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3 Cosmopolitanism, Trust, and Support for European Integration

Gaspare M. Genna

Cosmopolitanism is an idea that links various nationalities together. Instead of holding exclusive national identities, individuals broaden their affiliation so that people from neighboring countries, or perhaps the entire world, are also included in the same group. The existence of a cosmopolitan view deepens the integration of nations because leaders' decisions consider a wider set of individuals (Habermas 2012). It must be said, however, that connecting the idea of cosmopolitanism and the idea of Europe is not new. The ideas behind the various treaties that make up EU law draw on the spirit of cosmopolitanism. What is interesting would be to discover if the average European adopted the cosmopolitan ideal when they evaluate the European Union. To explain why cosmopolitanism is so important for European integration, we need to discuss why individuals would accept others outside of their nationality into a political community. The foundation of this community is the development of positive perceptions among fellow Europeans because such perceptions broaden intergroup trust.

Due to the European economic crises mentioned in the book's introduction, many individuals have questioned the ideas behind European integration as evidenced by the rise in Euroskepticism (Ray 2007). Questions arise concerning the wisdom of providing economic assistance to struggling economies. Other critics question the merit of austerity in exchange for assistance. Adding to the complex picture is the geographic concentration among those that ask these questions. The economic aid providers are from the wealthier north and the recipients are in the south and east. Much of this debate is often tied to perceptions regarding the economic motivations of giving and the conditions of receiving. I argue that the skepticism boils down to trust: If each side trusts that the motives of the other are mutually beneficial, then tensions can be reduced. The application of trust is at the heart of cosmopolitanism.

We need an explanation regarding how individuals' perceptions of others impact support for integration. In other words, are Europeans bonded into a political community? A political community promotes a significant degree of support for a political system's institutions and politicians (Easton 1965: 189). Karl Deutsch refers to a political community as a "people who have learned to communicate with each other and to

understand each other well beyond the mere interchange of goods and service" (Deutsch 1953: 61). A political community is, in other words, a cohesive set of individuals who have developed a social-psychological attachment with one another through greater communication and understanding. What some refer to as a "we feeling" (Deutsch et al. 1957: 36) is also found in other, more general, renditions of community (Taylor 1972; Harrison 1974). Interpersonal trust is the foundation of a political community (Putnam 1993).

This chapter empirically supports the theoretical connection between the level of trans-European political cohesion and support for integration. The proposed model will explain the association between trust in individuals from various parts of Europe and public support for integration. The remaining sections will detail the importance of in-group membership for an individual's motivation to support integration. I test the hypotheses using ordered logistic regression analysis and data from the *European Election Study* (2004). The data include a representative sample of individuals from 24 EU member-states.¹ I end by briefly illustrating the model using the 2015 German-Greek tensions regarding the latter's debt bailout negotiations.

Self-interest, Trust, and Cooperation

David Easton's (1965; 1975) theoretical work views public support as diffuse or specific/utilitarian. Individuals provide utilitarian support when the state provides acceptable outputs, which can be economic or non-economic gains for the individual (Easton 1965: 157). The research regarding utilitarian support of European integration builds on the conceptualization of self-interest, which is one cornerstone of political decisions (Olson 1965).

Researchers point out that motivations for utilitarian support increase with the EU's ability to provide benefits and minimize any negative effects (Anderson and Reichert 1996). Werner J. Feld and John K. Wildgen's (1976) work shows a connection between support levels in the four core countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) and welfare increases in the early years of integration. The attempt at explaining support continued with David Handley (1981) who notes that the economic downturns of the 1970s dramatically lowered support levels for the EEC. Richard C. Eichenberg and Russell J. Dalton (1993) refined the testing of Handley's argument by looking at the various material influences on support levels, and confirmed his results. Others have also built upon utilitarian theory with analogous findings (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996). Moreover, others have taken a more refined approach and predicted the probability of support given an individual's socio-economic position and the expected effects of market integration (Anderson 1991; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998).

Other individual motivations, while associated with self-interest in nature, are not necessarily economic. The founders of European integration were driven by the memories of catastrophic wars and hoped that regional integration would be a vehicle for a permanent peace (Deutsch et al. 1957; Haas 1958; Etzioni 1965; Mitrany 1966). Europeans also supported integration, in integration's early years, in part for its promise to prevent war (Hewstone 1986). However, with the passing memory of the world wars and the end of the Cold War, physical security is a diminishing factor in an individual's decision to support integration (Gabel 1998). Other benefits include a more effective form of governance at the supranational level because the individual lacks such a form at the national level due to underdeveloped welfare benefits and high levels of corruption (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000).

