In Search of Justice: Increasing the Risk of Business with State Sponsors of Terror

Gabriel C. Lajeunesse, Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy

Abstract

If the aims of tort law are deterrence, compensation, and provision of equitable distribution of risks, U.S. anti-terrorism laws have been marginally effective at best. Though Congress has passed legislation providing causes of action to U.S. victims of terrorism, compensation of victims is often difficult and terrorists are rarely deterred. Attempts to provide such recourse include the Antiterrorism Act of 1991 (“ATA”), the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), and the Flatow Amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). These attempts, however, are not enough. Until international banks and insurers realize the potential risk of doing business with terrorist entities, state sponsors of terror will face no hard policy choices, and the goals of deterrence, compensation, and equitable distribution of risks will not be realized. Legal mechanisms in this country must be strengthened to increase the costs of providing assistance to terrorism. Only then will the U.S. legal system provide an effective deterrent to state sponsored terror.