The article suggests a relational concept of fundamental rights. This concept

enhances the «functional» rôle played by some of the rights in the system of a state

governed by the rule of law, rather than an ethical universality or a substantial content

coinciding with any list of «human» rights. Fundamental rights belong to the fundamental

(ideal, substantice and normative) criteria of recognition/selection of actions and norms in

the institutional/normative practice of a legal order. Given this premise, the work analyses

some relevant issues: universal-fundamental nexus, property rights, liberty rights, social

rights. Fundamental rights refuse any rigid classification which identifies and distinguishes

among them on the basis of their fixed doctrinal structure: universal rights vs. non universal

ones, property vs. liberty rights, social rights as rights to state services. These classifications

miss the real point about “fundamental” rights, which are to protect interest and

values of individuals socially deemed worth of the best legal efforts in the most effective

approach.