We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be...

Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an...

We consider rent seeking contests between at least two agents who might value the prize...

We propose a new procedure for supplying Public Firms. This mechanism is inspired in an...

Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an...

This work proposes a novel way to finance the public services in order to reach...

We introduce the serial contest by building on the desirable properties of two prominent contest...

This paper proposes a way to allocate schools places conciliating Pareto efficiency and Equity. Taking...

This paper introduces τ-fairness as a compromise solution reconciling Pareto efficiency and equity in School...

This paper proposes a reform for school allocation procedures in order to help integration policies...

This paper proposes the notion of ε-stability to conciliate Pareto efficiency and fairness. We propose...

This paper proposes a way to allocate schools places conciliating Pareto efficiency and Equity. Taking...

This paper introduces τ-fairness as a compromise solution reconciling Pareto efficiency and equity in School...

This paper proposes a reform for school allocation procedures in order to help integration policies...

This paper proposes the notion of ε-stability to conciliate Pareto efficiency and fairness. We propose...

This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player's payoff...

This paper models a contractual process by a sequential mechanism, which mimics matching procedures for...

This paper explores the existence of stable research teams, when the preferences of each agent...

This paper proposes an strategic analysis of mechanisms assigning workers to firms. We point out...

This paper analyzes simple mechanisms implementing (subselections of) the core correspondence of matching markets. We...

This paper studies simple hiring procedures for job markets. We show that when agents act...

We implement the stable correspondence of a job matching market in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. We...

This paper analyzes the possibility of implementing stable outcomes for marriage markets. Our first result...

Two stability concepts for one-sided matching markets are analyzed: Gale-Shapley stability and ξ-stability. The first...

This paper explores the possibility of designing strategy-proof mechanisms yielding satisfactory solutions to the marriage...

This paper studies, from a theoretical point of view, the assignament of workers to different...

As is known, there is no rule satisfying Adittivity on the complete domain of bankruptcy...

This paper provides an analysis of the Minimal Overlap Rule, a solution for bankruptcy problems...

This paper explores an old solution for bankruptcy problems, described by Ibn Ezra in the...

This paper proposes a cost-sharing rule for the specific case in which the agents’ demands...

This paper proposes a new axiomatic justification for the employ of the Aumann-Shapley value for...

We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be...

This paper introduces τ-fairness as a compromise solution reconciling Pareto efficiency and equity in School...

This paper proposes the notion of ε-stability to conciliate Pareto efficiency and fairness. We propose...

We propose a new procedure for supplying Public Firms. This mechanism is inspired in an...

This work proposes a novel way to finance the public services in order to reach...

We introduce the serial contest by building on the desirable properties of two prominent contest...

This paper models a contractual process by a sequential mechanism, which mimics matching procedures for...

This paper explores the existence of stable research teams, when the preferences of each agent...

This paper proposes a cost-sharing rule for the specific case in which the agents’ demands...

This paper proposes an strategic analysis of mechanisms assigning workers to firms. We point out...

This paper analyzes simple mechanisms implementing (subselections of) the core correspondence of matching markets. We...

This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economies with...

This paper studies simple hiring procedures for job markets. We show that when agents act...

We implement the stable correspondence of a job matching market in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. We...

We compare different (direct) tax systems from an efficiency perspective.