This article takes a different approach. As the juxtaposition of rule and exception in the Statute of Monopolies so amply demonstrates, both antitrust law (the rule) and intellectual property law (the exception) are facets of economic law. They are both intensely practical, and their effect in practice, to the extent it is beneficial, is almost entirely economic. Therefore any deviance or breakdown in either must be addressed using sound economic principles. Attempts to resolve the present difficulties of unclear and inconsistent doctrine by resorting to abstract philosophizing or legal definitions, without a firm foundation in economics, are as likely to succeed as were ancient astronomers in developing a heliocentric theory of the solar system without telescopes. Accordingly, this article addresses the current explosion in patent coverage from an economic and practical perspective. It seeks sound economic principles, based upon the notion of entrepreneurial risk, to explain how the patent-law exception to the general prohibition on monopolies should be construed and to determine whether the exception, as properly extrapolated to modern science and technology, ought to encompass computer programs and business methods. Part I examines the nature of the balance between prohibited monopoly and the protection of intellectual property and concludes that the balance between rule (monopoly is bad) and exception (temporary patent protection may be good) depends on the concept of technological risk, as distinguished from market risk. Part II examines computer programs, compares them to other modern innovations, as well as to the building of skyscrapers and bridges, and concludes that computer program development does not involve the same level of technological risk as do other industries now supported by patent protection. Part III examines business methods and concludes that, in general, their exploitation entails only market risk--a risk ordinarily left to free competition in the marketplace, not avoided by monopoly. Part IV explores how two interacting trends in the Federal Circuit--the “suggestion” test for nonobviousness and the court's reluctance to exercise judgment in determining patentable subject matter-- exacerbate the problem of distinguishing innovations that need and deserve temporary monopoly for their creation from those that do not. Part V concludes with some observations about the results of current trends if continued.