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<title>Gary Moncrief</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2013  All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gary_moncrief</link>
<description>Recent documents in Gary Moncrief</description>
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<title>Legislative Politics in the States</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gary_moncrief/70</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 13 Feb 2013 14:10:59 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>State legislatures fascinate students of institutions as well as students of individual behavior. As institutions, state legislatures present an array of organizational and structural arrangements. Indeed, there is probably more variation among state legislatures than any other institution of state government. For example, some legislatures are very large (the New Hampshire House four hundred members), and others are quite small (the upper chamber in Alaska is composed of twenty senators, and the Nevada and Delaware Senates have twenty-one). The districts represented by individual legislators range widely in size as well. Representatives in Maine. Vermont, and Wyoming -- and many representatives in New Hampshire -- are from districts with fewer than 10,000 members, whereas each member of the Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Texas, and Washington lower chambers represents more than 100,000 people.<sup>1</sup> In fact, state senators in Texas (815,000) and California (930,000) represent more people than any member of the U. S. House of Representatives.</p>

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<author>Keith Hamm et al.</author>


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<title>Lobbying Under Limits: Interest Group Perspectives on the Effects of Term Limits in State Legislatures</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gary_moncrief/69</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2011 15:03:07 PST</pubDate>
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<author>Joel A. Thompson et al.</author>


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<title>Recruitment and Retention in U.S. Legislatures</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gary_moncrief/68</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2011 15:03:04 PST</pubDate>
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<author>Gary Moncrief</author>


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<title>State Legislatures Today: Politics Under the Domes</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gary_moncrief/67</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2011 15:03:01 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>A concise and provocative introduction to State Legislative Politics, <em>State Legislative Politics Today </em>is designed as a supplement for State and Local courses and upper level courses on legislative politics.</p>

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<author>Peverill Squire et al.</author>


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<title>The Implications of Term Limits for Women and Minorities: Some Evidence from the States</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gary_moncrief/66</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2011 15:02:59 PST</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p><dd>This article attempts to shed some light on an unintended consequence of the term limit movement, its likely impact on the representation of women and minorities in state legislatures. There has been a great deal of discussion recently about limiting the terms of elected officials. In 1990, 3 states, California, Colorado, and Oklahoma, led the way in adopting term limits for their state legislatures. The purpose of this research is to analyze extant characteristics and trends in the state legislatures to help inform the discussion of the effect of term limits on two groups who are presently underrepresented in most state legislatures, women and minorities. Proponents of term limits contend that state legislatures are becoming too much like the U.S. Congress, replete with the same problems: career politicians more concerned with their own electoral safety than the welfare of the people. It is argued that term limits will open up the legislature to new faces and fresh ideas, by diminishing the power of long-time incumbents, whom many view as being unduly influenced by special interests.</dd></p>

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<author>Joel A. Thompson et al.</author>


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<title>Floterial Districts, Reapportionment, and the Puzzle of Representation</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gary_moncrief/65</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2011 15:02:55 PST</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Because of recent Supreme Court decisions involving a more permissive stance toward a "rational state policy" (Brown v. Thompson) and the challenge of partisan gerrymandering (Davis v. Bandemer), state legislatures and reapportionment commissions are left with nebulous guidelines for the next round of reapportionment plans. This article reviews some of these issues of representation in light of a specific electoral technique known as the "floterial district." Floterials are not widely understood, but they reemerged in several states in the reapportionment plans of the 1980s, and there is some speculation that floterials will be considered by more states in the 1990s. With this in mind, I discuss the specific nature of floterials and pose some problems (framed as puzzles) in the use of floterials.</p>

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<author>Gary F. Moncrief</author>


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<title>Women Cabinet Ministers in Canadian Provinces 1976-1994</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gary_moncrief/64</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2011 15:02:52 PST</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Women’s participation in leadership circles in Canadian politics has moved beyond "firsts" of various sorts. This is perhaps especially true at the provincial level, yet at this point there has been insufficient study of women holding elite positions. Attention has more often focused on the federal level, and on legislative rather than executive positions. The article, which examines patterns of women’s roles in the cabinets of the provinces at three-year intervals over an 18-year period, from 1976 to 1994, presents some general conclusions about the process in Canada.</p>

