SelectedWorks - Jesse A. Schwartz

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Selected Works of Jesse A. Schwartz

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About Jesse A. Schwartz

Present	Associate Professor, Kennesaw State University
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Economics

Articles (15)

Article

A Closer Look at Two Conjectures About Irregular Marginal Revenue

Economics Letters (2022)

Alexander Maslov, Luc Noiset and Jesse A. Schwartz

A common assumption in models where buyers have private information is for the buyers to draw their private values from ...

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Article

Imperfect Competition in Online Auctions

Journal of Mathematical Economics (2022)

Alexander Maslov and Jesse A. Schwartz

We study online markets where two sellers sequentially choose reserve prices and then hold ascending auctions. Buyers can bid in ...

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Article

Comparisons of Utility Inequality and Income Inequality

Economics Letters (2019)

Jesse A. Schwartz and Timothy Mathews

A simple theoretical model is developed and analyzed to investigate the possible relationships betweenincome inequality and utility inequality. Measuring utility ...

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Article

Robust Trading Mechanisms with Budget Surplus and Partial Trade

Economic Theory Bulletin (2018)

Jesse A. Schwartz and Quan Wen

In a bilateral bargaining problem with private values,Hagerty and Rogerson(J Econ Theory 42(1):94–107, 1987) showed that essentially all dominant strategyincentive ...

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Article

A Subsidized Vickrey Auction for Cost Sharing

Journal of Mathematical Economics (2018)

Jesse A. Schwartz and Quan Wen

It is well-known that there is no cost-sharing mechanism that is budget balanced, efficient, and dominantstrategy incentive compatible (DSIC). The ...

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Article

A Note on k-price Auctions with Complete Information When Mixed ...

Economics Letters (2017)

Jesse A. Schwartz and Timothy Mathews

Restricting attention to players who use pure strategies, Tauman (2002) proves that in a k-price auction(k ≥ 3) for every ...

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Article

A 'Crying Wolf' Game of Interspecific Kleptoparasitic Mutualism

Faculty and Research Publications (2014)

Antonio J. Golubski, Nathaniel S. O'Connell, Jesse A. Schwartz and Sean F. Ellermeyer

We model a potentially mutualistic interaction between a species making antipredator alarm calls and a species which eavesdrops on those ...

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Article

A Characterization for Dominant Strategy Implementation

Frontiers of Economics in China (2013)

Jesse A. Schwartz and Quan Wen

Article

Dominant Strategy Implementation with a Convex Product Space of Valuations

Faculty and Research Publications (2012)

Katherine Cuff, Sunghoon Hong, Jesse A. Schwartz, Quan Wen, et al.

A necessary and sufficient condition for dominant strategy implementability when preferences are quasilinear is that, for every individual i and ...

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Article

The Relation Between Variance and Information Rents in Auctions

International Journal of Industrial Organization (2010)

Brett Katzman, Julian Reif and Jesse Schwartz

This paper examines the conventional wisdom, expressed in McAfee and McMillan's (1987) widely cited survey paper on auctions, that links ...

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Article

Wage Negotiation under Good Faith Bargaining

International Game Theory Review (2007)

Jesse Schwartz and Quan Wen

We study the wage negotiation model of Haller and Holden (1990) and Fernandez and Glazer (1991) under the "Good Faith ...

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Article

Wage Bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy (2006)

Jesse Schwartz and Quan Wen

Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) prohibit the management of a firm from unilaterally increasing ...

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Article

Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions

Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy (2002)

Peter Cramton and Jesse A Schwartz

This paper describes the bid signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. Bidders in these auctions bid ...

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Article

Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions

Journal of Regulatory Economics (2000)

Peter Cramton and Jesse Schwartz

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, ...

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Article

Nonseparable Utility and the Double Dividend Debate: Reconsidering the Tax-Interaction ...

Environmental and Resource Economics (2000)

Jesse A. Schwartz and Robert Repetto

Article

Imperfect Competition in Online Auctions

Journal of Mathematical Economics (2022)

Alexander Maslov and Jesse A. Schwartz

We study online markets where two sellers sequentially choose reserve prices and then hold ascending auctions. Buyers can bid in ...

Link

Article

A Closer Look at Two Conjectures About Irregular Marginal Revenue

Economics Letters (2022)

Alexander Maslov, Luc Noiset and Jesse A. Schwartz

A common assumption in models where buyers have private information is for the buyers to draw their private values from ...

Link

Article

Imperfect Competition in Online Auctions

Journal of Mathematical Economics (2022)

Alexander Maslov and Jesse A. Schwartz

We study online markets where two sellers sequentially choose reserve prices and then hold ascending auctions. Buyers can bid in ...

Link

About Jesse A. Schwartz

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Articles (15)

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