46:30 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Performance-based accountability systems (PBASs), which link incentives to measured performance as a means of improving services to the public, have gained popularity. While PBASs can vary widely across sectors, they share three main components: goals, incentives, and measures. Research suggests that PBASs influence provider behaviors, but little is known about PBAS effectiveness at achieving performance goals or about government and agency experiences. This study examines nine PBASs that are drawn from five sectors: child care, education, health care, public health emergency preparedness, and transportation. In the right circumstances, a PBAS can be an effective strategy for improving service delivery. Optimum circumstances include having a widely shared goal, unambiguous observable measures, meaningful incentives for those with control over the relevant inputs and processes, few competing interests, and adequate resources to design, implement, and operate the PBAS. However, these conditions are rarely fully realized, so it is difficult to design and implement PBASs that are uniformly effective. PBASs represent a promising policy option for improving the quality of service-delivery activities in many contexts. The evidence supports continued experimentation with and adoption of this approach in appropriate circumstances. Even so, PBAS design and its prospects for success depend on the context in which the system will operate. Also, ongoing system evaluation and monitoring are integral components of a PBAS; they inform refinements that improve system functioning over time.</p>

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<author>Brian Stecher et al.</author>


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<title>What Explains the Gender Gap in Financial Literacy? The Role of Household Decision-Making</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/kathleen_mullen/5</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 26 Jul 2010 16:10:21 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Research has shown that financial illiteracy is widespread among women, and that many women are unfamiliar with even the most basic economic concepts needed to make saving and investment decisions. This gender gap in financial literacy may contribute to the differential levels of retirement preparedness between women and men. However, little is known about the determinants of the gender gap in financial literacy. Using data from the RAND American Life Panel, the authors examined potential explanations for the gender gap including the role of marriage and division of financial decision-making among couples. They found that differences in the demographic characteristics of women and men did not explain much of the financial literacy gap, whereas education, income and current and past marital status reduced the observed gap by around 25%. Oaxaca decomposition revealed the great majority of the gender gap in financial literacy is not explained by differences in covariates - characteristics of men and women - but due to coefficients, or how literacy is produced. They did not find strong support for specialization in financial decision-making within couples by gender. Instead, they found that decision-making within couples was sensitive to the relative education level of spouses for both women and men.</p>

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<author>Raquel Fonseca et al.</author>


<category>Education</category>

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<title>Can You Get What You Pay For? Pay-For-Performance and the Quality of Healthcare Providers&quot;</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/kathleen_mullen/2</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 26 Feb 2008 15:23:20 PST</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Despite the popularity of pay-for-performance (P4P) among health policymakers and private insurers as a tool for improving quality of care, there is little empirical basis for its effectiveness. We use data from published performance reports of physician medical groups contracting with a large network HMO to compare clinical quality before and after the implementation of P4P, relative to a control group. We consider the effect of P4P on both rewarded and unrewarded dimensions of quality. In the end, we fail to find evidence that a large P4P initiative either resulted in major improvement in quality or notable disruption in care.</p>

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<author>Kathleen Mullen et al.</author>


<category>Health</category>

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<title>The Effect of Schooling and Ability on Achievement Test Scores</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/kathleen_mullen/1</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 16 Oct 2007 14:59:43 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>This paper develops two methods for estimating the effect of schooling on achievement test scores that control for the endogeneity of schooling by postulating that both schooling and test scores are generated by a common unobserved latent ability. These methods are applied to data on schooling and test scores. Estimates from the two methods are in close agreement. We find that the effects of schooling on test scores are roughly linear across schooling levels. The effects of schooling on measured test scores are slightly larger for lower latent ability levels. We find that schooling increases the AFQT score on average between 2 and 4 percentage points, roughly twice as large as the effect claimed by Herrnstein and Murray (1994) but in agreement with estimates produced by Neal and Johnson (1996) and Winship and Korenman (1997). We extend the previous literature by estimating the impact of schooling on measured test scores at various quantiles of the latent ability distribution.</p>

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<author>Kathleen Mullen et al.</author>


<category>Education</category>

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