Copyright (c) 2009 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/george_h_baker Recent documents in George H Baker en-us Thu, 05 Nov 2009 23:21:33 PST 3600 http://works.bepress.com/george_h_baker/25 http://works.bepress.com/george_h_baker/25 Wed, 04 Nov 2009 12:23:22 PST No critical infrastructure is self-sufficient. The complexity inherent in the interdependent nature of infrastructure systems complicates planning and preparedness for system failures. Recent wide-scale disruption of infrastructure on the Gulf Coast due to weather, and in the Northeast due to electric power network failures, dramatically illustrate the problems associated with mitigating cascading effects and responding to cascading infrastructure failures once they have occurred.The major challenge associated with preparedness for cascading failures is that they transcend system, corporate, and political boundaries and necessitate coordination among multiple, disparate experts and authorities. This symposium brought together concerned communities including government and industry technical and policy principals with experience in cascading infrastructure failures. The forum was designed to illuminate best practices for avoiding and responding to cascading failure contingencies created by natural, accidental, or malicious infrastructure debilitation. George H. Baker Critical Infrastructure Assurance System Effects and Hardening Education Infrastructure Modeling EMI/EMC Protection System Vulnerabilities Risk Management Public Policy Hardened Facilities Public-Private Partnerships Community Resiliency http://works.bepress.com/george_h_baker/24 http://works.bepress.com/george_h_baker/24 Fri, 10 Jul 2009 12:44:12 PDT Recent U.S. high consequence events have clarified the importance of government collaboration with industry. The benefit of such collaboration was one of the most important lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. The resources owned and controlled by American industry dwarf those available to local, state and even the federal government departments. Better agreements and incentives to bring the full capabilities of industry squarely into the national response agenda will be indispensable in effectively responding to large-scale catastrophes. At our 2007 Symposium, General Russel Honoré, who led the National Guard response to Katrina stated, "We need the partnering between local, state, and federal governments; but the biggest partner should be industrybecause people in industry, if they understand the problems, can take them on as business opportunities." The 2008 event program was structured to illuminate exemplary public-private partnerships at the local, regional, and national levels and consider steps to develop and improve public-private partnerships for the future. The program included presentations by recognized experts from government and industry engaged in operating and securing critical infrastructures. Participants represented academe, Federal/State/Local government agencies, private-sector companies, industry associations, and standards organizations. George H. Baker Critical Infrastructure Assurance Education Risk Management Public Policy Public-Private Partnerships http://works.bepress.com/george_h_baker/23 http://works.bepress.com/george_h_baker/23 Thu, 16 Apr 2009 08:05:28 PDT Atmospheric test fallout data have been used to determine admissible dust particle size distributions for nuclear winter and nuclear fallout studies. The research was originally motivated by extreme differences noted in the magnitude and longevity of dust effects predicted by particle size distributions routinely used in fallout predictions versus those used for nuclear winter studies. Three different sets of historical data have been analyzed:1. Stratospheric burden of Strontium-90 and Tungsten-185, 1954-1967 (97 contributing events) 2. Continental U.S Strontium-90 fallout through 1958 (75 contributing events) 3. Local Fallout from selected Nevada tests (16 events)The contribution of dust to possible long term climate effects following a nuclear exchange depends strongly on the particle size distribution. The distribution affects both the atmospheric residence time and optical depth. One dimensional models of stratospheric/tropospheric fallout removal were developed and used to identify optimum particle distributions. Results indicate that particle distributions which properly predict bulk stratospheric activity transfer tend to be somewhat smaller than number size distributions used in initial nuclear winter studies. In addition, both 90Sr and 185W fallout behavior is better predicted by the lognormal distribution function than the prevalent power law hybrid function.It is shown that the power law behavior of particle samples may well be an aberration of gravitational cloud stratification. Results support the possible existence of two independent particle size distributions in clouds generated by surface or near surface bursts. One distribution governs late time stratospheric fallout, the other governs early time fallout. A bimodal lognormal distribution is proposed to describe the cloud particle population. The distribution predicts higher initial sunlight attenuation and lower late time attenuation than the power law hybrid function used in initial nuclear winter studies. George H. Baker Nuclear Fallout Modeling http://works.bepress.com/george_h_baker/22 http://works.bepress.com/george_h_baker/22 Tue, 27 Jan 2009 12:37:19 PST Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures, the report of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP, 1997), concluded that the nation's physical security and economic security depend on our critical energy, communications, and computer infrastructures1. As our dependence on them increases, so too do the vulnerabilities of these infrastructures to a wide range of threats. During the Cold War, the federal government constructed a number of