Tariff protection in developed and developing countries: a cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis.

John A. Conybeare, University of Iowa

Abstract

Trade policy is of great importance to both developed and developing countries. It has become highly politicized along a number of dimensions. Tariff restrictions are one of the principal methods by which states have pursued their trade goals. Hence both economists and political scientists should find it useful to enquire into the reasons for differences in tariff policies across nations. The article tests for the determinants of tariff levels by taking average country rather than commodity tariffs. It explains the data sources and research technique; interprets the results for tariff levels in 1971 and the results for tariffs in 1902. The article considers four explanatory theories: international system, rational governmental economic actor, intragovernmental politics, and interest group politics. The systemic theory to be tested focuses on bargaining power. The rational governmental actor explanations emphasize primarily the economic objectives (namely modernization, growth, balance of payments) that a state acting as a unitary actor may pursue in seeking a specific set of goals. The intragovernmental theories selected deal with bureaucratic power and organizational structure, involving the measurement of such factors as the defense value of tariffs, the structure of taxes, fiscal federalism, and the overall role of government in the economy. Domestic politics explanations seek to measure the incentives and the abilities of interest groups to mobilize for the purpose of influencing tariff policy.