Copyright (c) 2009 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/joyce_sadka Recent documents in Joyce Sadka en-us Sun, 31 May 2009 07:41:59 PDT 3600 http://works.bepress.com/joyce_sadka/8 http://works.bepress.com/joyce_sadka/8 Fri, 27 Mar 2009 17:33:23 PDT Joyce Sadka Labor and Employment/Health and Welfare http://works.bepress.com/joyce_sadka/7 http://works.bepress.com/joyce_sadka/7 Tue, 27 May 2008 10:04:55 PDT Using a newly assembled data set on procedures filed in Mexican labor tribunals, we study the determinants of final awards to workers. On average, workers recover less than 30% of their claim. Our strongest result is that workers receive higher percentages of their claims in settlements than in trial judgments. We also find that cases with multiple claimants against a single firm are less likely to be settled, which partially explains why workers involved in these procedures receive lower percentages of their claims. Finally, we find evidence that a worker who exaggerates her claim is less likely to settle. Joyce Sadka Empirical Studies of Litigation and Settlement http://works.bepress.com/joyce_sadka/6 http://works.bepress.com/joyce_sadka/6 Tue, 27 May 2008 09:57:15 PDT This book focuses on describing and explaining the various levels of international agreements and national regulations affecting insurance markets in North America. An overview of insurance markets in the three countries is provided, including analysis of growth potential in each market. International agreements affecting insurance are then explained , including in-depth discussion of potential overlap and conflicts between agreements, and their overall impact on insurance markets. Finally, the book provides an analysis of national and local regulation in each of the markets, and predicts possible conflicts between national and local regulations and international commercial agreements. Joyce Sadka Contracts and Commercial Law http://works.bepress.com/joyce_sadka/4 http://works.bepress.com/joyce_sadka/4 Sat, 01 Mar 2008 04:38:45 PST The access pricing problem emerges when a vertically integrated firm (the incumbent) provides an essential service in the upstream market, to an entrant. Both firms produce a final service and compete in the downstream market. The standard treatment of this problem has been to add the access price to the list of instruments available to a regulator who maximizes a social welfare function. Motivated by the international trend to reduce the number of prices set by regulation, we use a light handed regulation approach in which the only tool available to the regulator is the access price, and where retail prices are set by quantity competition in the downstream market. In this setup, we find that a regulator seeking to maximize total market surplus will set an access price that subsidizes the entrant, so that entrants that are less efficient than the incumbent firm can survive in the market. We then compare the outcomes of the full regulation model with those of the light-handed regulation model, in terms of final prices, firm profits, and consumer surplus. When the regulator faces incomplete information about entrant firms' costs and cannot offer a menu of contracts to potential entrants, we find examples in which light handed regulation can dominate full regulation. Joyce Sadka Contracts and Commercial Law http://works.bepress.com/joyce_sadka/3 http://works.bepress.com/joyce_sadka/3 Sat, 01 Mar 2008 04:23:27 PST Joyce Sadka Contracts and Commercial Law http://works.bepress.com/joyce_sadka/2 http://works.bepress.com/joyce_sadka/2 Fri, 29 Feb 2008 17:33:33 PST We analyze lawsuits involving publicly-appointed lawyers in a labor court in Mexico to study how a rigid law is enforced. We show that, even after a judge has awarded something to a worker alleging unjust dismissal, the award goes uncollected 56% of the time. Workers who are dismissed after working more than seven years, however, do not leave these awards uncollected because their legally-mandated severance payments are larger. We use a simple model to generate predictions on how lawsuit outcomes should depend on the information available to the worker and on her cost of collecting an award after trial, both of which are determined in part by the lawyer. Differences in outcomes across lawyers are consistent with the hypothesis that firms take advantage both of workers who are poorly informed and of workers who find it more costly to collect an award after winning at trial. David S. Kaplan Empirical Studies of Litigation and Settlement