John Morgan is the Gary and Sherron Kalbach Professor of Business Administration at the Haas School of Business, UC Berkeley. He founded Berkeley's Xlab---a 40 subject laboratory for experiments in the Social Sciences. He created the MBA elective Game Theory, the most popular elective in the Berkeley MBA curriculum. The class uses a variety of in-class experiences in experimental economics to illustrate key lessons for managers. The materials for this award-winning class has been adopted by instructors in the US, Canada, and Europe. Before coming to Berkeley, Morgan was a professor in the Woodrow Wilson School for Public Policy at Princeton, where he also founded an experimental lab. Morgan's research, including field experiments on eBay and Yahoo, has been featured in top academic journals as well as in mainstream media outlets including the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and US News and World Report.
Articles
Reforming the IMF, The Economists' Voice (2008)
John Morgan presents a radical proposal to sell voting rights at the IMF and redistribute...
Clock games: Theory and Experiments, Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences Colloquium Series (2007)
Timing is crucial in situations ranging from currency attacks, to product introductions, to starting a...
...Plus Shipping and Handling: Revenue (Non) Equivalence in Field Experiments on eBay (with Tanjim Hossain), The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (2007)
Many firms divide the price a consumer pays for a good into two pieces---the price...
The Spite Motive and Equilibrium Behavior in Auctions (with Ken Steiglitz and George Reis), The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (2007)
We study auctions where bidders have independent private values but attach a disutility to the...
Price Dispersion in the Large and in the Small: Evidence from an Internet Price Comparison Site, Journal of Industrial Economics (2004)
Other
On the Buyability of Voting Bodies, Institute of Governmental Studies (2007)
We study vote buying by competing interest groups in a variety of electoral and contractual...
Securities Auctions Under Moral Hazard: An Experimental Study (with Shimon Kogan), Experimental Social Science Laboratory (Xlab) (2007)
In many settings, including venture capital financing, mergers and acquisitions, and lease competition, the structure...
Clicks, Discontinuities, and Firm Demand Online (with Michael R. Baye, J. Rupert J. Gatti, and Paul Kattuman), Competition Policy Center (2006)
The market values of online platforms, such as Yahoo, stem from their ability to monetize...
How much is a Dollar Worth? Tipping versus Equilibrium Coexistence on Competing Online Auction Sites (with Jennifer Brown), Competition Policy Center (2006)
The equilibrium model of Ellison, Fudenberg, and Möbius (2004) predicts that, if two competing auction...
Shrouded Attributes and Information Suppression: Evidence from Field Experiments (with Tanjim Hossain), Competition Policy Center (2006)
The recent theoretical literature suggests that consumer myopia may lead firms to profitably suppress or...