These studies provide insights into utilitarian support levels, but answer only a narrow range of questions and provide, at best, short-term explanations. Business cycles that would influence self-interest motivations help to explain utilitarian support, but these variables do not explain how psychological factors, such as in-group/out-group dynamics, would also influence support. Such dynamics would explain how Europeans' views of fellow EU nationalities relate to support, and can serve as a more stable explanation because views on fellow nationalities are deep-seated.

In contrast to specific or utilitarian support, diffuse support is "a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants" (Easton 1965: 273; 1975: 444). David Easton goes on to say that such support "is an attachment to a political object for its own sake, it constitutes a store of political good will. As such, it taps deep political sentiments and is not easily depleted through disappointment with outputs" (Easton 1965: 274). What "an attachment" refers to is not quite clear. Easton does mention that it is associated with a "sense of community" (ibid.: 325) but the concept of "community" also lacks specificity by leaving its definition as "the degree of solidarity" (ibid.: 184). In the simplest formulation, diffuse support occurs after a period of time when specific support is present (Easton 1965).² Diffuse support enters the picture when the political system has a "communal ideology" that promotes a common interest (ibid.: 333). However, common interest is not entirely separate from self-interest. It is possible for a collection of individuals to have similar interests; however, the summation of these interests does not necessarily define a common interest. Habermas (2012) points to common interests that arise from a coordination of similar self-interests and leads to collaboration. Collaboration is more likely at higher rates of political cohesion, as measured by trust in others. Common interest develops because there is a "sense of community" where individuals strongly identify with one another (Easton 1965: 326).

A Political Cohesion Model for EU Support

Research that looks at common interest motivations for individual support for integration has mainly focused on the factors that would impede the formation of the political community. They echo the claim by Robert Dahl (1989) that an attachment allows for easier rule because attachment adds legitimacy to those that govern by the governed. Lauren McLaren (2002) demonstrates that hostility towards other cultures effects attitudes towards the EU. Sean Carey (2002) agrees when he demonstrates that a strong national attachment lowers the probability that an individual will support regional integration. In addition, Kees Van Kersbergen (2000) explains support for the EU by examining the role integration has in forming primary national allegiances. The research demonstrates that these different attitudes lower the chances of supporting the EU. In developing a political cohesion model of public support, I focus attention on individuals' direct evaluations of members of the trans-European society. Support for integration improves with higher levels of cohesion because transnational social cohesion lowers the barriers to collective action. As pointed out by Habermas (2012), collective action is needed to solve problems facing Europeans.

Political cohesion is closely associated with the establishment of a common identity. Through a common identity, individuals can rationalize that individual problems are actually collective problems and that societies need to forge links, by way of integration, if collective problems are to be solved. A common European identity is not necessarily associated with a foundational mythos, ethnic affiliation (Obradovic 1996), common language, or shared customs (Smith 1992), or any characteristic that we usually associate with national identities (Zetterholm 1994; Cederman 1996; McKay 1996). However, a common European identity does have a similarity with national identities in that it is "imagined" and develops through the construction of a society (Anderson 1991). The notion of "imagined" affiliations speaks to the malleable nature of identity. Identity is constructed in order to adapt to new political and/or economic realities. Individuals make choices as to who can and cannot belong to a specific identity. In fact, individuals may also choose to belong or not to belong given the characteristics of those who already claim the identity. I will demonstrate that in-group/out-group identity, who is and is not a member of a group, is important in the social-psychological dynamics within and among such groups in a political community.

Many view European identity as part of a common belief in liberal-democratic values (Moravcsik 1993; Beetham and Lord 1998). Also, all citizens of member states are also citizens of the EU, thereby giving them a codified European identity. However, the average EU citizen may not have this level of sophisticated understanding of identity given that they are not well informed. A more reasonable approach in explaining support for integration is through the psychology of common interest evaluations. Jean Plagat (1965) stated that building attachments to groups is part of normal

human behavior. These attachments promote cohesion among group members and are associated with the social-psychological phenomena of in-group bias and subjective images. Individuals become members of the in-group because the group fulfills some need (Tajfel 1982). At the level of national identity, individuals form attachments because they see the nation as the embodiment of what is important (Delamater, Katz and Kelman 1969). Also individuals will interact with others who are members of another group if the other group's members share some commonalities with in-group members (Brewer 1968). The members of both groups are more trusting of each other and are therefore more likely to cooperate with each other.