underground facilities (UGFs) to house critical personnel and functions associated with the national defense. Although this threat has warned, the threat of high-casualty terrorist incidents and the diffusion of technologies for weapons of mass destruction have increased. In light of these growing threats, the Defense Special Weapons Agency of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) requested the assistance of the National Research Council to investigate how these existing facilities, or new underground sites, may contribute to an emerging national focus on the security of our critical infrastructures.The PCCIP noted that the potential threats to the nation's critical infrastructures range from natural disasters to criminal and terrorist activities to organized information warfare. Many of these threats are "cyber-threats" and are not readily addressed with traditional physical security techniques. However, some components of advanced information systems are vulnerable to physical damage, whether from terrorist bombings, earthquakes, or apparently ordinary traffic accidents. Other infrastructure systems, such as energy, transportation, and emergency services, also have critical elements that are physically vulnerable. Although the PCCIP did not directly address the role of UGFs for the protection of critical infrastructures, its report recommended a program of joint government and industry cooperation and information sharing to increase the security of our nation's critical infrastructures.Secure UGFs offer one means of protecting these critical elements and systems. UGFs can be particularly attractive if the perceived threat level or the consequences of loss are high and the vulnerabilities cannot be addressed through system redundancy or other nonstructural means. Although buildings can be hardened (strengthened) against structural failure from earthquakes, explosions, or accidents, beyond a certain threat level or structural loading, providing protection for critical elements in hardened above-ground structures may cost more than building an underground facility. A cost-risk analysis can demonstrate the most cost-effective approach for obtaining the desired level of protection. At the request of the Defense Special Weapons Agency, the Board on Infrastructure and the Constructed Environment of the National Research Council convened a workshop on April 6 and 7, 1998, on the use of underground facilities for the protection of critical infrastructure. The workshop, which was held at the National Academy of Sciences, in Washington, D.C., explored how existing UGFs constructed for defense purposes or new facilities might meet the nation's needs in protecting critical infrastructures. Workshop participants possessed expertise primarily in defense and security matters. Members of the commercial underground and tunneling communities also were in attendance. Richard G. Little Critical Infrastructure Assurance System Effects and Hardening Education Risk Management Public Policy Hardened Facilities http://works.bepress.com/george_h_baker/21 http://works.bepress.com/george_h_baker/21 Fri, 16 Jan 2009 12:46:01 PST Recent U.S. high consequence events have made clear the importance of government collaboration with industry. The benefits of such collaboration were clearly seen as a lesson from Hurricane Katrina. The resources owned and controlled by American industry dwarf those available to local, state and even the federal government departments. Better agreements and incentives to bring the full capabilities of industry squarely into the national response agenda will be indispensable in effectively responding to large-scale catastrophes. General Russel Honoré who led the National Guard response to Katrina has said, "We need the partnering between local, state, and federal governments; but the biggest partner should be industrybecause people in industry, if they understand the problems, can take them on as business opportunities." To foster the development of public-private-partnerships, JMU in cooperation with the Federal Facilities Council of the National Research Council organized a symposium held on May 22nd, 2008 at the National Academy of Sciences, 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. The event program was structured to illuminate successful public-private partnerships at the local, regional, and national level as models and consider steps to develop and improve public-private partnerships for the future. The program included presentations by recognized experts from government and industry engaged in operating and securing critical infrastructures. This article summarizes major points made by symposium keynote speakers and panelists. George H. Baker Critical Infrastructure Assurance Risk Management Public Policy http://works.bepress.com/george_h_baker/20 http://works.bepress.com/george_h_baker/20 Wed, 22 Oct 2008 10:25:26 PDT One lesson from the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon is that infrastructure built for beneficial purposes can become an instrument of mass destruction if it fails as the result of a malicious act. Dams and their related infrastructure are primarily built to control the flow of a river and mitigate flooding. The water impounded behind a dam can be used to generate power and to provide water for drinking, irrigation, commerce, industry, and recreation. However, if a dam fails, the water that would be unleashed has the energy and power to cause mass destruction downstream, killing and injuring people and destroying property, agriculture, industry, and local and regional economies.The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation is responsible for managing and operating some of this nation's largest and most critical dams, including five national critical infrastructure (NCI) facilities: the Hoover, Grand Coulee, Folsom, Shasta, and Glen Canyon dams. Reclamation's total inventory includes 249 facilities