Must We Teach Abstinence? Pensions' Relationship Investments and the Lessons of Fiduciary Duty
Copyright © 1994 by the Columbia Law Review Association, Inc. Reprinted by permission. This Note originally appeared at 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2222 (1994).
Commentators have speculated that pension funds do not act as activist investors because of the constraints of fiduciary duties under ERISA. This note examines the case law under ERISA and the common law of trusts on which it is based and concludes that there are no legal constraints. The institutional incentives of the people who manage pension funds seem a better explanation for their inactivity (assuming that activism is, in fact, cost-justified).
Ethan G. Stone. "Must We Teach Abstinence? Pensions' Relationship Investments and the Lessons of Fiduciary Duty" Columbia Law Review 94.7 (1994): 2222-2266.
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