One often-cited definition of trust is "the probability of getting preferred outcomes without the group doing anything to bring them about" (Garnson 1968: 54). That is, group members will not need to monitor each other because there is confidence that interests are aligned. In other words, one will not take advantage of the other because everyone has the interest to cooperate effectively. Robert Putnam (1993) shows, in the Italian case, that the level of trust one has for others produces effective institutional performance because of the higher probability of obtaining cooperation. It lowers the costs of association because of the perception that individuals will not cheat or defect. Paraphrasing Ronald Wintrobe (1995: 46), trust yields a stream of future returns on exchanges that would not otherwise take place because trust makes behavior predictable and stable. Therefore, individuals may develop overlapping group memberships or an integrated identity when trust is present. When trust is not present, overlapping memberships do not occur and group status becomes exclusive.

How is political cohesion, as measured by trust levels, associated with support for European unification? Why would geographic heterogeneity among member states from the north, south, and east partially explain the variation of support of the EU? Social identity theory helps us answer these questions by focusing on in-group and out-group biases. In-group bias is a social condition in which individuals tend to favor members of their group versus others who are not members (the out-group members) (Tajfel 1978). In early psychological experiments, individuals tended to give more rewards and side with other members of their group because of their affiliation. These biases occurred even when test subjects were only recently informed that they belonged to a particular group and had neither met nor interacted with other in-group members (Tajfel 1978, 1982; Turner 1978; Brewer 1979; Brewer and Kramer 1985; Messick and Mackie 1989).

The cause of in-group bias, as put forth by Henri Tajfel (1981, 1982), is due to the positive evaluations individuals have for members of their group. Members join and identify with such groups because, as stated above, the group symbolizes a set of values. By associating with similar-valued individuals, self-esteem improves because values are reinforced. Self-esteem further improves when individuals make favorable comparisons between the in-group and out-groups. Not only are individuals part

of a subjectively valued group, the in-group is also subjectively judged as better than the out-groups. Therefore, by tying an individual's social identity to the importance of the in-group, group maintenance or cooperation for group survival becomes important. To this end, individuals will tend to give favorable biases to fellow group members.

Out-group bias, in contrast, is a social condition in which individuals tend to favor members of out-groups instead of members of their own in-group. Out-group bias occurs when individuals perceive that the two groups are of differing social status (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Turner 1986). In this instance, individuals from the lower status group will have negative evaluations of members of their group when compared to the higher status out-group. The negative evaluations stem from their lower status and are tied to their self-esteem. The relative evaluations lead members of the lower status group to have positive evaluations of higher status members and thereby extend favoritism to them. The phenomenon of out-group bias also occurs when the lower status group feels that the higher status group is legitimately in their higher status position and that the status hierarchy is stable. That is, neither group will change their status (Turner 1978). However, the members of the higher status group will continue to exhibit in-group biases because they have positive evaluations of their members and negative evaluations of the members from the out-group. The in-group bias exhibited by members of the out-group stems simply from the differing social status of the groups (*ibid.*).

Since cohesiveness is a function of in-group evaluations associated with identity, it is important to revisit the possible phenomenon of overlapping in-groups. Overlapping in-groups are important in the context of integration because the formation of a European identity is not theorized to replace national identities but to coexist with them (Deutsch et al. 1957). It is important to note that the recognition of overlapping identities is based on perceptions. Perceptions are simply the images individuals carry. Kelman states that image:

Refers to the organized representation of an object in an individual's cognitive system. The core of an image is the perceived character of the object to which it refers—the individual's conception of what this object is like. Image is an inferred construct, however, rather than a mere designation of the way the object is phenomenally experienced. (Kelman 1965: 24)

William Scott, more succinctly, claims that "an image of a nation (or of any other object) constitutes the totality of attributes that a person recognizes (or imagines) when he contemplates that nation" (Scott 1965: 72). In addition, such images are subjective (Kelman 1965: 27). Individuals can use perceptions of other groups to formulate likes and dislikes for, and positive or negative stereotypes of, out-groups (Druckman et al. 1974; Hewstone 1986; Druckman 1994).