comprising 479 dams and dikes and related facilities. The importance of the water and power supplies provided by these facilities to the quality of life in 17 western states cannot be overstated. The failure of one or more of these dams as the result of a malicious act would come with little warning and time for evacuation. In the worst case, where a large dam is located above a major population center, the devastation in terms of lost lives and destruction of property, power and water supply facilities, and commerce could rival or exceed that in New Orleans after the levees failed following Hurricane Katrina.At the request of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, the National Research Council, through the Board on Infrastructure and the Constructed Environment, appointed a multidisciplinary committee of 14 experts to assess Reclamation's security program and determine its level of preparedness to deter, respond to, and recover from malicious acts to its physical infrastructure and to the people who use and manage it. This document summarizes the work and findings of the committee. John T. Christian Critical Infrastructure Assurance System Vulnerabilities Risk Management http://works.bepress.com/george_h_baker/19 http://works.bepress.com/george_h_baker/19 Fri, 25 Jul 2008 06:08:28 PDT Because the operation and control of most critical infrastructures are highly dependent on electronics, it is important to understand the vulnerability of those electronics to intentional electromagnetic interference (EMI). The possibility of interference using readily available consumer devices is a particular concern. We investigated the feasibility and effectiveness of using compact stun guns to intentionally interfere with electronic systems. Test articles included individual computers and computers networked through a central hub. 60KV and 600KV devices were used in the experiments. Results indicate that stun guns are effective in disabling digital electronic systems. George H. Baker Critical Infrastructure Assurance System Effects and Hardening EMI/EMC Protection System Vulnerabilities High Power Electromagnetics (HPEM) http://works.bepress.com/george_h_baker/17 http://works.bepress.com/george_h_baker/17 Fri, 11 Jul 2008 10:03:47 PDT The physical and social fabric of the United States is sustained by a system of systems; a complex and dynamic network of interlocking and interdependent infrastructures ("critical national infrastructures") whose harmonious functioning enables the myriad actions, transactions, and information flow that undergird the orderly conduct of civil society in this country. The vulnerability of these frastructures to threats -- deliberate, accidental, and acts of nature -- is the focus of greatly heightened concern in the current era, a process accelerated by the events of 9/11 and recent hurricanes, including Katrina and Rita. This report presents the results of the Commission's assessment of the effects of a high altitude electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack on our critical national infrastructures and provides recommendations for their mitigation. The assessment is informed by analytic and test activities executed under Commission sponsorship, which are discussed in this volume. An earlier executive report, Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) -- Volume 1: Executive Report (2004), provided an overview of the subject. The electromagnetic pulse generated by a high altitude nuclear explosion is one of a small number of threats that can hold our society at risk of catastrophic consequences. The increasingly pervasive use of electronics of all forms represents the greatest source of vulnerability to attack by EMP. Electronics are used to control, communicate, compute, store, manage, and implement nearly every aspect of United States (U.S.) civilian systems. When a nuclear explosion occurs at high altitude, the EMP signal it produces will cover the wide geographic region within the line of sight of the detonation.1 This broad band, high amplitude EMP, when coupled into sensitive electronics, has the capability to produce widespread and long lasting disruption and damage to the critical infrastructures that underpin the fabric of U.S. society. William R. Graham Critical Infrastructure Assurance System Effects and Hardening Education Infrastructure Modeling EMI/EMC Protection System Vulnerabilities http://works.bepress.com/george_h_baker/16 http://works.bepress.com/george_h_baker/16 Wed, 12 Mar 2008 07:11:27 PDT The presentation recommends an approach for unifying electronic system protection designs for a wide spectrum of electromagnetic environments. A general electromagnetic topological construct is developed as the basis for a consistent shielding and terminal protection methodology. Spectral characteristics of multiple interfering electromagnetic sources, both internal and external, are described. Effects addressed include EMI/EMC, lightning, nuclear EMP, and RF weapons. Protection practices for individual effects are discussed and means for integrating these into a single protection topology. George H. Baker Critical Infrastructure Assurance System Effects and Hardening EMI/EMC Protection Protection Standards System Vulnerabilities http://works.bepress.com/george_h_baker/15 http://works.bepress.com/george_h_baker/15 Tue, 11 Mar 2008 14:18:43 PDT Electric power is essential to the functioning of U.S. society. The electric power system increasingly operates at or near its reliability limits. The geographic scale of the tightly coupled networks involved makes the system susceptible to large-scale outages. More frequent natural and accidental failures portend possible catastrophes from intentional disruption. Deregulation has been a major factor to the lack of investment in system upgrades. Techniques to prevent attacks and reduce vulnerabilities are available and affordable. George H. Baker Critical Infrastructure Assurance