The standard prescribes minimum performance requirements for low-risk protection from mission-aborting damage or upset due to HEMP threat environments. The standard also addresses minimum testing requirements for demonstrating that prescribed performance has been achieved and for verifying that the installed protection measures provide the operationally required HEMP hardness for the completed system. If the prescribed testing results in any hardware damage or functional upsets, the operational authority for the system will make the determination whether the observed event is mission aborting.

The standard defines the design and testing criteria for specifically designated transportable ground-based systems in HEMP-hardened, critical, time-urgent C4I networks. Such systems include subscriber terminals and data processing centers, transmitting and receiving communications stations, and relay systems. The standard applies to both new systems and modifications of existing systems. Although only local portions of system interconnects are addressed, it is assumed that survivable long-haul communications paths, fiber optic links, or other hardened interconnects between systems will be provided as required for mission accomplishment.

The document provides a standardized, low-risk protection approach for transportable ground-based systems in HEMP-hardened C4I networks. These uniform requirements ensure balanced HEMP hardening for all critical systems and facilities in the network.

The major challenge associated with preparedness for cascading failures is that they transcend system, corporate, and political boundaries and necessitate coordination among multiple, disparate experts and authorities. This symposium brought together concerned communities including government and industry technical and policy principals with experience in cascading infrastructure failures. The forum was designed to illuminate best practices for avoiding and responding to cascading failure contingencies created by natural, accidental, or malicious infrastructure debilitation.

1. Stratospheric burden of Strontium-90 and Tungsten-185, 1954-1967 (97 contributing events) 2. Continental U.S Strontium-90 fallout through 1958 (75 contributing events) 3. Local Fallout from selected Nevada tests (16 events)

The contribution of dust to possible long term climate effects following a nuclear exchange depends strongly on the particle size distribution. The distribution affects both the atmospheric residence time and optical depth. One dimensional models of stratospheric/tropospheric fallout removal were developed and used to identify optimum particle distributions. Results indicate that particle distributions which properly predict bulk stratospheric activity transfer tend to be somewhat smaller than number size distributions used in initial nuclear winter studies. In addition, both 90Sr and 185W fallout behavior is better predicted by the lognormal distribution function than the prevalent power law hybrid function.

It is shown that the power law behavior of particle samples may well be an aberration of gravitational cloud stratification. Results support the possible existence of two independent particle size distributions in clouds generated by surface or near surface bursts. One distribution governs late time stratospheric fallout, the other governs early time fallout. A bimodal lognormal distribution is proposed to describe the cloud particle population. The distribution predicts higher initial sunlight attenuation and lower late time attenuation than the power law hybrid function used in initial nuclear winter studies.

The PCCIP noted that the potential threats to the nation's critical infrastructures range from natural disasters to criminal and terrorist activities to organized information warfare. Many of these threats are "cyber-threats" and are not readily addressed with traditional physical security techniques. However, some components of advanced information systems are vulnerable to physical damage, whether from terrorist bombings, earthquakes, or apparently ordinary traffic accidents. Other infrastructure systems, such as energy, transportation, and emergency services, also have critical elements that are physically vulnerable. Although the PCCIP did not directly address the role of UGFs for the protection of critical infrastructures, its report recommended a program of joint government and industry cooperation and information sharing to increase the security of our nation's critical infrastructures.

Secure UGFs offer one means of protecting these critical elements and systems. UGFs can be particularly attractive if the perceived threat level or the consequences of loss are high and the vulnerabilities cannot be addressed through system redundancy or other nonstructural means. Although buildings can be hardened (strengthened) against structural failure from earthquakes, explosions, or accidents, beyond a certain threat level or structural loading, providing protection for critical elements in hardened above-ground structures may cost more than building an underground facility. A cost-risk analysis can demonstrate the most cost-effective approach for obtaining the desired level of protection. At the request of the Defense Special Weapons Agency, the Board on Infrastructure and the Constructed Environment of the National Research Council convened a workshop on April 6 and 7, 1998, on the use of underground facilities for the protection of critical infrastructure. The workshop, which was held at the National Academy of Sciences, in Washington, D.C., explored how existing UGFs constructed for defense purposes or new facilities might meet the nation's needs in protecting critical infrastructures. Workshop participants possessed expertise primarily in defense and security matters. Members of the commercial underground and tunneling communities also were in attendance.

To foster the development of public-private-partnerships, JMU in cooperation with the Federal Facilities Council of the National Research Council organized a symposium held on May 22nd, 2008 at the National Academy of Sciences, 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. The event program was structured to illuminate successful public-private partnerships at the local, regional, and national level as models and consider steps to develop and improve public-private partnerships for the future. The program included presentations by recognized experts from government and industry engaged in operating and securing critical infrastructures. This article summarizes major points made by symposium keynote speakers and panelists.

The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation is responsible for managing and operating some of this nation’s largest and most critical dams, including five national critical infrastructure (NCI) facilities: the Hoover, Grand Coulee, Folsom, Shasta, and Glen Canyon dams. Reclamation’s total inventory includes 249 facilities comprising 479 dams and dikes and related facilities. The importance of the water and power supplies provided by these facilities to the quality of life in 17 western states cannot be overstated. The failure of one or more of these dams as the result of a malicious act would come with little warning and time for evacuation. In the worst case, where a large dam is located above a major population center, the devastation in terms of lost lives and destruction of property, power and water supply facilities, and commerce could rival or exceed that in New Orleans after the levees failed following Hurricane Katrina.

At the request of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, the National Research Council, through the Board on Infrastructure and the Constructed Environment, appointed a multidisciplinary committee of 14 experts to assess Reclamation’s security program and determine its level of preparedness to deter, respond to, and recover from malicious acts to its physical infrastructure and to the people who use and manage it. This document summarizes the work and findings of the committee.