A positive perception develops the likelihood that multiple identities form as members of in-groups view the values of out-group members as similar and therefore comparable. Groups can tie themselves together in a unifying identity, much like individuals do with one another in forming group attachments. Recall that individuals tend to form groups, in part, because of the importance of the group's values. If a subset of such values is present in other groups, then a broader identity will form without necessarily dissolving prior identities. We see evidence of this as Europeans simultaneously hold subnational, national, and supranational identities (Fitjar 2010; Chacha 2013). The individuals in the broader group, one that includes two or more in-groups, can now operate with similar cohesiveness as the individual in-groups. However, if such values are not present, then the in-group and out-group biases will manifest, leading to a lack of cohesiveness.

In the context of Europe, I hypothesize that individuals support integration when they hold a positive image of other EU nationalities. The positive perception may result from evaluations of similarity on a number of issues and thus an individual will tend to view other nationalities as more in line with the in-group versus an exclusive, out-group identity. Where there are similarities, a cohesive political community can develop. Subjectively perceived dissimilar values would produce less trust and lower the probability of supporting integration.

Studies show that individuals can perceive differences along a north-south-east divide. Jan Delhey (2007) demonstrates that underlying the geographic divide are stark differences in economic development and cultural characteristics.³ Perceptions of southern nationalities as lesser developed economically due to their values are prevalent in the minds of some. The eastern countries' economic development is also low and coupled with views regarding the legacies of communist rule and less experience with democracy. Finally, a more economically developed north can point to significant differences among the peoples of Europe. The level of economic development is perceived as an outcome of commonalities specific to the northern, southern, and eastern sub-regions.

The idea that culture can explain differences in the levels of economic development linger in the minds of the average European and can help decipher the variation of trust in nationalities. Oskar Niedermayer (1995) observed that there is a variation in trust among the first 12 EU nationalities. On average, individuals reported more trust in northern nationalities than in southerners. What is not clear from Niedermayer's research is the association between varying trust levels of northern and southern Europeans and support for integration, but it does make a case for looking at trust in community building. Delhey (2007) demonstrated that trust among EU nationalities does vary along geographic divides and that this variation of trust does have implications for the social cohesion of Europe. The empirical work reveals a link between variation in trust among the EU nationalities and general support for integration.

The logic of social identity theory in the context of the EU leads to the following testable hypotheses. First, there is a positive association between the overall level of trust for fellow EU nationalities and support for integration. I assume that trust reflects the positive images of European nationalities in the mind of the individual. Second, trust in eastern nationalities, followed by trust in southern nationalities will have a larger explanatory value than trust in northern nationalities. Eastern and southern nationalities comprise the lower-status groups because they come from countries with lower economic development. The lower status would promote biases, resulting in exclusion from the broader European in-group by northerners. Therefore, to support integration, individuals will need to trust the lower-status groups before members of groups enter into a collaborative relationship.

Data Description and Testing Procedures

The public opinion data for the analysis come from the *European Election Study 2004* (Schmitt et al. 2009).⁴ I use a weighting variable so that no national population will be over or under represented in the data; all tests are at the individual level. The weighting variable also adjusts for any over or under representation of socio-economic groups.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is support for European integration. The survey question asks:

Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a 10-point-scale. On this scale, 1 means unification 'has already gone too far' and 10 means it 'should be pushed further'. What number on this scale best describes your position?

Higher values indicate a greater support for the progress towards unification. One can interpret the lower values (<5) as less support and the midpoint (=5) as satisfaction with the status quo.

Independent Variables

The following are the explanatory variables, each of which measures the respondents' trust in fellow EU nationalities. To measure trust, I use a series of questions asking the respondents to gauge their trust in other EU nationalities:

Now I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. Can you please tell me for each, whether you have a lot of trust of them or not very much trust.

The respondents assign a level of trust to each EU nationality. The original values were transformed so that 1 = "have a lot of trust of them" and 0 = "not very much trust." I will conduct an analysis to validate the hypothesized grouping of the individual trust variables along a north-south-east division.

Control Variables⁵

The analysis requires the use of various other variables so that the results are understood in the light of some prevailing hypotheses.

Institutional Trust. Political trust is closely related to regime legitimacy (Hooghe and Zmerli 2011) and can be operationalized as trust in governmental institutions (Marien 2011). I therefore control for trust in two of the most visible and therefore well-known EU institutions: the European Parliament and European Commission. The survey measures trust in these two institutions by using the following question:

Please tell me on a score of 1–10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. One means that you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust.

One other political body that the respondents are asked to evaluate is their home governments. Support for integration can be negatively associated with trust in the respondents' governments (Sánchez-Cuena 2000). If respondents strongly trust their home governments, supporting European integration can be a risky trade-off.

