Copyright (c) 2012 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez Recent documents in Fernando Gómez Pomar en-us Sat, 24 Nov 2012 03:17:09 PST 3600 http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/29 http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/29 Thu, 15 Jan 2009 14:06:17 PST Fernando Gómez Torts http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/28 http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/28 Thu, 15 Jan 2009 14:03:16 PST Fernando Gómez Torts http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/27 http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/27 Thu, 15 Jan 2009 14:01:44 PST Fernando Gómez Torts http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/26 http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/26 Thu, 15 Jan 2009 13:55:20 PST Fernando Gómez Constitutional Law http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/25 http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/25 Thu, 15 Jan 2009 13:52:10 PST Fernando Gómez et al. Law and Economics http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/24 http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/24 Thu, 15 Jan 2009 13:39:25 PST El Anteproyecto de Ley de Responsabilidad Medioambiental, de 17.1.2006, ha incluido en su ámbito de aplicación materias que se encuentran sujetas, a su vez, a las reglas de responsabilidad civil general para los daños causados a bienes o intereses ajenos (arts. 1902 y ss. Código Civil), así como a las disposiciones sobre responsabilidad por limpieza y recuperación que resultan de la declaración de un suelo como contaminado (arts. 27 y ss. Ley 10/1998, de 21 de abril, de Residuos). En este trabajo se apuntan los problemas de interrelación entre los regímenes de responsabilidad previstos por estas normas y se analizan, de manera más extensa, las diferencias entre los regímenes responsabilidad del Anteproyecto de Ley de Responsabilidad Medioambiental y de la Ley de Residuos.

]]> Fernando Gómez et al. Torts http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/23 http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/23 Thu, 15 Jan 2009 13:35:48 PST El éxito o fracaso de una opa está fuertemente condicionado por la actitud de los administradores de la sociedad target. Su activismo contra la opa, o su pasividad, suelen ser factores claves en el resultado final. La Directiva de opas y el Derecho español -ambos por inspiración del Derecho inglés- sujetan a los administradores a un deber de pasividad, fuertemente contestado, sin embargo, en distintos países y por amplios sectores de la literatura. En este trabajo se defiende que el deber de pasividad constituye -como regla general dispositiva, excepcionable singularmente por los accionistas de la sociedad target- una pieza difícilmente reemplazable del entramado institucional que sustenta el mercado de control de las empresas cotizadas, en especial en el contexto europeo de alta concentración de la propiedad accionarial, opas obligatorias, y posibilidad de opas competidoras. Además, el trabajo se plantea como cuestión central la de la eficacia de tal deber y los mecanismos privados y públicos al efecto. La virtualidad de las acciones de responsabilidad planteadas por los accionistas o los oferentes frustrados, alegando la vulneración de la pasividad de los administradores, se enfrentan a obstáculos intrínsecos muy importantes, que hacen que tal responsabilidad sea remota, cuando no quimérica. Sólo el enforcement público de una institución reguladora de los mercados de valores que sea independiente, con recursos, y capaz de imponer sanciones disuasorias de la trasgresión de la pasividad está en condiciones de implantar esta como norma social de los agentes en el mercado del control societario.

]]> Fernando Gómez Law and Economics http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/22 http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/22 Thu, 15 Jan 2009 13:27:57 PST Termination and compensation after termination are two of the most relevant –albeit not the only ones- dimensions of the long-term contracts through which distribution chains are formed and structured. The EC rules that establish a regime of compensation after termination are studied in this paper, in particular, the Commercial Agents Directive. Then, compensation after termination is analysed from the economic perspective, highlighting the importance of the open-ended nature of a relationship, termination as a disciplining mechanism against non-verifiable breach of distribution contracts, the problem of specific investments and the covenants not to compete. The contrast of the examined EC rules with the theoretical findings of the Law and Economics literature dealing with the matter does not offer a promising view of their likely consequences for the contractual behaviour of the parties.

]]> Fernando Gómez Law and Economics http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/21 http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/21 Thu, 15 Jan 2009 13:23:49 PST Fernando Gómez Constitutional Law http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/20 http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/20 Thu, 15 Jan 2009 13:15:55 PST Fernando Gómez Torts http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/19 http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/19 Thu, 15 Jan 2009 12:02:55 PST The current enterprise of designing and making politically feasible a European Contract Law requires more ambitious goals than just introducing technical improvements in the acquis and smoothing the functioning of the internal market. The paper presents a position of the substantive goals of European Contract Law, from an economic approach to legal rules and institutions, linked to the promotion of the joint economic welfare of the contracting parties. In this respect, economic thinking tends to be more sceptical concerning the ability of Contract Law to bring about wealth redistribution policies than most legal scholars are. In the paper, the optimal scope of European Contract Law that is tentatively defended hinges upon inter-firm transactions, although keeping in mind the nature of consumer protection legislation as a regulatory framework to correct the informational market failures in consumer markets.

]]> Fernando Gómez Law and Economics http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/18 http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/18 Thu, 15 Jan 2009 11:58:42 PST Fernando Gómez Torts http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/17 http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/17 Thu, 15 Jan 2009 11:37:55 PST Fernando Gómez Torts http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/16 http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/16 Thu, 15 Jan 2009 11:27:40 PST Fernando Gómez Torts http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/15 http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/15 Thu, 15 Jan 2009 08:01:17 PST Fernando Gómez et al. Corporate Law http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/14 http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/14 Thu, 15 Jan 2009 07:59:09 PST Directive 2005/29 on unfair commercial practices constitutes an ambitious attempt at building a general regulatory framework for firm actions towards consumer in the marketplace. The declared objectives of the Directive, namely consumer protection and eliminating barriers for the internal market, do not seem to provide enough support for such an overreaching legal intervention. The paper explores whether other rationales can justify the new rules and critically examines the scope and the tools to determine unfairness in commercial practices. From an efficiency perspective, Directive 2005/29, although not devoid of merit and interesting solutions, is lacking both in terms of over-optimism in regulating practices that differ widely across markets for a whole range of goods and services, and disregarding several factors that greatly affect the necessary cost-benefit analysis for the major regulatory options.

]]> Fernando Gómez Law and Economics http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/13 http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/13 Thu, 15 Jan 2009 07:57:33 PST Should We Trust the Gatekeepers? Juan-José Ganuza Fernando Gómez Pomar 13/10/2005 Auditors’ and Lawyers’ Liability for Clients’ Misconduct In the aftermath of the corporate scandals that reached headlines worldwide in the first years of this decade (Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat) investors, and the general public, reacted with surprise at first, and then with indignation. Politicians, regulators, and lawmakers felt the pressure to increase and strengthen the range of measures to combat corporate misconduct and fraud. Probably the most ambitious and extensive legislative reaction to the problem, and the best-known, at any rate, has been the American Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. Some of the proposed or adopted policies to check corporate behavior for the benefit of investors and the public at large deal with general corporate governance issues. In the paper we try to model some of the issues raised by the current system of liability for clients' misconduct imposed upon auditors and lawyers as gate-keeping third-party allies of the public enforcement authorities.

]]> Fernando Gómez et al. Torts http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/12 http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/12 Thu, 15 Jan 2009 07:55:41 PST Fernando Gómez et al. Law and Economics http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/11 http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/11 Thu, 15 Jan 2009 07:52:35 PST Fernando Gómez et al. Law and Economics http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/10 http://works.bepress.com/fernando_gomez/10 Thu, 15 Jan 2009 07:50:22 PST Fernando Gómez Law and Economics