Copyright (c) 2009 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/gaspare_genna Recent documents in Gaspare M Genna en-us Fri, 18 Sep 2009 12:47:39 PDT 3600 http://works.bepress.com/gaspare_genna/8 http://works.bepress.com/gaspare_genna/8 Mon, 14 Sep 2009 12:50:26 PDT In this paper I contribute to the scholarship on public support for European integration by arguing that member-states' positive images influence individuals' support decisions. An attribute of this positive image is trust, which individuals utilize given the complexity of the integration process, the salient impact it has on their lives and the low levels of information individuals possess. The use of a member-state's image is therefore a short-cut to evaluate integration's impact on individuals. As the development of integration is strongly influenced by the relatively more economically powerful member-state, trust in Germany increases the level of support, more so than trusting the remaining members. Gaspare M. Genna http://works.bepress.com/gaspare_genna/7 http://works.bepress.com/gaspare_genna/7 Wed, 10 Oct 2007 13:46:10 PDT This paper explores the relationship between institutional homogeneity and integration. We argue that the homogeneity of economic institutions within a regional group and the integration process of the group jointly evolve. We examine detailed data on national economic institutions. The data include measurements of the size of government, a country's legal framework as associated with property rights enforcement, monetary policy, and business regulation. We hypothesize that dissimilarities in these areas increase the transaction costs among economic actors and therefore reduce the level of regional integration in a region. However, as these institutions become increasingly similar, integration improves and furthers the likelihood of increased homogeneity and integration. Yi Feng http://works.bepress.com/gaspare_genna/6 http://works.bepress.com/gaspare_genna/6 Wed, 10 Oct 2007 13:46:09 PDT We argue that successful economic integration requires a regionally preponderant country that acts as a provider of goods. However, when a large member acts in a costly unilateral manner, regional integration suffers because of the asymmetric effects on smaller members. In contrast, when smaller members act in a costly unilateral manner, the preponderant power is likely to absorb costs. We propose to test these hypotheses by using the case of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) during three crises: the attempted military coup in Paraguay in 1996, the 1999 devaluation of the Brazilian real, and the 2002 devaluation of the Argentine peso. Evidence shows that economic integration declined with costly Brazilian unilateral actions but improved when Brazil provided goods. Gaspare M. Genna http://works.bepress.com/gaspare_genna/5 http://works.bepress.com/gaspare_genna/5 Wed, 10 Oct 2007 13:46:09 PDT This work argues that the formation of an economic union requires that the homogeneity of domestic economic institutions and the process of regional integration reinforce each other. Granger causality tests on four cases of regional integration in the Americas, Asia and Europe(1975 through 1995)confirm our thesis. These cases include the Andean Pact, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Central American Common Market and the European Union. The most successful case of integration - the European Union - does evince a pattern of positive interaction between the two variables,while less successful cases, found in Latin America, are lacking in this mechanism of mutual influence. We further discuss several regional groups that have recently emerged and use our theoretical implications to assess their future development. Yi Feng http://works.bepress.com/gaspare_genna/4 http://works.bepress.com/gaspare_genna/4 Wed, 10 Oct 2007 13:46:08 PDT President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's government presided over three critical junctures in the development of the Common Market of the South (Mercosul): the attempted military coup in Paraguay in 1996, the devaluation of the Brazilian real in 1999, and the Argentine economic crisis in 2002. Its responses to these events were critical to the development of Mercosul because of Brazil's unique position as the largest country in the bloc. Many theories of free trade and regional integration hold that economic integration requires a regionally preponderant power that acts as a core provider of collective goods for member states. When such a power provides benefits, satisfaction among the member states increases and the likelihood of integration is increased. An examination of the Cardoso government's policies during the three critical junctures suggests that regional integration declined when Argentina incurred costs during the Brazilian currency crisis and increased when Cardoso's government provided aid during the Argentine economic crisis and helped defeat the attempted coup in Paraguay. Gaspare M. Genna http://works.bepress.com/gaspare_genna/3 http://works.bepress.com/gaspare_genna/3 Wed, 10 Oct 2007 13:46:07 PDT This article addresses the domestic and international conditions that influence regional integration. The national political elite is assumed to be opportunistic and will opt for regional integration when the domestic and international conditions provide economic gains for their constituencies through greater economic integration. The hypotheses state that increases in regional integration in Latin America and the Caribbean (ANCOM, CACM/SICA, CARICOM, and MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL) occur during periods of relative power asymmetries among pairs of countries, when mutual trade interests are high, and when alliance portfolios are similar. We test the hypotheses using aggregate data of country dyads from 1960 to 1997. To measure regional integration, we use an index referred to as the Integration Achievement Score. OLS and Cox proportional hazards regression estimates largely support our claims. Gaspare M. Genna http://works.bepress.com/gaspare_genna/2 http://works.bepress.com/gaspare_genna/2 Wed, 10 Oct 2007 13:46:07 PDT This paper proposes a theory for regional integration based on structural conditions. By applying power transition theory, we are able to account for and anticipate not only the tendency for pairs of countries to participate in integration, but the likely intensity of such integration as well. We find that integration is most likely when there is an asymmetric distribution of power between countries and when they are jointly satisfied after a power transition has occurred. These results hold even after controlling for level of development and trade flows. We test this theory on all politically relevant dyads between 1950 and 1996 using a novel method to measure the level of regional integration. We illustrate the empirical findings through simulations that track the developments leading to Europe's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Brian Efird http://works.bepress.com/gaspare_genna/1 http://works.bepress.com/gaspare_genna/1 Wed, 10 Oct 2007 13:46:05 PDT Generalizing the dynamics implied by power transition theory, we characterize the structural conditions that lead nations to initiate conflict or choose to integrate. The relationship between changes in relative power, hierarchical structures, and joint satisfaction are used to identify the structural conditions for conflict and cooperation. Empirical tests for the last two centuries confirm the strength and robustness of the characterization. In addition, long term assessments of Pax Britannica, the Cold War, and China's potential challenge to the Untied States in this century are used to illustrate the precision of these findings. The fundamental implication is that structural conditions provide the preconditions for conflict and cooperation, but decision makers have leeway in advancing policies that eventually lead to either war or peace. Brian Efird