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<author>Gary Moncrief et al.</author>


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<title>The Recruitment of Women Cabinet Ministers in the Canadian Provinces</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gary_moncrief/63</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2011 15:02:48 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>Although there have been several studies of women in legislatures in Canada, a cabinet position is a much stronger position from which to wield power in an executive-centered and party-disciplined parliamentary system. In the past decade, the increase of women's share of legislative seats, for majority parties as well as others, has led to more women being appointed to cabinet portfolios. This article utilizes data from the ten Canadian provinces over an 18-year period, from 1976 to 1994, to assess patterns of such appointments by province, party, percentage of women in the governing party, and percentage of women in the legislature. The proportion of women in the governing party far outweighs other variables in its impact on the percentage of women in the cabinet, in contrast to a previous study of West European cabinets which found that more women in the legislature was of greater importance. Although a high level of multicollinearity indicates caution in attempting to distinguish between the impact of these two variables, the differences in these studies may be due to Canadian provinces having single-party majority governments while West European cabinets are often coalitions.</p>

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<author>Donley T. Studlar et al.</author>


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<title>For Whom The Bell Tolls: Term Limits and State Legislatures</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gary_moncrief/62</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2011 15:02:44 PST</pubDate>
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<author>Gary Moncrief et al.</author>


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<title>A Matter of Time: Some Consequences of State Legislative Term Limits</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gary_moncrief/61</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2011 15:02:42 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>There is considerable rhetoric and speculation about the impact of term limitation proposals on state legislatures, but little in the way of empirical analysis. In this paper we examine multi-state data on legislators' backgrounds, and explore the potential impact of term limits on different groups. We are especially interested in the effect on cohorts categorized by gender, race, party, and leadership position. Using data that constitute a demographic snapshot from the late 1980s, we are able to demonstrate that if term limits were immediately imposed, they would affect male Republicans, and leaders and committee chairs more than rank-and-file. It does not appear that term limits would have a significant impact on the representation of African-Americans.</p>

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<author>Joel A. Thompson et al.</author>


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<title>Gender, Race, and the State Legislature: A Research Note on the Double Disadvantage Hypothesis</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gary_moncrief/60</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2011 15:02:38 PST</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>The "double disadvantage"  hypothesis stipulates that black females are politically disadvantaged  twice (once by gender, once by race). This  hypothesis suggests that because of both their race and gender, black  women will find it especially difficult to compete successfully in  electoral politics in the United States.  This leads one to expect that proportionately fewer black women would  hold elective office than is true for other groups (e.g. white women,  black men, white men). It would also  suggest that black women could overcome these disadvantages only if they  exceed their gender and racial counterparts in certain preparatory  background characteristics such as education and occupational prestige. We examine these issues, using data on state legislator's backgrounds. We find that only one of the two necessary conditions to corroborate the "double disadvantage" hypothesis is met. Generally, our findings support the conclusions of previous research.</p>

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<author>Gary F. Moncrief et al.</author>


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<title>Religion and Roll-Call Voting in Idaho: The 1990 Abortion Controversy</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gary_moncrief/59</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2011 15:02:35 PST</pubDate>
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<author>Stephanie L. Witt et al.</author>


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<title>The Increase in Campaign Expenditures in State Legislative Elections: A Comparison of Four Northwestern States</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gary_moncrief/58</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2011 15:02:31 PST</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>There is an increasing interest in the rising campaign costs in state legislatures. Our knowledge of these trends, however is limited by the fact that campaign finance data were generally unavailable until a few years ago. Because of the lack of information, most previous research was limited to either one state or a single time period. In this research note, state legislative campaign expenditure data are analyzed for two time periods in four states. We find that the rise in expenditures is conditioned by two contextual factors: the degree of competition for party control of the chamber, and the level of state legislative professionalization. Strong evidence also exists that incumbents are increasing their expenditure advantage over challengers, and that fewer candidates are running for state legislative office.</p>

