Copyright (c) 2009 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/james_olmsted Recent documents in James L. Olmsted en-us Mon, 08 Jun 2009 10:06:40 PDT 3600 http://works.bepress.com/james_olmsted/8 http://works.bepress.com/james_olmsted/8 Sun, 07 Jun 2009 12:16:52 PDT This timely article discusses the transfer of carbon offset rights in conservation easements. The article makes specific suggestions as to how best draft conservation easements to take advantage of marketing carbon offsets. James L. Olmsted Global Warming Conservation Easements Land Use Law http://works.bepress.com/james_olmsted/7 http://works.bepress.com/james_olmsted/7 Mon, 12 Jan 2009 14:24:07 PST James L. Olmsted Global Warming Conservation Easements http://works.bepress.com/james_olmsted/6 http://works.bepress.com/james_olmsted/6 Sun, 11 Jan 2009 18:23:14 PST This article is one of two articles published by the Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation (JELL) in a point-counterpoint format. These two articles, one by James L. Olmsted and the other by Professor of Law Julia D. Mahoney, represent the inaugural articles is what is to become a regular feature in JELL. In this point-counterpoint, the issue is whether conservation easements should be made perpetual. In this article, Olmsted argues that such easements should be perpetual while Professor Mahoney takes the opposing position. James L. Olmsted Conservation Easements http://works.bepress.com/james_olmsted/5 http://works.bepress.com/james_olmsted/5 Wed, 07 Jan 2009 15:08:53 PST The article is seminal in that it proposes a new twist on the "Tragedy of the Commons." The article does so by suggesting that contrary to our best intentions in preserving a portion of the commons, doing so may have the perverse result of enabling the exploitation of other resources. Stated another way, the premise of the article is the counter-intuitive and paradoxical notion that by conserving certain natural resources we are in effect enabling the consumption of potentially many more other natural resources. James L. Olmsted Environmental Law http://works.bepress.com/james_olmsted/4 http://works.bepress.com/james_olmsted/4 Tue, 24 Jun 2008 09:38:29 PDT This article begins the task of developing a conceptual framework to use in evaluating the effectiveness of regional responses to global warming and global climate change. The article concludes with a case study of global warming related legislation in the state of Oregon, focussing primarily on the 2007 legislative session. James L. Olmsted Global Warming http://works.bepress.com/james_olmsted/3 http://works.bepress.com/james_olmsted/3 Thu, 05 Jun 2008 16:34:54 PDT James L. Olmsted Land Use Law http://works.bepress.com/james_olmsted/2 http://works.bepress.com/james_olmsted/2 Thu, 05 Jun 2008 16:02:38 PDT This article explores conservation easement drafting strategies responsive to global warming and climate change. As a starting point, the article proposes the development of a new form of conservation easement, described in the article as an "Ark" easement. Unlike traditional, perpetual easements (referred to as "Park" easements in the article), the Ark conservation easement is not intended to exist in perpetuity and, instead, is terminable by the holder without resort to a judicial proceeding. The merit of the Ark easement is that if global warming caused changes such as species extirpation render the conservation purposes of the easement impossible or impractical, the easement holder can terminate the easement and use the proceeds for other conservation purposes similar to those of the now terminated easement. For this strategy to succeed, however, the easement holder must be able to recover the full, appreciated value of the development rights formerly held in abeyance by the now terminated easement. The same valuation principle holds for judicially terminated "Park" easements as well. Accordingly, the article recommends a "hybrid" valuation on termination provision which captures the full, appreciated value of the newly released development rights. This hybrid valuation method assigns to the easement holder the greater of the ratio-based value of the conservation easement from the Treasury Regulations (i.e., the ratio of the value of the conservation easement to the eased land at the time of easement creation is applied to the proceeds from the sale or exchange of the land subsequent to easement termination) or the fair market value of the conservation easement as of the date of termination. As there are currently approximately 1,500 land trusts in the United States which collectively hold approximately 18,000 conservation easements covering over 5 million acres, the amount of money at stake in easement terminations is enormous. This article seeks to provide means by which careful land trusts can avoid landowner windfalls from the appreciated value of these easements and instead capture the appreciated value to be re-deployed to further the social good of land and resource conservation. James L. Olmsted Conservation Easements