Copyright (c) 2008 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/joseph_stiglitz Recent documents in Joseph Stiglitz en-us Thu, 03 Jan 2008 05:51:47 PST 3600 http://works.bepress.com/joseph_stiglitz/13 http://works.bepress.com/joseph_stiglitz/13 Mon, 09 Oct 2006 09:10:09 PDT Joseph Stiglitz Globalization, International Trade and Markets http://works.bepress.com/joseph_stiglitz/12 http://works.bepress.com/joseph_stiglitz/12 Mon, 09 Oct 2006 08:46:10 PDT Joseph Stiglitz Globalization, International Trade and Markets Development http://works.bepress.com/joseph_stiglitz/11 http://works.bepress.com/joseph_stiglitz/11 Mon, 09 Oct 2006 08:21:08 PDT This paper examines alternative hypotheses concerning the determinants of success in the transition from Communism to the market. In particular, we look at whether speed of privatization, legal institutions or initial conditions are more important in explaining the growth of the transition countries in the years since the end of the Cold War. In the mid 90s a large empirical literature attempted to relate growth to policy measures. A standard conclusion of this literature was the faster countries privatized and liberalized, the better. We now have more data, so we can check whether these conclusions are still valid six years later. Furthermore, much of the earlier work was flawed since it did not adequately treat problems of endogeneity, confused issues of speed and level of privatization, and did not face up to the problems of multicollinearity. Our results suggest that, contrary to the earlier literature, the speed of privatization is negatively associated with growth, but is confirms the result of the few earlier studies that have found that legal institutions are very important. Other variables, which seemed to play a large role in the earlier literature, appear to have at most a marginal positive effect. Joseph Stiglitz Globalization, International Trade and Markets Development http://works.bepress.com/joseph_stiglitz/10 http://works.bepress.com/joseph_stiglitz/10 Mon, 09 Oct 2006 08:12:23 PDT This paper attempts to provide a more complete reckoning of the costs of the Iraq War, using standard economic and accounting/ budgetary frameworks. As of December 30, 2005, total spending for combat and support operations in Iraq is $251bn, and the CBO's estimates put the projected total direct costs at around $500bn. These figures, however, greatly underestimate the War's true costs. We estimate a range of present and future costs, by including expenditures not in the $500bn CBO projection, such as lifetime healthcare and disability payments to returning veterans, replenishment of military hardware, and increased recruitment costs. We then make adjustments to reflect the social costs of the resources deployed, (e.g. reserve pay is less than the opportunity wage and disability pay is less than forgone earnings). Finally, we estimate the effects of the war on the overall performance of the economy. Even taking a conservative approach and assuming all US troops return by 2010, we believe the true costs exceed a trillion dollars. Using the CBO's projection of maintaining troops in Iraq through 2015, the true costs may exceed $2 trillion. In either case, the cost is much larger than the administration's original estimate of $50-$60bn. The costs estimated do not include those borne by other countries, either directly (military expenditures) or indirectly (the increased price of oil). Most importantly, we have not included the costs to Iraq, either in terms of destruction of infrastructure or the loss of lives. These would all clearly raise the costs significantly.  Joseph Stiglitz Iraq http://works.bepress.com/joseph_stiglitz/9 http://works.bepress.com/joseph_stiglitz/9 Mon, 09 Oct 2006 08:05:21 PDT Joseph Stiglitz Globalization, International Trade and Markets Development http://works.bepress.com/joseph_stiglitz/8 http://works.bepress.com/joseph_stiglitz/8 Thu, 17 Aug 2006 18:24:58 PDT Expanding upon the literature of new institutional economics, the first part of this study stresses the significance of imperfections in information, bankruptcy and banks. The second part examines the policy implications of the new paradigm emphasizing loanable fund demand and supply, and demonstrates its relevance to our understanding of two recent historical episodes--the East Asian financial crisis and the 1991 U.S. recession and subsequent recovery and boom. Joseph Stiglitz Globalization, International Trade and Markets http://works.bepress.com/joseph_stiglitz/7 http://works.bepress.com/joseph_stiglitz/7 Thu, 17 Aug 2006 18:22:07 PDT Joseph Stiglitz Globalization, International Trade and Markets Development http://works.bepress.com/joseph_stiglitz/5 http://works.bepress.com/joseph_stiglitz/5 Thu, 17 Aug 2006 17:28:52 PDT Joseph E. Stiglitz calculates that the full cost of the Iraq War may reach $2 trillion, much more than the $60 billion OMB Director Mich Daniels originally foresaw. Joseph Stiglitz Iraq http://works.bepress.com/joseph_stiglitz/4 http://works.bepress.com/joseph_stiglitz/4 Thu, 17 Aug 2006 17:28:50 PDT The funding troubles of Social Security have been greatly exaggerated in an effort to push a privatization agenda. Privatization has laudable goals—increased choice and higher returns—but few would choose to risk their secure retirement income and unfortunately higher returns cannot be achieved without risk. Regrettably, if private accounts really do offer a lot of choices, many people who cannot afford to do so will unwittingly risk their incomes; and, in many cases, a combination of this risk and high transaction costs will consume what should be their core retirement income. When the government picks up the pieces, the funding troubles will be worse, not better. Joseph Stiglitz Public Finance http://works.bepress.com/joseph_stiglitz/3 http://works.bepress.com/joseph_stiglitz/3 Thu, 17 Aug 2006 17:28:49 PDT Transfers and economic costs are indeed different in the war in Iraq, and transfers may be significant. Joseph Stiglitz Iraq