We employ and develop general equilibrium and strategic models to examine short- and long-term economic and political problems. We develop policy guidelines and design new institutions aimed at fostering the common welfare.
Articles
When Inefficiency Begets Efficiency (with Hans Haller), Economic Theory (2005)
Collective consumption decisions taken by the members of a household may prove inefficient. The impact...
Emission taxes and optimal refunding schemes, Journal of Public Economics (2004)
We examine how refunding emission taxes to firms dependent on market shares should be designed....
Endogenous Spillovers and Incentives to Innovate (with Armin Schmutzler), Economic Theory (2003)
We present a new approach to endogenizing technological spillovers. Firms choose continuous levels of a...
Unpublished Papers
The Global Refunding System and Climate Change, CER-ETH Working Paper Series (2007)
We propose a global refunding scheme as a new international approach to addressing climate change....
Growth and Enduring Epidemic Diseases (with Clive Bell), CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1729 (2006)
This paper studies the formation of human capital and its transmission across generations when premature...
Elections, Contracts and Markets (with Markus Müller), CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5717. (2006)
As the performance of long-term projects is not observable in the short run politicians may...
Re-Election Threshold Contracts in Politics (with Verena Liessem), CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5175. (2005)
When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, social welfare can...
Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union (with Volker Hahn), CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5155 (2005)
We examine whether the central bank council of a monetary union should publish its voting...