Democratic Satisfaction. The democratic deficit is a widely talked about problem in EU politics (McCormick 1999; Schmitter 2000). Like trust in the respondents' home governments, satisfaction with democracy in the respondents' country is negatively associated with support for integration (Sánchez-Cuena 2000). The following question captures the degree to which individuals are satisfied with democracy in their country:

On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [c.]?

1. Very satisfied
2. Fairly satisfied
3. Not very satisfied
4. Not at all satisfied.

The values were recoded so that higher values indicate higher levels of satisfaction.

Ideology. Prior research demonstrates the negative effect nationalism has on both European identity formation and support for integration (McLaren

2002; Carey 2002). One method to measure this possible effect is through left-right self-evaluations.⁶ The respondents were asked to place themselves on a left-right continuum. The range is one to ten with ten being the most extreme rightist ideology. The more rightwing the respondents, the less supportive they will be of integration for reasons given in studies by Lauren McLaren (2002) and Sean Carey (2002).

Education. To measure education, the study uses a standard question that attempts to standardize educational achievement across Europe: *How old were you when you stopped full-time education?* Individuals who are still studying are recoded into their appropriate age group based on responses to the question on age. Although they have not completed their studies, this method captures the amount of their education at the time of the survey.

Income. Respondents were asked to provide the "total wages and salaries per month of all members of this household; all pensions and social insurance benefits; child allowances and any other income like rents etc." The survey researchers categorized the responses into "quintiles of income." Individuals in higher income quintiles will be more supportive of integration because their skills allow them to better take advantage of the opportunities offered by economic integration (Gabel 1998).

Age. Respondents were asked to list the year of their birth. I subtracted the response from 2004 in order to achieve the age at the time of the survey.

Geographic Effects. Geographic variables are included in each of the models. These variables control for effects that are specific to the countries' region: north, south, or east. They are constructed as "dummies" meaning that a value of one is tabulated if the respondent is from a specific European region. For example, respondents from Denmark are coded one for north but zero for south and east. I omit the variable representing the east in each regression.

Explaining Support for the EU

The overall results of the analysis below show that political cohesion is an important factor in explaining support for the EU. The first step is to determine if the trust variables measured the latent dimensions described in the theoretical section. Trust in the EU nationalities measures political cohesiveness. This trust is thought to be divided along a north-south-east dimension. Table 3.1 displays the results of the principle component factor analysis (varimax rotation). A factor analysis will tell us if the variables can be grouped together given our theorized latent variable. The analysis produced three factors, as hypothesized. Trust in the eastern nationalities loaded into the first factor, followed by trust in the northern nationalities, and then trust in the southern nationalities. The weakest factor value among the "trust in

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Table 3.1 Principle Component Factor Analysis for Trust in EU Nationalities (Varimax Rotation)

Trust in:	Factor loading	Factor loading	Factor loading
Lithuanians	0.811	0.248	0.043
Lavians	0.799	0.294	0.036
Slovakians	0.785	0.115	0.198
Slovenians	0.778	0.172	0.186
Estonians	0.776	0.311	0.046
Czechs	0.705	0.146	0.223
Hungarians	0.665	0.274	0.213
Cypriots	0.633	0.191	0.306
Poles	0.601	0.059	0.238
Maltese	0.590	0.367	0.260
Danes	0.248	0.801	0.134
Fins	0.325	0.753	0.108
Swedes	0.222	0.767	0.184
Dutch	0.176	0.745	0.234
Luxembourgers	0.237	0.691	0.278
Belgians	0.223	0.673	0.285
Irish	0.318	0.624	0.218
Austrians	0.243	0.598	0.207
Germans	0.094	0.533	0.430
British	0.191	0.375	0.299
Italians	0.228	0.214	0.718
French	0.080	0.375	0.637
Spaniards	0.201	0.338	0.623
Portuguese	0.315	0.369	0.557
Greeks	0.430	0.269	0.511

$\chi^2 (276) = 1.2 \times 10^5$; $p < 0.000$

Trust in northern nationalities reliability $\alpha = 0.889$

Trust in southern nationalities reliability $\alpha = 0.807$

Trust in eastern nationalities reliability $\alpha = 0.915$

Note
European Election Study 2004.

the northern nationalities" variables is "trust in British" (0.375). However, the value is higher than the 0.300 threshold for inclusion and will therefore not be omitted from the scale (DeVellis 1991; Acocck 2013). "Trust in the French" is strongly loaded into the southern nationalities factor. I calculated three new variables—trust in northern, southern, and eastern nationalities—based on the factor loadings. Reliability alphas tell us if we can be reasonably sure that grouping the trust in the three categories is not a random occurrence. In other words, if we were to conduct the survey again using a different sample, will we get similar results? The reliability alphas for the three scales range from 0.807 to 0.915, indicating very good reliability for the latent variable (DeVellis 1991).

