SelectedWorks - Huseyin Yildirim

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Selected Works of Huseyin Yildirim

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I joined Duke Economics in 2000 after receiving my Ph.D. from the University of Florida. I am an applied micro theorist with broad interests in Industrial Organization, Public Finance, and Political Economy. My most recent research explores career concerns in teamwork and tournaments.

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About Huseyin Yildirim

I joined Duke Economics in 2000 after receiving my Ph.D. from the University of Florida. I am an applied micro theorist with broad interests in Industrial Organization, Public Finance, and Political Economy. My most recent research explores career concerns in teamwork and tournaments.

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Economics

Industrial Organization, Political Economy, and Public Finance

Duke University
Department of Economics
Box 90097
Durham, NC
27708

Email:

Articles (29)

Multiple Prizes in Tournaments with Career Concerns

Journal of Economic Theory (2024)

Alvaro J. Name-Correa and Huseyin Yildirim

We introduce career concerns into rank-order tournaments and offer a novel explanation for the pervasiveness of multiple prizes. We argue ...

Who Fares Better in Teamwork?

RAND Journal of Economics (2023)

Huseyin Yildirim

This article establishes a tenuous link between ability and relative well-being in teamwork. It shows that higher-ability or lower-cost members ...

Credit Attribution and Collaborative Work

Journal of Economic Theory (2021)

Saltuk Ozerturk and Huseyin Yildirim

We examine incentives in research teams where the market, such as the scientific community, attributes credit for success based on ...

Biased Experts, Majority Rule, and the Optimal Composition of Committee

Games and Economic Behavior (2021)

Alvaro J. Name-Correa and Huseyin Yildirim

An uninformed principal or planner appoints a committee of experts to vote on a multi-attribute alternative, such as an interdisciplinary ...

Social Pressure, Transparency, and Voting in Committees

Journal of Economic Theory (2019)

Alvaro J. Name-Correa and Huseyin Yildirim

We examine the consequences of vote transparency in committees whose membersfear being blamed by interested observers for casting an unfavorable ...

Strategic Ignorance in Sequential Procurement

American Economic Journal - Microeconomics (2019)

Silvana Krasteva and Huseyin Yildirim

Should a buyer approach sellers of complementary goods informed or uninformed of her private valuations, and if informed, in which ...

A Capture Theory of Committees

Public Choice (2018)

Alvaro J. Name-Correa and Huseyin Yildirim

Why do committees exist? The extant literature emphasizes that they pool dispersed information across members. In this paper, we argue ...

A Theory of Outsourced Fundraising: Why Dollars Turn into “Pennies ...

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (2017)

Zdravko Paskalev and Huseyin Yildirim

Charities frequently rely on professional solicitors whose commissions exceed halfof the solicited donations. To understand this practice, we propose a ...

Information, Competition, and the Quality of Charities

Journal of Public Economics (2016)

Silvana Krasteva and Huseyin Yildirim

Drawing upon the all-pay auction literature, we propose a model of charity competition in which informed giving alone can account ...

"Giving" in to Social Pressure

Games and Economic Behavior (2016)

Alvaro J. Name-Correa and Huseyin Yildirim

We develop a theory of charitable giving in which donors feel social pressure from adirect solicitation. We show that equilibrium ...

Andreoni‐McGuire Algorithm and the Limits of Warm‐Glow Giving

Journal of Public Economics (2014)

Huseyin Yildirim

We provide a full equilibrium characterization of warm-glow giving à la Andreoni (1989, 1990) by extending the Andreoni-McGuire (1993) algorithm. ...

(Un)Informed Charitable Giving

Journal of Public Economics (2013)

Silvana Krasteva and Huseyin Yildirim

Evidence suggests little informed giving. To understand this behavior, we examine voluntary provision of a discrete public good with independent ...

A Theory of Charitable Fund-raising with Costly Solicitations

American Economic Review (2013)

Alvaro Name Correa and Huseyin Yildirim

We present a theory of charitable fund-raising in which it is costly to solicit donors. We fully characterize the solicitation ...

On the Role of Confidentiality and Deadlines in Bilateral Negotiations

Games and Economic Behavior (2012)

Silvana Krasteva and Huseyin Yildirim

The preference between public and private negotiations for a buyer who sequentially visits two sellers is examined. It is shown ...

Payoff Uncertainty, Bargaining Power, and the Strategic Sequencing of Bilateral ...

RAND Journal of Economics (2012)

Silvana Krasteva and Huseyin Yildirim

This paper investigates the sequencing choice of a buyer who negotiates with the sellers of two complementary objects with uncertain ...

Subjective Performance and the Value of Blind Evaluation

Review of Economic Studies (2011)

Curtis R. Taylor and Huseyin Yildirim

The incentive and project selection effects of agent anonymity are investigated in a setting where an evaluator observes a subjective ...

A Unified Analysis of Rational Voting with Private Values and ...

Games and Economic Behavior (2010)

Curtis R. Taylor and Huseyin Yildirim

We provide a unified analysis of the canonical rational voting model with privately known political preferences and costs of voting. ...

Distribution of Surplus in Sequential Bargaining with Endogenous Recognition

Public Choice (2010)

Huseyin Yildirim

I examine a sequential bargaining situation in which agents contest the right to propose an allocation. The contest can either ...

Public Information and Electoral Bias

Games and Economic Behavior (2010)

Curtis R. Taylor and Huseyin Yildirim

We present a theory of voting that predicts that elections are more likely to be close, and voter turnout is ...

Proposal Power and Majority Rule in Multilateral Bargaining with Costly ...

Journal of Economic Theory (2007)

Huseyin Yildirim

This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer. In equilibrium, agents’ effort ...

Getting the Ball Rolling: Voluntary Contributions to a Large-Scale Public ...

Journal of Public Economic Theory (2006)

Huseyin Yildirim

This paper examines dynamic voluntary contributions to a large‐scale project. In equilibrium, contributions are influenced by the interplay of two ...

Contests with Multiple Rounds

Games and Economic Behavior (2005)

Huseyin Yildirim

This paper studies contests where players have the flexibility to add to their previous efforts after observing their rivals' most ...

Managing Switching Costs in Multi-period Procurements with Strategic Buyers

International Economic Review (2005)

Tracy R. Lewis and Huseyin Yildirim

This article examines the use of switching costs by long‐lived strategic buyers to manage dynamic competition between rival suppliers. The ...

On the Endogeneity of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria: Games of ...

Journal of Economic Theory (2005)

Richard Romano and Huseyin Yildirim

We characterize equilibria of games with two properties: (i) Agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their ...

Piecewise Procurement of a Large-Scale Project

International Journal of Industrial Organization (2004)

Huseyin Yildirim

This paper studies the optimal piecewise procurement of a large-scale project. In the unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of the ...