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<author>Gary Moncrief</author>


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<title>Committee Stacking and Reform in the Texas House of Representatives</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gary_moncrief/57</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2011 15:02:28 PST</pubDate>
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<author>Gary Moncrief</author>


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<title>The Evolution of the State Legislature: Institutional Change and Legislative Careers</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gary_moncrief/56</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2011 15:02:25 PST</pubDate>
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<author>Joel Thompson et al.</author>


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<title>Pursuing the Pork in a State Legislature: A Research Note</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gary_moncrief/55</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2011 15:02:22 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>This note extends an earlier analysis of pork barrel politics in North Carolina by examining several individual-level variables. Our findings indicate that partisanship is the most important determinant of success in obtaining discretionary funds for local projects. Of secondary importance is party loyalty. Once partisan factors are accounted for, other variables that decide pork barrel success (longevity or electoral vulnerability) are determined by the leadership in each house. Thus, the formula for pork barrel success is likely to vary from state to state, chamber to chamber, and leader to leader.</p>

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<author>Joel A. Thompson et al.</author>


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<title>Urban and Rural Ridings and Women in Provincial Politics in Canada: A Research Note on Female MLAs</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gary_moncrief/54</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2011 15:02:19 PST</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Several previous studies have noted that women constitute a relatively small proportion of provincial legislators in Canada. Numerous explanations for this phenomenon exist, most of which are identified clearly by Brodie, Bashevkin, Burt and others. In this research note, the authors examine the relationship between the proportion of female legislators and the urban/rural nature of the electoral district. They find that there is a distinct difference in the proportion of female legislators who represent urban districts compared to rural districts. This urban-rural disparity exists regardless of political party affiliation. Moreover, the gap appears to be widening over time.</p>

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<author>Gary F. Moncrief et al.</author>


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<title>Professionalization and Careerism in Canadian Provincial Assemblies: Comparison to U. S. State Legislatures</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gary_moncrief/53</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2011 15:02:16 PST</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>The development of legislative professionalization is well documented in U.S. state legislatures, where it is closely associated with the advent of careerism. This association is partly responsible for the term limit movement. In this paper we show that Canadian provincial legislative assemblies have undergone a similar trend toward professionalization but that careerism has been less evident. Turnover rates are higher than under similar conditions in U.S. state legislatures because the electoral advantage of incumbency is substantially smaller in Canadian provincial elections. We identify five reasons why incumbents are less advantaged in the Canadian system.</p>

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<author>Gary F. Moncrief</author>


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<title>The Old Statehouse, It Ain&apos;t What It Used to Be</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gary_moncrief/52</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2011 15:02:12 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>This paper reports data from a survey sent to all state legislators who have served for more than 15 years. The purpose of the questionnaire was to ascertain the nature and extent of changes in the legislature during the members' tenure. Veteran legislators perceived significant changes in influence structures within the legislature, in the nature of their job, and in the general environment in which they legislate. Variations in some of their perceptions are associated with differences between types of legislatures.</p>

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<author>Gary F. Moncrief et al.</author>


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<title>Upping the Campaign Ante as Parties Compete to Control the State Legislature</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/gary_moncrief/51</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2011 15:02:09 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>Campaign financing in state legislative elections is a topic generating a great deal of interest. Difficulties in gathering and reporting data make it hard to provide comparative studies (either across time or across states) of this phenomenon. Recently a few cross-state studies have emerged, but almost no longitudinal studies exist. The authors analyze data from one state through seven election cycles (1978-1990). In so doing, they note the differential trends in campaign expenditures by chamber and show that much of that difference is due to increased party competition for control of the two chambers.</p>

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<author>Gary F. Moncrief et al.</author>


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