Table 3.2 presents the first results of the ordered logit regression. Model one tests the relationship between trust for all EU nationalities and

Table 3.2 Ordered Logit Model: Support for European Unification on Trust for Europeans

Independent variables	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient	S. E.	Coefficient	S. E.
Trust variables				
Trust in all EU nationalities	0.306***	0.025	0.076***	0.025
Trust in northern nationalities	-	-	0.158***	0.023
Trust in southern nationalities	-	-	0.265***	0.023
Trust in eastern nationalities	-	-	-	-
Control variables				
Trust in the European Parliament	0.105***	0.015	0.106***	0.015
Trust in respondents' government	-0.037***	0.010	-0.037***	0.010
Trust in the European Commission	0.168***	0.015	0.167***	0.015
Satisfaction with democracy in respondents' country	0.182***	0.032	0.176***	0.032
Left/Right self-placement	-0.036***	0.009	-0.030***	0.010
Northern country dummy	-0.695***	0.082	-0.589***	0.084
Southern country dummy	-0.295***	0.077	-0.221**	0.078
Demographic variables				
Education	0.003***	0.001	0.003***	0.001
Income	0.015	0.009	0.013	0.009
Age	0.003*	0.001	0.003*	0.001
τ^1	-1.05	0.140	-0.979	0.141
τ^2	-0.592	0.139	-0.517	0.140
τ^3	-0.065	0.138	0.009	0.139
τ^4	0.335	0.138	0.411	0.139
τ^5	1.35	0.130	1.434	0.140
τ^6	1.78	0.140	1.868	0.140
τ^7	2.35	0.141	2.434	0.141
τ^8	3.04	0.142	3.130	0.143
τ^9	3.34	0.144	3.426	0.144
χ^2 (degrees of freedom)	1,068.65 (11)***		1,098.98(13)***	
log likelihood	-13,533.9		-13,565.9	
N	6,431		6,454	

Notes

*** $p \leq 0.001$;** $p \leq 0.010$;* $p \leq 0.050$;

European Election Study 2004.




Figure 3.1 Percentage Point Change for European Integration Support by Political Trust Category for Germans.

support. The trust for all EU nationalities variable is the average value of the individual trust components. The sign of the coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that the more an individual trusts members of other EU nationalities, the higher levels of support. Since the models include other variables that hope to explain support for integration, we can say that the result holds even while controlling for the other variables. While holding the control values at their means, support for integration increases steadily as the trust for all EU nationalities goes from its minimum to its maximum value: aggregating the dependent variable's response values of six or greater together, respondents are about 24.5 percentage points more likely to support integration as we move from the lowest to the highest level of trust in fellow EU nationalities.

The second model in Table 3.2 substitutes the trust in all EU nationalities variable with those that measure trust in the northern, southern, and eastern nationalities. The results fall along expected lines. All three variables are positive and have high levels of statistical significance. The coefficient for the trust in eastern nationalities variable is the largest, followed by the southern variable. Trust in northern nationalities has the smallest coefficient. Given these results, the largest percentage point change in support for European integration is with the trust in eastern nationalities variable, followed by trust in southerners, and then northerners. This means that trust in eastern nationalities has greater explanatory value, followed by trust in southerners and leaves trust in northerners with the least explanatory value. As the trust in eastern nationalities variable goes from its minimum to its maximum value, support for integration increases by 27.2 percentage points. The increase for trust in southerners is 24.6, while the increase for trust in northerners is only 10.2.

Figure 3.1 plots the marginal percentage point change as the various regional trust variables increase from their minimum to their maximum values among the German respondents. Each bar represents a different

combination of trust levels for each category of trust. I isolate these respondents given Germany's central role in current economic crises. I also wish to highlight Habermas' (2012) argument that it is critical for Germans to adopt a cosmopolitan attitude in order to have a viable solution to the financial crisis. Therefore, it would be interesting to see how German views fit with the general model. The trend is similar to the general model: as trust goes up for each of the groups, so does the percentage point change in the likelihood of supporting European integration. Also, as the bars indicate, the explanatory value becomes larger as we go from trust in northerners, to trust in southerners, and then to trust in easterners. As the trust in eastern nationalities variable goes from its minimum to its maximum value, support for integration increases by 26.8 percentage points. The increase for trust in southerners is 23.2, while the increase for trust in northerners is only 10.3.

