This Article analyzes the events predicating the Kimberley Process and examines the validity of the Kimberley Process in relation to international trade obligations. Part I describes the background of conflict diamonds and their role in African wars. The section outlines the need for regulation in the diamond industry and examines how other attempted measures at curbing the illicit diamond trade have fallen short. Part II details the Kimberley Process and its guidelines. This section analyzes the relevant U.S. legislation passed in 2003, the Clean Diamond Trade Act. Part II also suggests that because the Kimberley Process ("KP") is predicated upon voluntary compliance, the KP in its current form will have little to no impact on curbing trade in conflict diamonds because its parameters are not legally binding. Part III analyzes whether, despite the current WTO waiver, the KP is a violation of international trade law. This section discusses the use of morality in international trade and proposes that any WTO challenge to the legislation will not stand because the Kimberley Process warrants the general exception to GATT in Article XX(a). Therefore, this section argues that despite its renewal, the waiver is not necessary to preserve the goals of GATT and international trade laws.