German and Greek Trust

Cosmopolitanism is especially important during times of economic crisis. The fiscal crisis experienced by a few eurozone countries, mostly in the southern part of Europe, required solidarity from less economically vulnerable member states, like Germany. Solidarity in this case would be the extension of loans and other financial benefits. According to the cohesion model, individuals are more likely to support integration when they trust the less economically developed nationalities. Trust is assumed to result from positive images that bridge group identities. The quarrels between Germany and Greece in 2015 over continuing loan bailouts and austerity provides a good illustration of the model presented in this chapter.

Tensions between Greece and the EU began shortly after the electoral victory of the Syriza Party and the appointment of its leader, Alexis Tsipras, as prime minister in late January 2015. Syriza ran on an anti-austerity platform and also demanded the renegotiation of Greek public debt. Tsipras argued that austerity harmed the economy and that the mismanagement of previous administrations produced the high debt. Syriza therefore reasoned that the government cutbacks and higher taxes required by the austerity package in return for further loans were unfair to the Greek people.

The rhetoric hit a feverish pitch when Germany and its chancellor, Angela Merkel, were targeted as villains. Anti-austerity demonstrations were festooned with Nazi-era symbols and remembrances of the German occupation of Greece during World War II.⁷ Protestors also re-imaged Merkel in placards with a Hitler-like mustache.⁸ The protestors, many of whom were Syriza supporters or party members, attempted to send a message that the imposition of austerity on the Greek people by the current German government bore a strong resemblance to the Nazi brutal occupation. The image that linked the current crisis to the Nazi past also included demands that the Germans give the Greeks war reparations. Tsipras made

an official request for reparations in the first half of 2015, 70 years after the fact.⁹

The manner in which the Syriza government targeted Germany, and Germany's reaction, displayed clear in-group and out-group dynamics. By casting Germany as the villain, the government questioned Germany's motivation for exchanging bailout loans for austerity. Greeks attempted to cast Germany's image as no different from its terrible past. In other words, according to the Greeks, Germany is not behaving like a member of modern Europe. Germany for its part argued that Greeks needed to live within their means. Further, they implied that Greek fiscal behavior would drag the rest of the EU into economic crisis. It demanded that Greece behave responsibly, cut back on government spending, and live up to its financial obligations. In other words, the Germans viewed Greece as not behaving like a good member of modern Europe.

To what degree do the German-Greek tensions matter with regards to support for integration? Support for integration would be critical because if support decreases among Germans, then German desire to support Greece economically would also decrease. Admittedly, the two are not perfectly correlated. However, while it is possible to support integration but not economic support for Greece or austerity, it is unlikely to support the latter two without supporting integration.

The data used in this chapter is very useful since researchers executed the survey prior to the economic crisis. This allows us to gauge the effect trust has on support without worrying if the crisis itself had an effect on both trust and support. I reran the model using only the German sample and substituting "trust in Greeks" variable for the other trust variables. The resulting coefficient for the trust variable is 0.562 (se = 0.222; $p = 0.012$). This means that the German likelihood to support integration increases by 13.6 percentage points when they trust Greeks. However, the results were completely different when we examine the relation trust in Germans has on support for integration for the Greek sample. Trust in Germans is not statistically significant.¹⁰ This further supports the hypothesis that trusting nationalities from lesser economically developed member states is the critical variable in explaining support for integration, more so than trusting nationalities from more economically developed member states.

The results using the German and Greek samples has important implications for the bailout negotiations. For the Greeks, it is important that the Germans trust them. Higher levels of trust in the Greek people mean that Germans are more supportive of integration, and, by implication, are more willing to help. If Germans on the whole are less trusting of Greeks, then they will be less supportive of Greek bailouts. For the Germans, it is not important that the Greeks trust them with regard to European integration. The models indicate that Greek support for integration does not hinge, on average, on trusting the German people. In other words, Greeks, on average, do not use trust in Germans as their reason for supporting integration.

Conclusion

The findings indicate that the idea of cosmopolitanism as a way to deepen integration is valid, yet complex. Political cohesion developed from trusting various national groups can aid in explaining the probabilities for supporting European integration. Given the lower level of economic development among the southern and eastern countries, individuals that trust these nationalities are more likely to see the common interests involved in building a united Europe. Common interests are necessary when considering the economic divide among member states and the special needs of the less economically developed states during times of crisis. The German-Greek example also demonstrated the value of the direction of trust.

Two important issues must be considered with regard to these results. Neither of these issues would necessarily put into question the results found in this paper, but are important enough to consider. First, we need up-to-date data so that we can further validate the association between trust among Europeans and support. Unfortunately, at the time of writing, such survey data do not exist. However, there is nothing in the model's logic that makes the arguments any less salient today.

Second, the survey occurred at the time Europe expanded eastward. This fact may not necessarily add complexity to model. One can argue that the findings of the trust variables may be an artifact of the current expansion and have less to do with economic development. In other words, it may reflect the "newness" of the eastern members. The results showing the impact of trust in southern nationalities, as demonstrated through the data, puts this argument in doubt. The southern trust scale included two of the original members of the EU. If time of entry were the underlying factor, then we should see trust in the French and Italians factor together along with the older members. Also, trust in the British factored into the northern grouping, even though it joined later. These points lead to the conclusion that heterogeneous economic development is the key factor in understanding why trust in southern and eastern nationalities has greater explanatory value.

Notes

- 1 Individuals from Malta were not included in this survey. Bulgarian and Romanian respondents were also not included because these countries were not yet EU members.
- 2 See Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt (1981) for the evidence of this process in the case of post-war Germany.
- 3 See also Gerritsen and Lubbers (2010).
- 4

The data utilized in this publication were originally collected by the 2004 European Election Study research group. This study has been made possible by various grants. Neither the original collectors of the data nor their sponsors bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations published here. The data are available from the homepage of the European Election

Study (<http://eeshomepage.net/>) and from the Archive Department of GESIS (the former Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA) at the University of Cologne, Germany). (www.gesis.org)

- 5 I made every attempt to include controls for alternative explanations.
- 6 McLaren (2002) and Carey (2002) used survey questions that directly measured nationalism. I use the left-right self-evaluations as a proxy given that the survey used in this chapter does not have direct measures.
- 7 "Protesters rally as Merkel voices support for austerity-hit Greece," CNN, October 9, 2012. www.cnn.com/2012/10/09/world/europe/greece-merkel-visit/.
- 8 "Merkel tells irate Greeks painful reforms will pay off," Reuters, October 9, 2012. <http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/10/09/greece-merkel-idINDEE89808720121009>.
- 9 "Greece Nazi occupation: Athens asks Germany for €279bn," BBC, April 7, 2015. www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32202768.
- 10 Trust in Germans coefficient is 0.264 (se = 0.197; $p = 0.179$).

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4 European Reform from the Bottom-Up

The Presence and Effects of Cosmopolitan Values in Germany

Aubrey Westfall

The European Union is an international anomaly: Its powers extend beyond the state, making it more than an international organization but not yet a functioning sovereign system. The recent financial crisis and controversy over the Greek bailout reveal some of the starkest differences in the competencies of the state versus the European Union; and the struggle over how to manage the crisis has disintegrated into conventional power politics of bargaining between states, especially between Greece and Germany. Jürgen Habermas is very vocal in his disapproval of using conventional politics to reform the non-conventional ethos of the European Union. He argues the economic crisis in the European Union has inappropriately directed political energies towards intergovernmental economic reforms that reinforce state sovereignty at the expense of increased regional cooperation and democratization. Instead, Habermas argues, resources should be directed at reinforcing the values of human rights through democratization.

Habermas wants the EU to expand notions of democracy beyond the state into a form of cosmopolitan democracy. Cosmopolitanism encompasses the idea that all humans should be equal citizens in a single (usually global) community; it requires democratic institutionalization beyond the state to resolve the tension between current forms of state-based democracy and human rights. As Habermas conceives it, the European Union represents a step in the process of institutionalizing a cosmopolitan world society, but only the first step. In order for the process of integration to continue, national governments must abandon preconceptions of governance tied to notions of national sovereignty and readjust their priorities with reference to humanitarian solidarity. As such, the future of the European Union rests in the ability of its members to expand notions of sacrifice and solidarity beyond national borders and to view all members of the union as having equal claims to the rights and privileges conventionally granted to national citizens.

Beck and Grande agree:

If Europe wants to overcome its current crisis, it urgently needs to develop a new political vision and a new concept for political integration.... Our